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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Raymond S. K. Attawia, Ph.D.
Department of Economics
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Evan Anderson and George Slotsve, Co-Directors

The correlation between incomes and democracy is well documented, but the exact
nature of the relationship and direction of causation, if any, is still being debated. The empirical
conceptualization of democracy to include the accumulation over time of social and political
infrastructure upon which economic policy is devised and implemented is a novel and promising
approach. We present three essays that extend our understanding of the relationship between
democracy, expressed as “democratic capital,” and economic growth.
In the first essay, we put together a dataset of various functional forms for democratic
capital, with annotations, summaries, and the correlation among them, and we explore their
properties as measures of democracy. We find that, compared to democratic capital based on a
full scale of democracy index, democratic capital built on the binary form produces a better fit as
a predictor of both the incidence of democracy and of incomes. This result suggests that the
qualitative difference between democracy and autocracy (as opposed to the extent of democracy)
has more explanatory power about the relationship between democratic capital and economic
growth. The correlation between democratic capital and levels of income is positive and

statistically significant but negative and statistically significant in relation to income growth.
This result supports the notion that democratization is a feedback mechanism to higher incomes,
not the initiator of it.
In the second essay, we drop the assumption of zero initial democratic capital as neither
theoretically necessary nor reasonable in most if not all situations. We also vary the depreciation
rate used in the accumulation of democratic capital. Using democratic capital based on the
binary indicator of democracy, we estimate the relationship with levels of income per capita and
examine the fit statics for various combinations. Our results show that the best fit combination
of initial democratic capital and depreciation rate is one that assumes that countries enter the
dataset with a mostly autocratic history. This best fit initial democratic capital is, however, also
greater than zero. Furthermore, we find the depreciation rate that produced the best fit estimates
to be between three to six percent. Depending on the initial democratic capital–depreciation rate
combination, the estimates of the coefficients on democratic capital vary from positive to
negative and from no statistical significance to highly statistically significant estimates. Finally,
the top ranked (by fit statistic) initial democratic capital–depreciation rate combinations have
estimates for democratic capital that are positive and statistically significant in relation to levels
of income but negative and statistically significant for income growth.
In the third essay we test the relationship between democratic capital and economic
growth before and after countries have taken off into industrial growth. We use the best fit
combination of underlying binary indicators of democracy, initial democratic capital (about a
quarter of the maximum possible), and a depreciation rate (4%) obtained in the first and second
essays as our preferred variable for democratic capital. We find that among countries that have
taken off into industrial growth, electoral democracy has a negative relationship with income per

capita before the takeoff into industrial growth in contrast to a positive one after. The
relationship with annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth rate also changes but
the results are not as robust. Our results were sustained for two sets of criteria for takeoff into
industrial growth.
Taken together, our investigations provide further evidence for endogenous
democratization. That is, as countries experience economic growth, the pressure for political
liberalization also grows. That the estimates on democratic capital are positive after takeoff into
industrial growth, but negative before, even while democracy has a generally slightly negative
effect on economic growth may suggest that political reforms consolidate the economic gains of
growth, but do not produce them.
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CHAPTER 1
ON THE ACCUMULATION OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITAL

Introduction
Measurable Democracy
The concept of democracy covers a large number of interactions between governing
authorities and the people they lead. How to measure it in practice is also a complex task. Taken
together, these two facts require that we clarify what we mean by the term at the very outset of
our investigations. Most students of political economy would agree with the broad definition of
democracy as a rule “… of the people, by the people, for the people” (Lincoln, 2014)1. However,
the design of a measure that best captures this concept among countries is debatable. There are
those like Tatu Vanhanen (2000) and Przeworski (2004), who advocate a very narrow measure
focused around elections: “Democracy is a political regime in which rulers are selected through
free and contested elections.”2 Others, like Coppedge et al. (2012), propose measures that
capture its widest possible implications for society (sometimes referred to as “liberal

1

From the online Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014, URL:
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/232225/Gettysburg-Address accessed May 20, 2014.
2
Przeworski, Adam. 2004. “Democracy and Economic Development.” In Edward D. Mansfield and Richard Sisson
(eds.), The Evolution of Political Knowledge. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. p. 3.

2
democracy”), and who would also object to efforts to aggregate the different components of
democracy into a single measure (Coppedge et al. 2012, page 9).3
In this chapter, we adopt the Polity IV Project approach: that democracy can be reduced
to its core characteristics which can be operationalized into a fair estimate of the extent of
democratization within a country4. The Polity IV Project proposes three major characteristics of
democracy to evaluate the democratic or otherwise autocratic nature of a political regime: The
extent of political competition for executive office, the extent and effectiveness of institutional
constraints (direct or indirect) on executive actions, and the nature and extent of political
participation in the political process by all citizens. We adopt these core characteristics and use
the Polity IV Project measure of democracy as a suitable compromise between the potentially
expansive and complex measures of “liberal democracy” and the narrower alternative, that is,
“electoral democracy.”
The Correlation between Democracy and Economic Growth
The correlation between democratic histories of nations and their corresponding real
incomes is easily demonstrated by a simple plot of number of years of democracy against income
for each country (Figure 1).5 Irrespective of the measure of the incidence of democracy, such a
plot generally shows that the lower right-hand corner of the graph tends to be empty, indicating
that countries with long years of democracy also tend to be wealthy. However, whether there is

See Coppedge et al. 2012, “A New Approach to Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy,” Paper presented by
Michael Coppedge and Jan Teorell at the 3rd International Conference on Democracy as Idea and Practice,”
(Vanhanen, 2000) University of Oslo, Norway, 12-13 January 2012, as a proposal for a new database on democracy.
4
Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers & Ted Robert Gurr. 2010. Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual. Center for
Systemic Peace: Polity IV Project., p. 18.
5
Persson and Tabellini (2009) also plot this graph; Acemoglu (2009, p. 833) also asserts this long-term correlation.
3

3
a causal relationship between the two, and, the direction of possible causality are still open
questions.

Figure 1: Democratic Experience and GDP per Capita
Note – The figure shows a plot of number of years of democracy against 2010 GDP per capita for selected countries.
Years of democracy are the sum of a dummy variable for the democracy index (Polity2 in Polity IV Project
database, version 2011) where 1 is assigned for all positive values and 0 otherwise. GDP per Capita are in 2005
United States dollars; BEL=Belgium; CAN=Canada; CHL=Chile; Col=Colombia; DNK = Denmark; FRA=France;
GBR=Great Britain; GER=Germany; GRC=Greece; JPN=Japan; KOR=South Korea; NOR=Norway; NZL=New
Zealand; SGP=Singapore; TWN=Taiwan; USA=United States; SWE=Sweden; Source–GDP per Capita data is from
The Maddison Project: accessed at www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm, version 2013 accessed December 17,
2013.

Figure 2 illustrates the possibilities for the direction of influence between regime types
and macroeconomic outcomes. The factors and the macroeconomic outcomes that they
influence are separated into three groups. At the center are socio-economic preferences:
constitutional arrangements (for example, detailing the presence and extent of a democratic
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versus an autocratic system of government), which influence political outcomes and a menu of
long-term national economic policy set. The middle ring represents economic activities that
these institutional arrangements regulate, facilitate, coordinate, or otherwise influence.
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Figure 2: Macroeconomic Outcomes in a Political Economy Environment

The outermost circle represents the outcomes that result from such economic activity:
GDP and GDP growth, Human Development Index, Productivity, etc. However, this narrative
could just as easily be rearranged. For example, macroeconomic outcomes (outer ring) from
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economic activity (middle ring) can dictate the preferred economic policy, political outcomes,
and national preferences at the center. Moreover, the figure also allows for the possibility that
the direction of influence can be self-reinforcing in both directions.
The Arguments For and Against a Positive Relationship
In addition to the debate about the direction of causation is the nature of the influence:
Does democracy have a positive influence on income levels and/or income growth or is it
negative? Theoretical arguments have been made for a positive relationship between democracy
and income and income levels and in both directions of causation.6 It has been argued7, for
example, that democracy is good for economic growth because at its core, democracy (meaning
ability of citizens to influence and participate in the choice of national leadership and of national
economic policies) rewards only good economic performance and that this dynamic should result
in long-term efficiency for the macro economy. Advocates of this view also suggest that
democracy may be more politically stable since it offers a practical and potentially more peaceful
method for addressing distributional conflicts, which is good for investor confidence and
subsequently long-term growth8. Finally, some advocates9 also see in democracy the potential
for investments in human capital (better education, health, access to resources), that would lead
to greater long-run productivity.

6

See Sirowy and Inkeles [1990] and Przeworski and Limongi [1993] for surveys of theories that relate democracy to
economic growth.
7
See Rivera-Batiz (2002) for an example of this line of argument and (Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009) for a
relatively more recent assessment of the debate around the issues of democratization and economic growth.
8
Gerring et al. (2005) also reach this conclusion in their work.
9
See Rodrik (2000), Sierrmann (1998), and Helliwell (1992) as examples of this view.
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On the other hand, critics of this perspective10 argue that the same dynamic that allows
citizens to influence better outcomes for the country as a whole could be utilized by special
interest groups (ethnic, commercial, traditional, religious, regional, etc.) to pursue policies that
advance parochial interests in place of the long-term economic well-being of the country.
Another source of potential inefficiency in a democracy is that it is possible for the
electorate (citizens as a whole) to be myopic and use a democratic system of government to
promote policies that favor present consumption over sound investment for enhanced
productivity in the future. Finally, a democratic system of government may also require more
frequent elections, which are resource intensive. In this view, those who seek to influence
electoral and policy outcomes often divert vital resources away from investments and
productivity to electioneering and lobbying for special interests, all of which could represent a
significant drain on the long-run growth of the economy. From this point of view, democracy
might actually compromise long-term planning, and investments necessary to spur continued
economic growth.
The Empirical Evidence
Empirical research concerning the direction of causation is inconclusive.11 Note that in
Figure 1, although there are hardly any countries in the lower right-hand corner, there are a

10

A counterfactual of the line of argument that democracy keeps policy makers accountable and therefore produces
better outcomes is the historical fact that practically all of the “Asian Tiger” countries experienced their rapid
growth under dictatorships. Furthermore, China’s recent rapid growth (from 1979 to the present) while remaining an
authoritarian state contradicts the notion that democracy could be a condition (not even a necessary one) for
economic growth. Also see Haggard and Kaufman (1995).
11
A Good example is Singapore, which is not known to have any directly and easily marketable natural resource
wealth such as oil, but which nevertheless posts among the highest GDP per capita in the world at $42,784 in 2010
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significant number of countries in the upper left corner. Furthermore, some countries with
shorter democratic histories (Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea) post impressive real incomes
even when oil wealth and/or the abundance of other natural resources are taken into
consideration. In Kurzman et al. (2002), for example, of 47 studies reviewed, 19 found a
positive relationship, 6 found a negative relationship, and 10 reported no statistically significant
relationship, while the rest found a combination of results depending on the sample and
specification.
Democratic Capital: The Variable of Choice
Before Gerring et al. (2005),12 practically all empirical studies treated democracy as the
indicator of a nation's democratic credential at a point in time much in the same way that price
signals value in a competitive market13. However, they (Gerring et al., 2005) point out that
democracy is more than a mere fixed period’s indicator of the state of a nation's political regime.
They argue that democracy should instead be seen as the accumulation of institutional
infrastructure over time not only for its influence on past economic policy, but also in the
building up of new institutions that learn how to effectively manage such a system into the
future. In this way democracy acts like the social infrastructure for effective economic policy.
In their paper, they find that this historical accumulation of democracy–democratic capital–has a
positive effect on wealth and the economic growth of nations. We consider this a very credible
and realistic approach to the study of the effect of democracy or autocracy on economic growth.

(expressed in current 2014 United States Dollars); source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD,
accessed May 5, 2014.
12
Gerring et al. (2005).
13
See Kurzman et al. (2002).
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To the best of our knowledge since Gerring et al. (2005), only three further attempts have been
made to investigate the relationship between democracy and income using this historical
perspective. Altug et al. (2008) found significant impact for Turkey’s long-run growth using
democratic capital, while Lisa Verdon (2008) also saw a positive impact for democracy although
the magnitude of the impact is conditioned on the specific measure of democratic capital.
Persson and Tabellini (2009) have argued for different effects of this “democratic capital”
depending on whether or not a nation is more naturally suited for democracy.
From the perspective of the present study, this important use of accumulated experience
with democracy as the variable of choice to study the relationship with income and growth
deserves further investigation. Towards this end, we have put together a dataset for the
accumulation of democratic capital of various formulations and definitions which can be made
available for future research. We have also made preliminary estimations using our democratic
capital dataset, including estimation of the effect of democratic capital on income and income
growth built on the transform of the democracy index that resulted in the best fit in predicting the
incidence of democracy.
The Choice of Democracy Database
For our computation of democratic capital, we chose datasets that are free and readily
available to the public, namely the Polity IV Project, Freedom House, and the Professor Tatu
Vanhanen (2000) datasets. The Polity IV Project dataset serves as the primary source while the
other two sources provide supplementary information.14

14

The Polity IV Project does not cover countries whose 2006 population is less than half a million.
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This choice of the Polity IV Project as the primary dataset is based on several factors.
First, Polity IV has a concise and yet adequate concept of democracy. It is a practical
compromise between measures of strictly electoral democracy and of fully liberal democracy. 15
The latter extends to a much larger set of citizenship rights (civil liberties), including freedom of
the press, freedom of speech, the right to peaceful protests, the independence of the Judiciary,
etc., whereas the former is overly reductive. The Polity IV Project narrows the definition of
democracy to its essentials – Executive Recruitment, Executive Accountability, and Political
Participation/Competition, making it more amenable for empirical research and analyses while
maintaining the non-electoral characteristics which are also fundamental to the concept.
Second, the Polity IV Project has very broad coverage in terms of the number of
countries (over one hundred and sixty in its latest edition – 2012) and the extent of coverage in
time. A slight weakness in this regard, however, is that it does not include countries with a 2006
population of less than half a million people. We therefore supplement for this gap whenever
possible with information from the two other datasets, namely Freedom House political rights
data and Professor Vanhanen's dataset. The Polity IV Project database is also quite extensive,
going back all the way to 1800 for some countries.
Finally, we chose Polity IV as the primary dataset because of its growing reputation in
the field (Hadenius & Teorell, Assessing Alternative Indices of Democracy, 2005)16. Its intercoder reliability tests introduced in 2000 have much to recommend it to researchers who are

Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers & Ted Robert Gurr. 2010. Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual. Center
for Systemic Peace: Polity IV Project.
16
See Hadenius and Teorell (2005), who, after surveying the properties of various indices, confirmed the Polity IV
Project and the Freedom House Political Rights Indices as the best available at the time of publishing. We have seen
no other assessment to date that has contradicted this finding. See also Coppedge et al. (2012).
15
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seeking a quantitatively rigorous and objective measure of democracy. It is probably the most
widely used dataset on political regimes.
The other two datasets serve an additional function as supplements to the Polity IV
Project database. In the calculation of a continuous time series of democracy indexes we refer to
as democratic capital, no breaks are allowed. Therefore, when for procedural and practical
reasons, there are missing observations in the Polity IV Project dataset and/or where they chose
to record certain observations as effectively missing, we glean information from the other two
datasets, giving priority to the Freedom House dataset, which has a similar conceptual
framework.
The unique contribution of this section of our study is that researchers can find in one
place a variety of democratic capital measures, complete with country notes describing the
operational choices made at each point, with summaries, a correlation matrix among them,
programming codes, and any information pertinent for the calculation of democratic capital of
each country. We also show that it is statistically more preferable to build democratic capital
based on the binary indicators of democracy than on the full scale indexes. Finally, for the first
time in the literature, we investigate the properties of measures of democratic capital that is
calculated relative to the frontier value, that is relative to the maximum in the dataset (that is, to
the world leaders’ observation) or to the theoretical maximum.
In the next section, we present a brief overview of the literature in the field followed by
section three, in which we present a brief description of each dataset used in the building up of
the measures of democratic capital. In section four, we describe our research method.
Specifically, we detail the rules for building the dataset and the approaches we used in estimating
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the best fit type of index used to estimate the relationship between democratic capital and
incomes and income growth. Section five presents our results followed by a discussion of those
results and our conclusion and avenues for further research.
Literature Review
Lipset (1959) is credited with the start of research into the link between democracy and
economic growth. He theorized that reasonable minimal economic wealth was a necessary
ingredient for citizens to be able to participate intelligently and peacefully in the political process
as required by democracy. According to him, as countries become more prosperous, the
probability of democratic reform will be higher. Przeworski et al. (2000) called it Endogenous
Democratization, while Acemoglu (2005) referred to this as the modernization theory. Among
the landmark studies since Lipset (1959) are Helliwell (1994), Barro (1999), and Przeworski et
al. (2000).
The Helliwell study, based on 125 countries from the mid-sixties to 1985, found that
there is no direct relationship between democracy and economic growth. Indeed, he found that
overall, democracy has a weak negative effect on income. Barro (1999) studied a similar
selection of countries over a similar time period and found that income positively influences the
onset of democracy. Przeworski et al. (2000) also found evidence that higher incomes increase
the survival of democracy although not the onset of democracy.
Thus, the literature is far from united as these landmark studies suggest. Indeed, whether
the specific study is looking at the effect of income on the onset and/or survival of democracy or
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at democracy’s effect on income and growth overall, there has not been much of a consensus in
the field.
Comprehensive surveys of these efforts can be found in Przeworski and Limongi (1993),
Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), Brunetti and Weder (1995), de Haan and Siermann (1998), Brunetti
(1997), and Kurzman, Werum, and Burkhart (2002). These works clearly demonstrate the
inconclusiveness of the evidence on a causal relationship between democracy and economic
growth. Furthermore, and in addition to Kurzman et al. (2002) cited above, a meta analysis by
Hristos Doucouliagos and Mehmet Ulubasoglu (2008)), utilizing 470 estimates from 81 papers,
concluded that there is “on average, no evidence of democracy being detrimental to growth” and
“no direct effect” on economic growth either.
An important qualification of these results is that there is some consensus on the indirect
effects of democracy on economic growth. Democracies are associated with higher human
capital, lower inflation, lower political instability, and higher economic freedom, which have
been shown to positively influence economic growth and incomes. The indirect effect has been
found to be statistically significant for economic growth in a majority of inquiries, for example in
Barro (1996, 1999), Kurzman et al. (2002), Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008), and Glaeser et
al. (2004). Usually, though, once economic freedoms and other factors are controlled for,
measures of democratic quality fail to attain statistical significance according to Brunetti (1997)
and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005).
The mechanisms for this indirect effect have been posited to include the notion that
democracy promotes political stability, assert Alessina et al. (1996), which fosters investment
and thus growth. Others such as Rivera-Batiz (2002) have suggested that democracy increases
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accountability, reducing inefficiencies and corruption, which can be seen as a kind of tax on
investment.
Scholars have also investigated links of various types between democracy and income.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)17 investigated the possibility that reduced income inequality
might have an impact on income growth (democracies reduce inequality and therefore the
tendency for adverse re-distributive policies). Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) studied the
influence of powerful lobbies under democracies (democracy tends to produce well-organized
special interest and incumbent groups that lobby for preferred, and possibly outdated and
inefficient technologies and thus to effectively kill economic policy designed to encourage the
adoption of improved technologies).18 Persson and Tabellini (2006) found that the specific type
of democracy (parliamentary or presidential; majoritarian or proportional representation, etc.),
and the precise type of voting (direct or indirect, proportional representation, etc.)19 have
explanatory power for the varied impact of democracy on macro-economic outcomes.
The controversies surrounding the direction of causation (if any) between political
regimes and economic growth may also arise from the constraints on empirical analysis of the
issue. There are unique problems that arise from cross-country empirical analyses. The standard
method of statistical estimation of relationship between democracy and economic growth was
pioneered by Komendi and McGuire (1985). It faced criticisms of sample bias, failure to
account for heteroscedasticity, and other shortcomings. Other difficulties including endogeneity
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a).
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b).
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Persson and Tabellini (Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details, 2006).
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and reverse causality (both income and democracy may affect each other), multi-collinearity
(economic and political indicator variables may strongly correlate with each other), serial
correlation, heterogeneity, and omitted variable bias (countries are different) have led to the
deployment of various other econometric methods.
Shen (2002) and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2007), for example, carried out a
successful estimation of the effect of democracy on economic growth using a before and after
event analysis and found that transition into democracy does indeed positively affect growth.
Others have made extensive use of instrumental variables drawn from a country's history.
Acemoglu et al. (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001) used colonial-era settler mortality rates
as instruments for institutional quality while Acemoglu et al. (2005) used past savings rate.
Deana and Gamba (2008) identified structural breaks in the growth path of economies and
regressed the types of breaks (negative or positive) on political regime types to find support for
the positive role of democracy on economic growth.
To the best of our knowledge, Gerring et al. (2005) were the first to point out the
importance of considering the effect of democracy on growth and incomes as long -run
accumulated social stock input to growth, in place of democracy as concurrent indexes for
economic activity. Persson and Tabellini (2009), building upon this concept, use this notion of
democracy (as democratic capital), although they collapse indicators of democracy into a binary
index. This form, while having the advantage of simplicity, nevertheless could lose some
information from the variation in terms of degrees of democratization among countries. Altug et
al. (2008) also show a positive link between democratic capital and Turkey’s long-run economic
performance.
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In this chapter we create various functional forms of democratic capital that show the
remarkable variation that can be obtained from this approach to democracy. We also highlight
the fact that assumptions underlying the choice of democratic history variable have implications
for the results that are obtained. The binary scale of the indexes is also shown to be preferred to
a full scale index for the building of democratic capital. In the next section of this study, we
detail the source of our democracy indexes, and our method of calculating democratic capital
including considerations for maintaining consistent country coverage over time in the presence
of changing political and geographical borders. We also calculate sample variants of democratic
capital accumulation and test for their implications on the relationship with income and income
growth.
Data
There are many datasets on democracy, each with a set of unique strengths and
weaknesses. We chose the top two recommended by Hadenius and Teorell (2005), that is, the
Polity IV Project and the Freedom House dataset, along with Vanhanen’s Polyarchy dataset, for
our democratic capital calculations. Vanhanen’s dataset complements the Polity IV Project
because of the similarity in their country and year coverage. All three datasets are freely
available to the public. Below we provide a brief description of each.
The Polity IV Project
The Polity Project and the dataset that resulted from it arose out of a 1975 concept paper
written by Ted Robert Gurr with Harry Eckstein, titled Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis
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for Political Inquiry (Gurr & Eckstein, 1975)20. The project has gone through four editions, with
the current dataset referred to as the Polity IV Project. The goal of the original project was to
define and track identifiable political regime characteristics of “polities” (Gurr & Eckstein, 1975)
21

in terms of their persistence and survival. The initial unit of measurement was polity-case.

The project responded to the needs of researchers for the dataset to provide a panel of political
regime characteristics of sovereign nations for each calendar year. Starting in 1986, the project
adopted a country-case format. In the current edition, both approaches are preserved but the
project makes no claim about the extent to which a country's central authority exercises its power
within the borders of its internationally recognized territory. One hundred and sixty-seven
countries are covered in the 2010 version, with the longest series dating back to 1800.
At the center of a regime’s characteristics is its legitimacy, which itself is related to three
core features: the recruitment of its chief executive; the constraints of its chief executive, and
participation of the members of the society in the decision-making processes of the state. These
characteristics were used to code each country on two separate eleven-point scales. Some
distinctive features and levels within these three categories were assigned as more likely to be
characteristic of an autocratic system, while others were thought to be more consistent with a
democratic system of government (where it is assumed that citizens have as complete a role as
possible in the recruitment of the chief executive; that there are institutional and substantial
constraints on the executive; and that political participation is open, free, expected, and usually
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Ted Robert Gurr, 1975 with Harry Eckstein, Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975).
21
According to the 2010 Manual, ‘polities’ are like governments and at their essence are characterized by a subset of
members in a society with the ability to set goals and direction on behalf of society. They also control and
coordinate the activity of its members.
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the case). However, researchers quickly put the two scales together to come up with a single
measure of the democratic characteristics of the nation-states. This new variable, called
“Polity2”—a combination of the two, with the autocratic side taking on negative values opposite
the democratic side—is now incorporated into the most recent dataset.
The Polity IV Project is careful to point out that this was not part of the original concept
paper and that they do not necessarily support the view that autocracy is a negation or even the
absence of a democratic system of government. Some data is also lost when the two scales are
combined (for example, a value on the single scale can be produced by several different
combinations from the two scales). Furthermore, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that in many
real-life situations, certain democratic aspects of government could be found alongside autocratic
characteristics in some countries of the world.
A manual is published with each edition of the dataset (the version used in this study is
Polity IV and covers the period 1800 to 2010). The coding of each country's characteristics is
done by trained personnel (“coders”) using standard historical and other original sources
pertinent to each country. External checks have been performed by independent researchers
since the earlier editions, with impressive consistency. The database, along with its detailed
coding guidelines, is available to researchers for scrutiny. Inter-coder reliability tests have also
been designed and used since 2000. Each revision includes updates on these tests in order to
guarantee an ever-decreasing role for subjectivity. New guidelines now allow for documentation
of every change to the codebook or the dataset. Table 1 contains the Polity IV Project
democracy indicators, while Tables 2 and 3 Illustrate Polity2 coding for countries rated as
democracies (Table 2) and non-democracies (Table 3) in 2013.
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Table 1
Polity IV Project Democracy Indicators
Democracy

Scale
Autocracy
Weight
Executive Recruitment
Competitiveness
Competitiveness
Election
2
Selection
Transitional
1
Openness
Openness
Dual/Election
1
Closed
Election
1
Dual/Designation
Constraint on Chief Executive
Executive Parity or Subordination 4
Unlimited (no limitations)
Intermediate Category
3
Intermediate
Substantial limitations
2
Slight to Moderate
Intermediate Category
1
Competiveness of Political Participation
Competitive
3
Regulation of Participation
Transitional
2
Restricted
Factional
1
Sectarian
Competitiveness of Participation
Repressed
Suppressed
Source –Polity IV Project Database, version 2011, URL: T, accessed on December 31, 2013

Scale
Weight

2

1
1
3
2
1

2
1
2
1
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Table 2
Sample of Democracies by their 2013 Polity2 Scores
Country

Democracy
Country
Democracy Country Democracy Country Democracy
Index
Index
Index
Index
Australia
10
Albania
9
Korea South
8
Nepal
6
Australia
10
Albania
9
Latvia
8
Niger
6
Austria
10
Estonia
9
Lesotho
8
Ukraine
6
Canada
10
France
9
Mexico
8
Armenia
5
Denmark
10
India
9
Serbia
8
Ecuador
5
Germany
10
Macedonia
9
Benin
7
Mali
5
Greece
10
Moldova
9
Bolivia
7
Somalia
5
Hungary
10
Montenegro
9
Colombia
7
Guinea
4
Ireland
10
Nicaragua
9
Georgia
7
Ivory Coast
4
Israel
10
Panama
9
Honduras
7
Mozambique
4
Italy
10
Paraguay
9
Pakistan
7
Nigeria
4
Japan
10
Peru
9
Senegal
7
Russia
4
Mauritius
10
Romania
9
Sierra Leone
7
Venezuela
4
Netherlands
10
South Africa
9
Thailand
7
Zimbabwe
4
New Zealand
10
Turkey
9
Zambia
7
Gabon
3
Norway
10
Argentina
8
Burundi
6
Iraq
3
Poland
10
Belgium
8
Guyana
6
Madagascar
3
Portugal
10
Botswana
8
Lebanon
6
Algeria
2
Spain
10
Brazil
8
Liberia
6
Cambodia
2
Sweden
10
Czech Republic
8
Malawi
6
Guinea-Bissau
1
Switzerland
10
El Salvador
8
Malaysia
6
Burkina Faso
0
United Kingdom
10
Ghana
8
Namibia
6
Haiti
0
United States
10
Guatemala
8
Nepal
6
Libya
0
Note. –The table shows excerpts of the Polity2 variable in Polity IV Project database, version 2011, URL:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, accessed on December 31, 2015.
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Table 3
Sample of Non-Democracies by their 2013 Polity2 Scores
Country

Democracy
Index
Tanzania
-1
Uganda
-1
Angola
-2
Chad
-2
Mauritania
-2
Singapore
-2
Togo
-2
Ethiopia
-3
Jordan
-3
Myanmar (Burma)
-3

Country

Democracy
Index
Rwanda
-3
Tajikistan
-3
Cameroon
-4
Congo Brazzaville
-4
Egypt
-4
Fiji
-4
Morocco
-4
Sudan-North
-4
Equatorial Guinea
-5
Gambia
-5

Country

Democracy
Index
Kazakhstan
-6
Azerbaijan
-7
Belarus
-7
China
-7
Cuba
-7
Eritrea
-7
Iran
-7
Kuwait
-7
Laos
-7
Vietnam
-7

Country

Democracy
Index
Oman
-8
Turkmenistan
-8
UAE
-8
Swaziland
-9
Syria
-9
Uzbekistan
-9
Bahrain
-10
Korea North
-10
Qatar
-10
Saudi Arabia
-10

Note. –The table shows excerpts of the Polity2 from the Polity IV Project Database, version 2011, URL:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, accessed on December 31, 2015.

Freedom House
Our secondary dataset of choice for the accumulation of democratic capital is the
Freedom House dataset. We use it to provide information where there are gaps in the Polity IV
Project dataset. The Freedom House dataset was started by Raymond Gastil in the 1950s. The
first annual published report was released in 1975 for the year 1972. The version used in this
investigation was released in 2011 and covers 194 countries and 14 territories up to 2010.
Freedom House publishes its assessments of freedom in countries and territories of the world on
two separate scales, one each for political and civil rights. These scales are not combined
formally, but a three-category designation (“Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free”) is made based
on these two scores. Freedom House places emphasis on the experiences of residents within a
country rather than on the spoken and/or written guarantees (constitutional or otherwise) claimed
by that country. The organization relies on field analysts who use a variety of sources (in-person
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country and regional experts, written sources, and organizational reports–local, international, and
transnational, etc.), to respond to survey questions and on the bases of these responses score
points for each country on a predetermined scale. The work of the field analysts is scrutinized by
senior academic and other expert advisers and finally collated by staff. The survey instruments
have not remained static, but the organization claims strong continuity in the data. The
organization defines political freedoms as rights that
enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote
freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join
political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact
on public policies and are accountable to the electorate.22
This definition matches very closely to the definition of "democratic-ness" as defined by
the Polity IV Project. Both series have three core concepts around which countries are scored.
The Polity IV concepts used in the evaluation of democracy are: “Executive Recruitment” (how
the chief executive of the state ascends to his position); “Executive Constraints” (the extent to
which the Chief Executive and State functionaries are held accountable by the citizens); and
“Political Competition and Participation” (how open a country is to political competition and
participation by all its citizens, either through political parties or other non-government
sponsored groups). The corresponding Freedom House concepts are: Electoral Process (which is
quite similar in definition to the Executive Recruitment concept of Polity IV); “Political
Pluralism and Participation” (which is close to the third concept in the Polity IV Project: namely,
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Source: Freedom House, 2011, Washington, Methodology, Introduction; http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom,
-world, -2011/methodology#.U2h22lea_, -I accessed May 5, 2014.

22
Political Competition and Participation); and the “Functioning of Government” (which is the
equivalent of the Executive Constraints in the Polity IV Project).
The Freedom House scales of political and civil rights each range from zero to seven,
with lower scores corresponding to high levels of political rights. This is a condensation of 40
total possible points that can be obtained from responses to survey questions that capture
different characteristics of the political regime in a country.
One advantage in using the Freedom House dataset as backup is that, unlike the Polity IV
Project, it does not place any constraints on the population size of the countries that are included
in the dataset. Quite a number of smaller countries are not only independent and sovereign
nations (many since 1972), but their population size has little resemblance to their economic
influence and significance on the international stage23. Furthermore, whereas the Polity IV
Project often codes observations as missing if there is an interruption or interregnum, Freedom
House—because of its reliance on the perceptions (through on-the-ground surveys) of resident
experts and citizens—can code the extent of political rights even at such times. The similarity in
concepts at the core of both scales make conversion between scales a simple matter of
extrapolation, as detailed in Table 32 of Appendix D.

23

For example, Malta, Luxemburg, and Liechtenstein all have populations under half a million, but nevertheless
have an impressive showing, each with a per capita income of over 50,000 dollars. The trends in their regime
characteristics might shed light on the overall picture of how democracy relates to income within countries.
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Polyarchy Dataset by Tatu Vanhanen24

Our third dataset of preference is one originally produced by Professor Tatu Vanhanen of
the University of Helsinki, Finland. This study uses version 2 released in 2000, and covers the
period 1810-1998 (Vanhanen, 2000)25, for over 187 countries26. As detailed below, the dataset is
operationally different from the other two and is therefore incorporated into our calculations only
when both the Polity IV Project and Freedom House datasets are missing observations over a
significant length of time.
The definition of democracy by Vanhanen is similar enough to the other two datasets:
“. . . a political system in which ideologically and socially different groups are legally entitled to
compete for political power and in which institutional power holders are elected by the people
and are responsible to the people” (Vanhanen, 2000). Once again, we see the familiar three-part
functionality of the definition as in the other two datasets: popular elections, political
participation, and accountability of political leaders to their citizens. However, the operational
approach is different in Vanhanen.
Vanhanen seeks to both simplify and remove all subjectivity from the process of rating
democratic-ness of political regimes across countries. To do so, he limits his rating system to
two observables: proportion of votes obtained by opposition parties in elections as an indicator of
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Tatu Vanhanen is professor emeritus at University of Tampere at the University of Helsinki, Department of
Political Science and International Relations., His dataset is referred to as “Polyarchy Dataset”; we shall refer to the
dataset from here on by the name of the author.
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http://www.prio.no/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/Governance/file42501_introduction.pdf, accessed2/03/14
26
Vanhanen, Tatu (2000) “A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998,” Journal of Peace Research,
37(2): 251-265.
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competitiveness and plurality, and proportion of the adult population who vote in elections as an
indication of openness, inclusion, and access by the entire population. These two percentages
are combined in equal weight into a single measure of democracy. The effort is laudable, but the
author acknowledges some of the drawbacks to his approach. Two broad groups of them are
worth highlighting.
First, there still remains a need for some interpretation and subjective judgment call on
the exact application of his system because of complexities that exist in practice. Examples of
such issues include which types of elections are to be included in the index: local, statewide,
regional, or national? Legislative or presidential? Referenda or just elections for public office?
Mid-term elections or not? What role should Proportional Representation elections, or non-party
national elections play? What weights should be assigned to each type of election in assessing
the extent of democracy in a country? Finally, when one or more of these types of issues exist
concurrently, how can the relative power or influence of the office(s) or issues that are up for
electoral decisions be captured by the index of democracy?
Second, whereas the principles outlined by Vanhanen can be used to divide regime types
by country into the broad categories of democracy and autocracies, the dataset is ill equipped to
delve any further into distinguishing between the finer qualities of regimes that are within these
categories. It is therefore safe to conclude that although by definition, Vanhanen's democracy
concept is similar to that of the other two datasets; operationally the dataset is distinct. Based on
this we resort to Vanhanen’s dataset only when information from the other two is lacking, and
when other sources (historical or concurrent) fail to provide alternative observations for specific
countries.
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Research Method
Our first step is to obtain a composite dataset of democracy indexes from which we can
calculate a continuous series of democratic capital for each country. Starting with the Polity2
variable in the Polity IV Project dataset, we supplement it with observations from Freedom
House and Vanhanen datasets, and build a continuous times series of democracy indexes for
each country from the time of independence or the year 1800 (whichever comes later), up to the
year 2010. Then we create variants of this composite index for each country by applying several
monotonic transformations, and compare their statistical properties and correlations with each
other.
Going further, we calculate the democratic capital for each country using the Persson and
Tabellini (2009) framework. That is, we fix the initial democratic capital at zero and the
depreciation rate at one percent and construct and compare the statistical properties of the
democratic capital obtained from the various transforms and their correlation with each other as
well as with the underlying components of each democracy index where available.
Additionally, we compare the predictive power of the democratic capital obtained by the
binary form of the democracy indexes with that obtained from the full scale of the index (and its
transforms) by estimating the relationship between lagged democratic capital and the annual
indexes of democracy.27 These steps allow us to choose between the binary and the full scale of
the index of democracy for the calculation of democratic capital and to select from among the
transforms of indexes of democracy the variant that produced the best fit for subsequent analysis.
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We also estimated the relationship with Tatu Vanhanen’s index of democracy variable (ID), a continuous variable.
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Using the specific transform of the democracy index that provided the best fit in
preliminary estimation of the relationship between democratic capital and democracy indexes,
we ran a regression of log of GDP per capita income(and of GDP per capita income growth) on
democratic capital, controlling for other key variables. As a final step we assess these
relationships using relative democratic capital: that is, democratic capital expressed as a ratio to
some frontier value of democratic capital.
The Consolidation of the Polity2 Index
Our primary dataset for the calculation of democratic capital is the Polity IV Project
dataset, specifically the Polity2 variable. However, for various operational reasons the Polity IV
Project dataset is not as complete as it can be. As mentioned above, it does not provide data for
countries of less than half a million population, and in some cases will code some years for some
countries as missing observations if a country is under international oversight. Democratic
capital, on the other hand, cannot have breaks, since by definition it is a continuous series in
which the current realization is a function of the preceding period’s democratic capital. We
therefore provide for rules for building a complete set of democracy indexes for each country as
far back as 1800 or the year of independence, whichever is later. We describe these rules briefly
here. 28
The order of priority for obtaining missing observations for the Polity IV Project dataset
is to first use the Freedom House dataset (more specifically, the Political Rights variable), then
historical sources for information about the period of the missing observation, and finally the
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Detailed notes are contained in Appendix E for each case of missing observations.
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Vanhanen dataset. This is not as straightforward as it seems in view of the fact that the Freedom
House data series starts in 1972 and is therefore not useful for observations predating 1972.
Freedom House has no limits on population size, however, and is a rich source of information on
smaller nations which for the most part, as it turns out, gained their independence after 197229.
For periods before 1972, we go back and forth between gleaning information from a
historical reading of a country’s democratic experience in order to manually fill in the missing
values, and to using the Vanhanen dataset after the appropriate conversion. The key determinant
of which approach we use depends on the number of periods of missing data, and the presence or
absence of an apparent trend on either side of the gap in a country’s dataset. Generally, we used a
historical reading and manual replacement of missing values when the gap covers four periods
(years) or less.
To convert Freedom House values to Polity IV Project values, we used a simple
extrapolation of the scale to coincide with the Polity2 variable scale in the Polity IV Project
dataset (See Table 32, Appendix D). We developed rules for filling in missing values. When the
gap of missing values is small and there is a trend on either side, we fill in the gap manually in
equal sequential steps. In some cases, (especially when the missing observation is for a one-year
period due to an interregnum) we simply took the average of the observations on either side of
the gap. Please see the appendix for details of all the rules and guidelines for filling in gaps in the
data.
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See Appendix E.
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To obtain missing values from Vanhanen and convert them into Polity2 scores, we
regress Polity2 observations on Vanhanen’s non-missing values using various functional forms
and obtain coefficient estimates on Vanhanen values. We used the functional form with the
highest adjusted R-squared value and used the fitted values to fill in the gaps in the Polity2
series. In some cases, all three datasets have common missing values. In these instances, we
manually replaced the missing values after reading the history of the country during the period,
paying attention to the values on either side of the gaps. It turns out that the only values that
remain missing after the three-step process account for 62 observations out of about nineteen
thousand, or 0.3%.
Finally, using the distributional properties of the dataset, we used a statistical tool to
impute missing values based on at least 20 random draws of the dataset, and estimated the
relationship between incomes and lagged democratic capital for each draw. We then compared
the results with those obtained from the procedure for replacing missing observations described
above. It turns out that the difference in the estimated coefficients is in the order of between 1%
and 12%, with identical statistical significance levels. In this paper, we report the results of the
simplest approach: simply fill in missing values from the two additional datasets (Freedom
House and Vanhanen’s), and from a reading of history where necessary.
Keeping Track of Central Authorities for Calculation of Democratic Capital
The Polity2 variable is designed to capture the regime characteristics of the central
authority defined within internationally recognized country borders. However, those borders are
not static. Wars and political rearrangements have often redrawn those boundaries within which
political power is exercised. Specifically, some countries have absorbed others, while smaller
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ones have also come together to form newer, larger countries. In other instances, countries have
split up into smaller components then come back together to reunite. In earlier eras, colonial
powers controlled territories beyond their geographical boundaries, sometimes contiguous with
them, and in other cases in faraway places across the globe.
To ensure that that the democratic capital variable is referring to the same central political
authority over time, we created guidelines for assigning democratic capital measures through the
various permutations of a country’s political and geographical history. Our rules closely follow
those of Gerring et al. (2005). However, in this paper, we detail every aspect of the operational
decision we made in assigning democratic capital consistently to make it available for future
reference, updating, and possible further refinement (Appendix E).
Generally speaking, a country keeps the democratic capital of the original state when it
breaks off and becomes a sovereign state if (and this is an important condition) it was within
and/or contiguous with the original state. If a country is absorbed by a larger dominant country,
we reckon the smaller country ceases to exist while the larger country’s democratic capital series
continues unchanged. Former colonies inherit the democratic capital of their colonial powers
when they become independent, if the subject country was contiguous with it. Otherwise, the
new sovereign state is assigned a new series of democratic capital. In such a case the relative
age of a country may be a factor in the effect of democratic capital on incomes and income
growth.
It is also possible (as in the case of Germany) for a country to first be united, then divide
and reunite again. In such a situation, there will be a series for a united Germany that is traced
through Germany (up to May of 1949), and West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany, May
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1949–October 1990) and Germany again (1990–present). There will also be a shorter series for
East Germany (German Democratic Republic, 1949–1990) that lasted only as long as that
country was an independent autonomous state. There are other peculiar situations and we
provide the details of each case in the world in Appendix E.
Democracy Indexes and their Transformations
The accumulation of democratic capital for each country is a running sum of yearly
democracy indexes. Building on the raw indexes of the Polity IV Project data, specifically the
Polity2 variable, augmented with observations from Freedom House and Tatu Vanhanen, there is
no limit to the number of possible transformations of the raw index, which one can then use to
calculate democratic capital. Table 4 presents a summary of the various transformations of the
polity2 index used in the calculation of democratic capital. We now detail the various forms
used in this paper.
Raw Index
This is the most basic: we simply take the raw observations as given in the Polity IV
Project database, namely the polity2 variable. The justification for using the raw index is that,
first, it is consistent with the original database. However, if one were to approach the question of
democracy’s effect from a conceptual perspective, this index promotes the idea that autocracy
(negative values) is essentially the antithesis of democracy (positive values) even though we are
using the same ordinal scale to rate regime characteristics. If we assume that depreciation in
every regime type is in the direction of more autocracy (less democracy), then democratic capital
based on this scale is non-stationary. However, in this paper we shall assume that regimes on the
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autocratic side experience “depreciation” opposite to the experience of those on the democratic
side. That is autocracies “depreciate” towards democracy and vice versa.

Table 4
Polity2 Based Democracy Index Transforms by Type
Name

Description

Functional Form

Raw Index

Polity2 variable taken as is

= 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2

Positive Index

Polity2 variable plus ten.

= 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 + 10

Zero-One Index

Positive Index divided by 20

= (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 + 10)⁄20

Exponential Index

Polity2 standardized to between 0 and 1
using a logistic transformation.
Dummy variable equal to 0 if polity2 is
strictly negative, 1 otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if polity2 is
strictly positive, 0 otherwise.

exp(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2)
(1 + exp(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2)
= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 ≥ 0
= 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 < 0
= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 > 0
= 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 ≤ 0

Binary Index
Persson & Tabellini – PT
(2009) Index

=

Note. –The table shows the various transformations to the Polity2 variable that are used in the accumulation of
democratic capital. Polity2 refers to the polity2 variable in the Polity IV Project dataset version 2011.

To obtain democratic capital based on this index, we simply either sum the indexes (total
democracy index), or we sum the indexes at a fixed depreciation to most recent value. The
values of the democratic capital at any point can thus be either positive or negative depending on
the values of the polity2 variable over time.
The Positive Raw Index Transformation
In this transformation, the Polity2 scores are rendered positive by adding 10 to each
observation, shifting the raw scale to between 0 and 20. The conceptual distinction here is that,
unlike the raw index, this transformation allows a rating of regime characteristics on a
continuum; there is really no essential difference between an autocracy and a democracy, except
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that there is a distinction of quantity of the same thing. Depreciation or accumulation of
democratic capital occurs in the same direction for both regime types (towards zero). This index
maintains perfect correlation with the raw index. However, in some instances, the estimated
maximum likelihood is not always the same, although for the most part they maintain the same
signs and more or less same statistical significance levels.
Two other transformations were done to the raw index for the purpose of our study.
Their distinctiveness is to limit the values of the raw index to between zero and one. The limit of
the index to between zero and one makes it easier to express the values as proportions. This
quality is desirable when taking relative values, say, of one country as the leader among all
countries, or some other frontier value.
The Zero-One Raw Index Transformation
This index is the Positive Index standardized to between zero and one. We simply divide
each observation by the maximum possible observations (20). This is expected to be perfectly
correlated with the positive raw index.
Exponential Raw Index Transformation
The Exponential Index is a logistic transformation in which the raw index is transformed
into a positive value of between 0 and 1, by taking an exponent of the value and dividing it by
the sum of the exponent and 1. This transformation is expected to be highly but not perfectly
correlated with the other functional forms.
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Binary Indicator Transformation
In the Binary Indicator, we assign dummy values to the Polity2 observations as follows: a
value of zero for negative polity2 score (that is, autocratic) and a value of one otherwise (that is,
democratic). Unlike the previous two, there is an additional conceptual relevance for this
transformation. This form of democracy index advances the view that democratic capital is
accumulated only when the index for the current year is positive. At the level of the yearly
indexes, it reduces the scale to an event type outcome. This may be hard to justify in practice
because regime characteristics can be quite fluid from year to year. At the level of the
accumulated indexes (that is, democratic capital), some information is lost when the smaller
scores are discarded. It is also true in practice that democracies do emerge out of dictatorships
(The “Arab Spring” in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, etc. since 2011 are recent examples),
supporting the notion that other underlying forces may be at play that are moving countries
towards reform even under autocratic regimes.
We preserved two approaches to this coding. The Polity2 values are coded one if they
are strictly positive; otherwise, Polity2 values are coded zero. This is the approach in Persson
and Tabellini (2009). We refer to this binary index as the “PT Binary Index.” We also preserved
a different form of the index by coding zero only for observations that are strictly negative.
Accumulation of Democratic Capital
As we noted above, democratic capital is really a running sum of the yearly indexes.
However, several considerations need to be noted.
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Total Indexes (Raw Sums)
The most basic type of democratic capital is a running sum of the yearly democracy indexes (i.e.,
zero depreciation). This calculation based on the raw index and the various transforms can serve
as a benchmark against which to evaluate the other formulations. However, in this form—in
which no depreciation is allowed—the series is non-stationary. One advantage of this type of
accumulation is that it is better suited to calculate proportional changes in democratic capital
around any reference point.30
Democratic Capital (Accumulated Indexes with Depreciation)
In this formulation, the stock of capital accumulated at the most recent period is allowed
to depreciate by fixed percentage and then the democracy index of the current year is added.
There is a rationale for this form of accumulation. First, this formulation recognizes that office
holders have an incentive to try to circumvent existing institutions that safeguard democracy
(rules and regulations ensuring electoral competition, executive constraint, political competition,
and participation for the effectiveness of democratic governance) if it will increase their chances
of prolonging their stay in office and/or collecting more economic and political rent. The longer
a certain set of rules and regulations exists, the more likely it is for political actors to find ways
around it. As such, one can imagine that the effectiveness of democratic institutions is
continually being depleted with time (hence a depreciation of democracy) and therefore
investments of resources are required in each current period to upgrade, refine, and freshly

30

Democratic capital accumulation with depreciation imposes an asymptotic maximum, and thus a natural decay in
proportional change. Running sums do not have this problem. As further research we use this property to assess
and compare the proportional change in democratic capital around the takeoff into industrial growth.
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enforce its application. On the negative side of the raw scale, we are also assuming that
depreciation takes the form of a push by the citizens for more voice and participation in the
political systems of a country, leading to more democracy.
Second, by allowing for depreciation, this construction imposes an asymptotic maximum
and minimum31 for democratic capital accumulation. This is appropriate, because democracy is
an institutional arrangement defined by a fixed set of characteristics as dictated by theory and the
operational guidelines of the datasets we are using. In practice, it should be reasonable that in
time societies that make strong and continuing efforts to improve their systems of democracy
will get close to a state where all of the characteristics are in place and are operating routinely.
At such a state, further investments in democracy will be needed only to counter efforts by office
holders and other groups to subvert institutional democracy. This can be regarded as the
equivalent of a steady state of capital in the standard Solow Growth Model.
A case can be made that many western industrialized countries are close to or
approaching this steady state. For many of these countries, occurrences of dramatic reforms to
their political systems of democracy are uncommon, while at the same time many if not all of the
characteristics listed in the criteria for democracy are clearly to be seen in these countries.
However, we hasten to emphasize, as in the case of physical capital, that this is a dynamic, not a

31

In the case of an all-negative value for any specific panel, equally so we assume there is an asymptotic minimum.
The rationale for this is that first, just as on the positive side of the scale, it is impossible in practice to have
infinitely increasing totalitarianism. At the same time, it is also plausible to assume that a totalitarian regime’s grip
on power weakens with time unless it revises and renews the methods used to maintain its grip on power.
Incidentally, a cursory review of the history of dictatorships around the world indicate that such regimes are often
challenged either by movements of the citizens from the ground up or by some other source of non-ruling class
threats to their power. It is therefore proper that on the negative end of the range, depreciation is allowed to erode
authoritarianism, while on the positive side it erodes democratic values.
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static equilibrium. These societies are by no means perfect, and attention must continually be
given to ensure that these systems are not weakened by office holders or strong special interest
groups.
Third, depreciation allows for democracy indexes of more recent years to have a greater
influence on current outcomes than that of distant democratic achievements.32 Intuitively, a
country’s recent experience with democracy will tend to have a stronger weight over the current
policy choices even if we allow that earlier decisions also set trends for future policy.
A possible disadvantage of using a depreciated accumulation of democratic capital occurs
when there is a need to measure proportional changes over time around specific reference points.
By construction, the steady-state properties of this formulation imply that proportional changes
in democratic capital will be confounded with those coming from other influences in the
economy. Equation 1 is the mathematical formulation for the accumulation of democratic
capital.
Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 .

(1)

where Dcapi,𝑡 is the calculated democratic capital at time 𝑡, for country 𝑖, 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 is the
observation of democracy index at time 𝑡 and ρ is the depreciation rate of democratic capital
applied to the most recent period’s value. Table 5 presents a summary of democratic capital for
selected countries for the various transforms of the democracy scale and assuming zero initial
democratic capital with a depreciation rate of 1%.

32

A point that Persson and Tabellini (2009) also make in their investigation.
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Table 5
Democratic Capital in 2010 for Selected Countries at 1% Depreciation Rate
Country

Raw Index Positive

United States
Switzerland
Canada
United Kingdom
Australia
France
Sweden
India
South Africa
Germany
Botswana
Korea South
Pakistan
Turkey
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Ukraine
Mexico
Cuba
Egypt
Syria
Libya
Iraq
Korea North
Russia
Iran
China

861.81
809.54
725.76
720.58
675.55
533.60
501.32
398.39
349.07
345.56
259.07
79.67
44.65
10.59
-24.75
-37.00
-173.28
-200.13
-256.11
-259.94
-308.60
-310.68
-368.74
-434.40
-467.72
-559.96
-575.59

1744.24
1619.08
1495.23
1603.01
1351.11
1416.03
1383.75
883.25
993.91
1227.99
635.54
559.33
529.51
893.02
388.21
370.03
426.04
654.67
416.17
339.38
191.57
153.05
222.44
45.26
414.71
322.47
306.84

Zero-One Exponential Binary
87.21
80.95
74.76
80.15
67.56
70.80
69.19
44.16
49.70
61.40
31.78
27.97
26.48
44.65
19.41
18.50
21.30
32.73
20.81
16.97
9.58
7.65
11.12
2.26
20.74
16.12
15.34

88.22
80.95
76.84
83.13
67.55
74.76
64.79
46.97
63.68
62.28
37.56
29.03
27.53
46.66
20.34
18.93
19.74
22.99
20.54
9.55
6.91
1.04
2.34
0.01
19.13
11.02
0.61

88.24
80.95
76.95
82.95
67.56
73.87
64.84
46.91
64.48
64.19
37.65
29.32
30.19
45.88
21.15
21.34
20.64
24.45
22.53
11.43
7.14
1.99
1.97
0.00
19.64
12.47
0.37

PT Binary
88.24
80.95
76.95
82.95
67.56
73.87
64.48
46.91
64.48
64.19
37.65
29.32
27.87
45.47
19.44
17.85
18.84
17.38
21.40
11.43
7.14
0.00
1.97
0.00
18.03
6.21
0.37

Note. – The table shows democratic capital (Dcap) for selected countries as calculated by the author.
Democratic capital is the running sum of the annual democracy indexes by country with the most recent
period’s democratic capital discounted at 1%. Initial (i.e., starting) democratic capital is assumed to be zero.
Positive is the Polity2 value (Raw Index) plus 10. Zero-One index is the Polity2 value plus 10 divided by 20.
Exponential Index is a ratio of the exponent of the Polity2 value to the sum of the exponent of the Polity2
value and 1. Binary Index is a dummy variable, equal to zero for values that are strictly negative and 1
otherwise. PT Binary Index is the Persson and Tabellini (2009) dummy variable equal to one for strictly
positive values and zero otherwise. Source: Polity IV Project (version 2011) dataset supplemented with
observations from Freedom House (version 2011) and Tatu Vanhanen’s (2012) Polyarchy datasets.
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Democratic Capital as a Predictor of Democracy
We fix the depreciation rate at 1% and an initial democratic capital at zero33 and estimate
the relationship between lagged democratic capital as calculated in this paper, and an indicator of
democracy from an independent but similarly well-regarded dataset–Alvarez et al. (2005). We
extended this estimation to other indicators of democracy such as Tatu Vanhanen’s Index of
Democracy (ID) and to the in-sample binary indicators and full scale indexes of democracy as
described above. Using the results from these estimations, we identify the underlying index for
the accumulation of democratic capital that gave the best fit based on maximum likelihood and
Akaike’s information criteria (AIC), and Stata calculated r-squared within statistic.
The estimation equation is:
d_indexi,t = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏1 DCapi,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2 Incomei,𝑡−1 + 𝑏3 Durablei,𝑡−1 + 𝑏4 InvstShri,𝑡−1
+ 𝑏5 Openi,𝑡−1 + 𝑏6 Age01Dist i,𝑡−1 + 𝑏7 PopGrwthi,t−1 + 𝑏8 GvtConi,𝑡−1
+ 𝑏9 XRat i,𝑡−1 + 𝑏10 InfMort i,𝑡−1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(2)

where
d_index is the democracy indexes from independent dataset, and the subcomponents of
democracy indexes in these datasets,

33

This is from the Persson and Tabellini (2009) estimation. The authors estimated the probability of transition into
and out of democracy and found that the maximum of the envelope of maximum likelihoods of a large number of
possible depreciation rates was always between one and six percent.
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i, t are panels and time indicators, respectively, and
Dcap is the democratic capital calculated using various underlying transformations.
Income is the log of per capita income.
Durable is the durability of political regimes (i.e., number of years without a three-point
change in Polity IV composite score and proxy for political stability,
InvstShr is the real investment share of real GDP,
Open is the openness to trade (i.e., imports and exports as a share of GDP)
Age01Dist is the difference in years between the age of a country and the number of
years needed to get to the maximum democratic capital for the given depreciation rate
(1%) calculated by the author,
PopGrwth is the annual population growth,
GvtCon is the government consumption share of real GDP,
Xrat is the real exchange rate to the United States Dollar,
InfMort is the under-five infant mortality rate, and
𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 is a trend variable.

We also estimated a similar equation, this time using income and income growth rate as
the dependent variables, with the same controls:
Income(Income Growth)

𝑖,𝑡

= 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏1 DCapi,𝑡−1 + 𝛃′𝐗 i,𝑡−1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(3)
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where 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients for control variables, (X) including government consumption
share of income, openness and trade, infant mortality, inflation, investment share of real income,
and lagged levels of income per capita, etc.

Relative Measures of Democratic Capital
A separate framework for the calculation of democratic capital is to express the values as
relative measures. In this regard, one could calculate a measure relative to the world leaders’34
maximum democratic capital at a terminal year in the dataset. Each country’s current democratic
capital can also be calculated relative to that of the concurrent observation for the United
States,35 conditioned on the specified underlying index transformation.
Another relevant approach would also be to calculate democratic capital relative to the
age of a country. Countries with longer histories have a longer time (and presumably more
opportunity) to obtain higher democratic capital scores and therefore a bias in their favor.
Standardizing the democratic capital relative to the number of observations or the age of the
country (i.e., relative to the time it recorded its first observation) would account for this bias.
The number of penalties that could be applied to rescale the imbalance in favor of countries with
longer recorded histories of democracy is uncountable. However, working around the
asymmetry of the Polity2 scale, we use the Positive Index to obtain an age-weighted democratic

34

In this case the United States.
The United States has the highest democratic capital of all countries in the world in 2010 and is closest to the
theoretical maximum.
35
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capital by dividing each democratic capital observation by the square root of the age (or
alternatively multiplied by the fraction of its current age over its total age).36
We summarize each relative democratic capital variable and show how it correlates with
the other variables. Then we run a simple panel fixed effects regression with three different
types of dependent variables: indicators of democracy, income, and income growth using the
various measures of relative democratic capital.
Our estimation equation for income in this case is:
̂0 , 𝜌̂, 𝛼) + 𝛃′𝐗 i,𝑡−1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
Indexi,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏1 Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷

(4)

where 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients for control variables (𝐗) including government consumption
share of income, openness and trade, infant mortality, inflation, investment share of real income,
̂0 , 𝜌̂, 𝛼). It is the
time trend and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. The new variable here is Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷
democratic capital based on best-fit combination (following Persson and Tabellini, 2009) of
̂0 ) depreciation rate (𝜌̂) calculated relative to some other relevant
initial democratic capital (𝐷
value or a feature of a country’s history (𝛼). Table 6 presents a summary of the accumulation
(totals, and “democratic capital”) for the polity2 index and its transforms. Table 7 presents the
various combinations of democratic capital and indexes in relative to that of the United States.

36

It should be noted that the goal of eliminating the bias in favor of countries with more observations could be
achieved in any estimation by including a variable for the age of the country as one of the controls. However, a
democratic capital that captures this relative democratic capital directly from the onset is preferable in our initial
investigation of the statistical properties of various types of democratic capital.
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Table 6
Democracy Indexes and the Accumulation of Indexes
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6

Type of Index
Raw Index
Positive Index
Zero-One
Exponential Index
Binary Index
PT Binary Index

Totals
Raw Index
Positive Index
Zero-One
Exponential Index
Binary Index
PT Binary Index

Democratic Capital Depreciated 1%
Democratic Capital Raw Index
Democratic Capital Positive Index
Democratic Capital Zero-One Index
Democratic Capital Exponential Index
Democratic Capital Binary Indicator
Democratic Capital PT Binary Indicator

Note. –The table shows categories of the measures of democracy used in the text based on the underlying index and
their transformations. Raw Index is the Polity2 index from the Polity IV Project. Totals are the cumulative sums of
Indexes. Democratic capital is the cumulative sum of democracy indexes, with the most recent period’s value
depreciated at a fixed rate (1%). Positive Index is the Raw Index plus ten. Zero-One is the sum of the Polity2 value
Plus 10 divided by 20. Exponential index is a ratio of the exponent of the Polity2 value to the sum of the exponent
of the Polity2 value and one. Binary Index is a dummy variable equal to zero for values that are strictly negative
and 1 otherwise. PT Binary Index is the Persson and Tabellini (2009) dummy variable: one for strictly positive
values and zero otherwise.

Table 7
Accumulated Democracy Indexes Relative to United States Maximum Value
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6

Relative, to the US Maximum
Total Democracy index
Democratic Capital (1% Depreciation)
Raw Index Relative to US Max.
Raw Index Relative to US Max.
Positive Index Relative to US Max.
Positive Relative to US Max.
Zero-One Relative to US Max.
Zero-One Relative to US Max.
Exponential Index Relative to US Max.
Exponential Relative to US Max.
Binary Index Relative to US Max.
Binary Relative to US Max.
PT Binary Index Relative to US Max.
PT Binary Relative to US Max.

Note. – The table shows the categories of accumulated democracy measures relative to the maximum value of the
United States as well as based on the underlying democracy index and its transforms. Relative values are calculated
as ratios to the US (United States) maximum (Max.) value. Relative to US maximum (Max.) is a ratio of the
observed value of Polity2 for a country to the maximum value observed for the United States. It is an indicator of
the distance from the leader or frontier level of democratic capital. Raw Index is the Polity2 variable from the Polity
IV Project. Total Indexes are the cumulative sum of Indexes. Democratic capital is the cumulative sum of
democracy indexes, with the most recent period’s value depreciated at a fixed rate (1%). Zero-One index is the sum
of the Polity2 value (Raw Indexes) plus 10 divided by 20. Exponential Index is a ratio of the exponent of the
Polity2 value to the sum of the exponent of the Polity2 value and one. Index is a dummy variable, equal to zero for
values that are strictly negative and 1 otherwise. PT Binary Index is the Persson and Tabellini (2009) dummy
variable equal to one for strictly positive values and zero otherwise.
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Results
Summaries: Democracy Indexes and Democratic Capital
Indexes
There are almost nineteen thousand observations for democracy indexes and democratic
capital. The minimum and maximum of the indexes are dictated by construction. As one would
expect, the standard deviation of the Raw and the Positive indexes are the same37 and both are
significantly higher than any of the other transformations. The order of magnitude of the
standard deviations of the indexes that fall between zero and one is Binary, PT Binary,
Exponential, and Zero-One Indexes.
Accumulated Indexes – Raw Totals and Democratic Capital
The maximum of total indexes is greater than maximum democratic capital, and the
higher the depreciation rate the lower the maximum democratic capital. Conversely, the higher
the depreciation rate, the higher the minimum democratic capital (Table 8). The order of
magnitude of the standard deviation of the totals of the transformed indexes is the same as the
order among the indexes themselves. Among the underlying indexes the between standard
deviation is greater than the within standard deviation (with the exception of the Binary and the
PT Binary indexes—not shown). At the level of the democratic capital, however, the between
standard deviation is smaller.

37

The Positive index is obtained from the raw index by adding ten.
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Table 8
Extract from Summaries of Democratic Capital at 1% Depreciation Rate
Variable
Raw Index
Positive Index

Observations
18923
18923

Mean
-145.069
516.289

Totals
Std. Dev.
415.061
607.185

Min
-1641.000
0.000

Max
2002.000
4132.000

861.806
1744.236

249.845
499.803

Raw Index
Positive Index

18747
18747

Democratic Capital with 1% Depreciation
-78.484
254.513
-735.2874
342.022
344.670
0 .000

Raw Index
Positive Index

18747
18747

Democratic Capital with 6% Depreciation
-28.15362
119.922
-248.858
162.7124
136.755
0.000

Note. – The table shows excerpts from summaries of democratic capital measures. Positive Index is the Polity2
value (Raw Index) plus 10. The totals are running sums of the indexes. Democratic capital is the running sum at a
fixed depreciation rate (1% and 6% respectively) applied to the most recent period’s value. All calculations are by
the author. Source. – Polity IV Project dataset.

Although the scale of the democracy index ranges from negative to positive ten, the
arithmetic mean of the raw indexes as given by the Polity IV Project Polity2 variable is negative
for the indexes and across all accumulations of the indexes (that is, total indexes and depreciated
totals—democratic capital). It is also true of all accumulated relative indexes: i.e., relative to the
United States measures, the age of the country, and the theoretical maximum of any of the
democratic capital measures.
Correlations
The transformed indexes are all highly correlated to each other but less so with the raw
index. Going from the indexes to the totals, there is also a significant drop in the correlation of
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the transforms with the raw index, but there is an increase in correlation among the transforms
(Table 9). In general, the correlation between accumulated democracy indexes (totals and
democratic capital) of various types with the raw index type is markedly different (lower)
compared to that of the correlation between transforms and the raw index type.
More significantly, the correlation between the raw index and the sub-components of the
Polity IV Project democracy indicators (Autocracy and Democracy) as well as with other subcomponents of the independent dataset (Participation and Competition – for the Polyarchy
dataset, the binary indicators of Alvarez et al. – ACLP) are higher than that for the other
transforms—including the binary indicator (Table 10). This pattern (that the raw index and its
variants have higher correlation with other indicators of democracy compared to the binary
indicators) is, however, reversed in relation to Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy (Table 11).
Generally, correlations among the relative measures of democratic capital (for example,
democratic capital relative to the United State maximum value, or democratic capital relative to a
country’s age) are lower across all types of the underlying indexes (not shown).
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Table 9
Correlations: Indexes and Total Indexes
Index Type
Raw
Positive
Zero-One
Exponential
Binary
PT Binary

Raw
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.9526
0.9096
0.9134

Raw
Positive
Zero-One
Exponential
Binary
PT Binary

1.0000
0.4975
0.4975
0.6321
0.6191
0.6401

Raw
Positive
Zero-One
Exponential
Binary
PT Binary

1.0000
0.6907
0.6907
0.7774
0.7582
0.7754

Positive
Index
1.0000
1.0000
0.9526
0.9096
0.9134

Zero-One

Indexes
Exponential
Index

1.0000
0.9526
1.0000
0.9096
0.9766
0.9134
0.9762
Total indexes

Binary
Index

1.0000
0.9409

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.9551
0.9551
1.0000
0.9325
0.9325
0.9912
1.0000
0.9281
0.9281
0.9905
0.9913
Democratic Capital (1% Depreciation)
1.0000
1.0000
0.9593
0.9371
0.9345

1.0000
0.9593
0.9371
0.9345

1.0000
0.9913
0.9909

1.0000
0.9899

PT Binary

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

Note. – The table shows Pearson’s correlation coefficients among democracy index and their transformations,
among totals of democracy indexes and, among democratic capital calculated from their respective indexes.
Positive is the Polity2 value (Raw Index) plus 10. Zero-One index is the Polity2 value plus 10 divided by 20.
Exponential Index is a ratio of the exponent of the Polity2 value to the sum of the exponent of the Polity2 value and
one. Binary Index is a dummy variable, equal to zero for values that are strictly negative and 1 otherwise. PT
Binary Index is the Persson and Tabellini (2009) dummy variable equal to one for strictly positive values and zero
otherwise. Calculations of totals and democratic capitals are by author. Source. Polity IV Project dataset version
2011.
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Table 10
Correlation among Democracy Indicators
Dem. Indicator
ACLP Binary
Competition
Participation
ID
Autocracy
Democracy
Raw
Exponential
Binary
PT Binary

ACLP Competition Participation Index of Autocracy Democracy
Binary
Democracy
1.0000
0.8381
1.0000
0.4784
0.5045
1.0000
0.7970
0.8778
0.6684
1.0000
-0.8134
-0.8686
-0.4588
-0.7714
1.0000
0.8583
0.8733
0.5254
0.8566
-0.9052
1.0000
0.8578
0.8924
0.5064
0.8368
-0.9726
0.9792
0.8479
0.8839
0.4592
0.7890
-0.9387
0.9499
0.8377
0.8682
0.4548
0.7765
-0.9121
0.9355
0.8288
0.8686
0.4484
0.7707
-0.9157
0.9305

Note. –The table shows Pearson’s correlation coefficients among democracy indexes and their transformations as
well as among the components parts of the indexes themselves. Competition and Participation are the components
of Tatu Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy (ID) variable; Autocracy and Democracy are the components of Polity2
variable in Polity IV (version 2011) dataset. Raw variable is the actual Polity2 variable. Positive is the Polity2
variable Plus 10, Zero-One is the Polity2 variable standardized to a value between zero and one by adding 10 and
dividing by 20; the Exponential Variable is the ratio of the exponent of the Polity2 variable to the sum of the
Exponent and one. The Binary, is a dummy variable corresponding to zero if Polity2 variable is strictly negative
and 1 otherwise. The PT Binary variable is taken from Persson and Tabellini (2009) calculation, which assigns a
dummy variable of one if the Polity2 variable is strictly positive, and zero otherwise. “Dem” is an abbreviation for
democracy. Source. – ACLP is the democracy indicator from Alvarez et al, Democracy and Development Extended
Dataset (2004). Participation (Part), Competition (Comp) and Index of Democracy (ID) are from Vanhanen's Index
of Democracy, version 2.0 (Vanhanen, 2000); Autocracy and Democracy are from Polity IV (version 2011).
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Table 11
Correlations: Democratic Capital and Democracy Index of an Independent Dataset
Democratic
Capital
ID
Raw
Positive
Zero-One
Exponential
Binary
PT Binary

ID

Raw

Positive

Zero-One

1.0000
0.5442
0.5987
0.5987
0.5971
0.5854
0.5894

1.0000
0.6865
0.6865
0.7723
0.7543
0.7711

1.0000
1.0000
0.9554
0.9330
0.9295

1.0000
0.9554
0.9330
0.9295

Exponential

1.0000
0.9915
0.9910

Binary

PT Binary

1.0000
0.9912

1.0000

Note. –The table shows Pearson’s correlation coefficients among democratic capital calculated at 1% depreciation
rate and an assumed initial democratic capital of zero (Persson and Tabellini, 2009). Raw variable is the actual
Polity2 variable. The PT Binary, variable is from Persson and Tabellini (2009); Positive is the Polity2 variable plus
ten; Zero-One is the Polity2 variable standardized to between zero and one by adding 10 and dividing by 20; the
Exponential variable is derived by calculating the ratio of the exponent of the Polity2 variable from Polity IV Project
to the sum of the Exponent and 1. The Binary, is a dummy variable corresponding to zero if the Polity2 variable is
strictly negative, and one otherwise. The PT Binary variable is from Persson and Tabellini (2009) calculation;
which assigns a dummy variable of 1 if the Polity2 variable is strictly positive, zero otherwise. Source. ID (Index of
Democracy) is from Vanhanen's Index of Democracy, version 2.0 (Vanhanen, 2000). The Polity2 variable is from
Polity IV Project dataset (version 2011).

Finally, for each underlying index the correlation across types of accumulation (that is,
going from actual indexes, to their totals, democratic capital, and relative democratic capital) is
almost exactly the same across all transformations of the raw index (that is, Positive, Zero-One,
Exponential, Binary, and PT Binary).
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Regressions: Best Fit Transform for Democratic Capital
Democratic Capital and Incidence of Democracy
Using panel fixed effects estimation, we find that democratic capital is positively
correlated and statistically significant at the 5% level with the incidence of democracy across all
types of democratic capital (relative and non-relative) and for all types of indexes (Table 12
provides an extract detailing the estimates for ACLP binary indicator of democracy as the
dependent variable). However, for gmm-based fixed effects estimation, statistical significance at
the 1% level is produced consistently only in the case of the binary forms of democratic capital
(last two columns). The fit statistics based on information criteria such as log likelihood,
Akaike’s information criteria (AIC), Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) rank democratic
capital calculated from the binary forms of democracy indexes higher than that based on the full
scale of the indexes. Across the dependent variables, the best fit overall in terms of Jansen’s J
statistic p-value (JP), log likelihood and AIC is from the estimation with the ACLP index as the
dependent variable.

Table 12
Democratic Capital by Type as Predictors of Democracy
Index Type
Democratic Capital (Dcap)
Income
Durable
Investment Share
Government Consumption
Trade
Inflation
Infant Mortality

Raw
0.510**
(0.234)
63.100
(68.990)
-10.259***
(2.775)
-30.600
(28.190)
66.200
(47.930)
79.519***
(28.490)
0.024
(0.035)
-0.828
(0.892)

Positive
0.698**
(0.274)
59.100
(68.920)
-10.226***
(2.748)
-30.800
(28.120)
66.400
(47.850)
77.290***
(28.220)
0.025
(0.035)
-0.953
(0.902)

Zero to One
13.962**
(5.477)
59.100
(68.920)
-10.226***
(2.748)
-30.800
(28.120)
66.400
(47.850)
77.290***
(28.220)
0.025
(0.035)
-0.953
(0.902)

Exponential
13.734***
(4.559)
56.400
(67.880)
-10.226**
(2.736)
-29.500
(28.010)
58.800
(48.370)
76.049***
(28.090)
0.026
(0.035)
-0.919
(0.866)

Binary
16.841***
(4.989)
46.500
(67.940)
-10.412***
(2.627)
-27.000
(27.590)
56.100
(47.980)
72.680***
(27.650)
0.025
(0.035)
-0.987
(0.858)

Raw (GMM)
0.196
(0.253)
63.100
(68.990)
-10.426***
(1.029)
11.600
(20.560)
53.975*
(27.600)
68.635**
(27.010)
0.012
(0.028)
0.258
(0.808)

Binary (GMM)
10.583**
(4.901)
46.500
(67.940)
-10.549***
(0.990)
9.3300
(20.000)
46.392*
(27.620)
64.132**
(20.590)
0.012
(0.025)
-0.034
(0.824)

(Continued on the following page)
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Table 12 (continued)
Relative Age
Trend
Constant(𝛂)

02.730
(4.068)
14.374***
(3.284)
-2.545***
(0.855)

Hansen’s J statistic – P-value
Akaike’s Information Criteria -164.600
Log Likelihood
92.280
Rho
0.762
R-squared Within
0.331

6.205*
(3.736)
11.809***
(3.848)
-2.407***
(0.866)
-181.500
100.800
0.663
0.334

6.205*
(3.736)
11.809***
(3.848)
-2.407***
(0.866)
-181.500
100.800
0.663
0.334

04.450
(3.871)
11.474***
(3.645)
-2.241***
(0.853)
-207.300
113.700
0.658
0.339

03.580
(3.934)
10.418***
(3.719)
-1.983**
(0.879)
-250.200
135.100
0.634
0.346

7.882**
7.387**
(48.000)
(3.249)
21.095***
17.412***
(4.221)
(4.989)
-4.038***
-3.385***
(1.128)
(1.136)
0.524
0.631
213.100
101.800
49.430
106.100
0.488
0.631
0.817
0.717

Note. –The table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of 𝐝_𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐱 i,𝑡 = α +
Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time indicators respectively, d_index is the annual index of
democracy for each country, Dcap is democratic capital, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic capital, 𝛃 is a vector of
coefficients on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown after the third row of the first column. 𝛾 is the intercept term for 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables
for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. The dependent variable is from Alvarez et al, (2004). Each model shows estimates of the
coefficients of lagged democratic capital based on transforms of the polity2 variable. Democratic capital (Dcap) is a running sum of
democracy indexes at a fixed depreciation rate (𝜌). That is, Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 . Each series of democratic capital
assumes a zero initial value 𝐷0 and a 1% depreciation rate (𝜌). All estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. The first
five specifications use panel fixed effects, robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. The last two use two-step generalized method of moments
approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time indicator variables for every five year period. The moment conditions are:
𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the instruments. The optimal weighting matrix (the inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The S
matrix (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated using the Newey-West kernel with bandwidth equal to 3. Significance
levels are given by asterisks where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income
per capita due to the individual effects Relative age is calculated as the ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of years since
the first observation in the data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to the steady state of democratic capital (to four decimal
places) under the conditions of perfect democracy index each year. The errors are assumed normal, identical and independently distributed
with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log likelihood calculations. Total number of observations for each specification is
about four thousand.
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Democratic Capital, Income, and Income Growth
Our control variables include key factors such as government consumption, real
investment share of GDP, openness to trade, and infant mortality as a simplified representation
of the health status in the country. The inclusion of the economic freedoms variable significantly
reduces our sample size to about 1500. Reliable data on this and other similar variables such as
government effectiveness and corruption index for most countries have not been available until
more recent times. As such, they generally cover only a short time span in the data. We retain
this variable (economic freedom) in the estimation because much of recent research on economic
growth has focused on institutional quality as a key factor for economic growth. Estimations
without these variables however do not change the statistical significance or the sign of the
estimates on democratic capital.
Democratic Capital and Income
In the lager sample both types of democracy indicators, indexes and democratic capital,
are found to be positively correlated with income and both types have statistically significant
coefficient estimates (Table 13). Fit statistics improve going from annual democracy indexes to
democratic capital (for all types of fit statistic employed – AIC, BIC, log likelihood). The
pattern of fit statistic observed in regressions with the incidence of democracy as the dependent
variable is also repeated: likelihood based fit statistics rank binary democratic capital higher
with an exception: democratic capital based on the full scale relative to a concurrent US
observation as well as relative to a country’s maximum age in the data outperforms that of the
binary type without any change in the ranking of the other fit statistic. The best fit overall is

Table 13
Democratic Capital by Type and Levels of Income
Index
Annual Index
Raw
0.791***
Democratic Capital (Dcap) 3.588**
(1.801)
(0.181)
Durable
6.475***
5.653***
(0.711)
(0.583)
Real Investment
191.002***
178.738***
(20.540)
(21.620)
Government Consumption -109.355*** -119.243***
(31.990)
(32.420)
Trade
-50.100
-42.500
(33.130)
(33.070)
Inflation
-0.027
-0.020
(0.031)
(0.034)
Infant Mortality
2.018***
1.575***
(0.383)
(0.413)
Economic Freedom
Political Stability

Democratic Capital
(Larger Sample Size)
Positive
Zero to One Exponential
0.873*** 17.454*** 10.939***
(0.207)
(4.145)
(2.884)
5.834***
5.834*** 5.909***
(0.584)
(0.584)
(0.588)
175.060*** 175.060*** 179.394***
(21.820)
(21.820)
(21.620)
-116.023*** -116.023*** -120.672***
(32.330)
(32.330)
(32.460)
-42.700
-42.700
-44.100
(33.150)
(33.150)
(33.390)
-0.017
-0.017
-0.018
(0.034)
(0.034)
(0.034)
1.431***
1.431*** 1.661***
(0.430)
(0.430)
(0.410)

Democratic Capital
(Smaller Sample Size)
Binary Raw(GMM) Binary (GMM)
10.688***
0.144
6.572*
(2.657)
(0.314)
(3.963)
5.766***
1.230
1.130
(0.585)
(0.829)
(0.815)
181.626*** 27.100
26.800
(21.00)
(17.10)
(17.060)
-119.600*** -180.093*** -183.701***
(32.270)
(46.410)
(45.740)
-44.300
-68.500
-66.100
(32.380)
(44.520)
(44.060)
-0.0234
-0.019*** -0.020**
(0.029)
(0.070)
(0.080)
1.660***
-0.288
-0.268
(0.409)
(0.983)
(0.987)
132.741*** 133.845***
(25.670)
(25.350)
44.413*** 42.976***
(13.720)
(13.740)

(Continued on the following page)
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Table 13 (continued)

Relative Age
Trend
Constant(𝛂)
Hansen’s J stat – P-value
Akaike’s Information Criteria
Log Likelihood
Rho
R-squared Within

7.310***
0.116
6.178***
6.178***
4.743**
4.429*
-10.500
-10.500
(2.162)
(2.911)
(2.172)
(2.172)
(2.326)
(2.336)
(13.530)
(12.440)
16.732*** 12.983***
10.197*** 10.197*** 12.343**
12.485***
22.899**
20.682**
(1.431)
(1.777)
(2.414)
(2.414)
(2.054)
(1.974)
(3.701)
(3.686)
2.565***
3.907***
3.743**
3.743**
3.502***
3.481**
2.749***
3.119***
(362.400)
(523.800)
(509.500)
(509.500)
(481.100)
(467.400)
(947.000)
(795.700)
0.632
0.640
0.632
0.630
0.642
0.627
0.576
0.571
-830.500
-896.900
-906.300
-906.300
-865.000
-919.000
-2314. 000 -2336.000
568.200
600.400
605.200
605.200
584.500
612.500
1311. 00
1323. 000
0.521
0.721
0.704
0.704
0.674
0.671
0.833
0.865
0.414
0.425
0.426
0.426
0.421
0.425
0.665
0.558

Note. – The table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of Incomei,𝑡 = α + Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 +
𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income is log of per capita income, 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time indicators respectively, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on
democratic capital, 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown after the fourth row in the first column in the , 𝜸 is the intercept
term associated with 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. (𝐷0 ) is initial democratic capital and (𝜌) is the depreciation rate.
Each model shows the estimates of the coefficients on democratic capital calculated from transforms of the Polity2 index in the Polity IV Project dataset. All
estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. Democratic capital (Dcap) is a running sum of the polity2 index at a fixed depreciation rate
(𝜌, assumed 1%). That is Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 . The estimation method is a fixed effects two-step generalized method of moments
approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time indicator variables for every five year period, that is the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 −
𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the instruments. The optimal weighting matrix (the inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix (heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated using the Newey-West kernel with bandwidth equal to 3. The total number of observations in each specification is
about 5,000 for the larger sample and 1500 for the smaller sample—due to the limited scope of observations of the Economic Freedom variable. Significance
levels are given by asterisks where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita due to
the individual effects. Each series of democratic capital is also a function of an assumed initial value (𝐷0 , assumed zero). Relative age is calculated as the
ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of years since the first observation in the data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to
the steady state of democratic capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions of perfect democracy index each year and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in
democratic capital. The errors are assumed to be normal, identical and independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log
likelihood calculations.

54

55

produced by democratic capital relative to the maximum age of a country based on the binary
indicator of democracy (not shown).
In the smaller sample, the estimates are statistically significant only in the case of the
binary democratic capital although all remain positive. The pattern in fit statistic described in
Table 12 (i.e., the binary indicator based democratic capital produced a better fit than that based
on the full scale index), is also reproduced.
Democratic Capital and Income Growth
In the presence of economic freedom and political stability, only the indexes of
democracy are statistically insignificant (Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.).38 All types
of democratic capital have a negative and statistically significant correlation with income
growth. More significantly moving from the annual indexes to democratic capital reduces the fit
across all forms of democratic capital calculated on the two types of the binary indicators of
democracy. However, democratic capital based on the binary forms of democracy index
outperforms that of the full scale index and its transforms, a pattern first observed with the
incidence of democracy (Table 12).
Lagged income levels estimates have their expected signs (negative) consistent with
convergence theory of economic growth. Trade and political stability have positive estimates,
but regime durability39 is negatively correlated with growth. Although the economic freedoms
variable is positively correlated with growth, the estimates are not statistically insignificant.

38

This is also true of the larger sample where economic freedoms are excluded.
Regime durability is a variable in Polity IV Project dataset and is defined as a significant change in the democracy
profile of a country indicated by a three point change in their polity2 index between adjacent years.
39

Table 14
Democratic Capital by Type and Income Growth
Annual Index
Index Type
Raw
Democratic Capital (Dcap)
-0.509
(0.919)
Regime Durability
-1.738***
(0.551)
Real Investment
-7.760
(7.459)
Government Consumption
0.477
(13.510)
Trade
49.470***
(16.370)
Inflation
-0.002
(0.003)
Infant Mortality
0.358
(0.404)
Economic Freedom
14.100
(9.400)
Political Stability
20.402***
(7.708)
Relative Age
22.477***
(5.472)

Raw
-0.655***
(0.168)
-1.328***
(0.506)
-9.770
(7.746)
4.930
(13.880)
44.840**
(17.430)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.254
(0.405)
10.600
(9.948)
20.677***
(7.643)
30.611***
(7.626)

Democratic Capital
Positive
Zero to One Exponential
-0.824***
-16.477***
-9.448***
(0.208)
(4.167)
(2.348)
-1.284**
-1.284**
-1.456***
(0.509)
(0.509)
(0.547)
-10.100
-10.100
-8.220
(8.005)
(8.005)
(7.492)
5.040
5.040
8.320
(14.220)
(14.220)
(14.290)
44.561**
44.561**
45.443**
(17.610)
(17.610)
(17.690)
-0.003
-0.003
-0.003
(0.003
(0.003)
(0.003)
0.271
0.271
0.180
(0.419)
(0.419)
(0.393)
10.400
10.400
10.800
(10.220)
(10.220)
(9.960)
22.137***
22.137***
21.942***
(8.013)
(8.013)
(7.925)
20.055***
20.055***
23.877***
(6.131)
(6.131)
(6.457)

Binary1
-8.872***
(2.205)
-1.554***
(0.574)
-7.750
(7.362)
8.200
(14.360)
46.252***
(17.920)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.188
(0.380)
11.600
(10.040)
22.216***
(8.002)
24.496***
(6.596)

Binary2
-8.032***
(2.019)
-1.432***
(0.536)
-7.390
(7.418)
6.820
(14.100)
45.320***
(17.420)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.233
(0.406)
10.900
(9.846)
20.940***
(7.693)
24.106***
(6.382)
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Table 14 (Continued)

Lagged Income Levels

-189.138***
(24.800)
Trend
13.124***
(2.358)
Constant(𝛂)
-1491.174***
(425.900)
Observations
1500.000
Hansen's J-Stat p-value
0.321
Akaike's Information Criteria -4903.000
Log-likelihood
2608.000
Rho
0.898

-183.812***
(22.820)
16.502***
(3.181)
-2637.506***
(696.500)
1491.000
0.291
-4816.000
2563.000
0.922

-182.740***
(22.710)
18.976***
(3.827)
-2482.676***
(677.500)
1491.000
0.319
-4754.000
2532.000
0.927

-182.740***
(22.710)
18.976***
(3.827)
-2482.676***
(677.500)
1491.000
0.319
-4754.000
2532.000
0.927

-183.790***
(23.150)
16.973***
(3.269)
-2284.925***
(612.600)
1491.000
0.314
-4791.000
2550.000
0.919

-187.296***
(24.120)
17.0226***
(3.307)
-2258.375***
(612.600)
1500.000
0.323
-4821.000
2566.000
0.921

-181.434***
(22.660)
16.243***
(3.095)
-2183.394***
(585.700)
1500.000
0.291
-4844.000
2578.000
0.912

Note. The table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of the equation, Income Growthi,𝑡 = α +
Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income Growth is log of per capita income growth, 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time indicators
respectively, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic capital, 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown after the
fourth row in the first column in the table, 𝜸 is the intercept term associated with 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error
term. (𝐷0 ) is initial democratic capital and (𝜌) is the depreciation rate. Each model shows the estimates of democratic capital calculated from
transforms of the Polity2 index in the Polity IV Project dataset. All estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. Democratic capital
(Dcap) is a running sum of the polity2 index at a fixed depreciation rate (𝜌, assumed 1%). That is Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 . The
estimation method is a fixed effects two-step generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time indicator
variables for every five year period. The moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the instruments. The optimal weighting matrix (the
inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated using the Newey-West
kernel with bandwidth automatically selected by the Newey and West (1994) procedure. Significance levels are given by asterisks where *= p-value
<0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita growth due to the individual effects. Each
series of democratic capital is also a function of an assumed initial value (𝐷0 , assumed zero for this estimation). Relative age is calculated as the ratio of
the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of years since the first observation in the data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to
the steady state of democratic capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions of perfect democracy index each year and a minimal 1% depreciation
rate in democratic capital. The errors are assumed to be normal, identical and independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance for the
purpose of log likelihood calculations.
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Discussion and Conclusion
Some findings of this study stand out and are instructive for all subsequent researchers.
First, the choice of the measures of democracy matters. The choice between indexes, totals, or
democratic capital in our estimation of the effect of democracy on the incidence of democracy
and on income and income growth has implications for the results. Moving from index to
democratic capital for income improves the model fit, but the opposite is true for income growth.
Furthermore, the binary indicators of democracy do better at predicting growth than the full scale
index-based democratic capital. Finally, our results show that the correlation of democratic
capital with levels of income is different from that of the correlation with income growth.
The Choice of Democracy Index for Democratic Capital
It turns out that democratic capital calculated on a simple (binary) indicator variable of
whether a country is a democracy or not, produces better fit and better explanatory power than
the full scale indexes of democracy in relation to the incidence of democracy (based on Hansen’s
J statistic p-value and the r-squared within statistic and Akaike’s information criteria). This
seems to suggest that the presence of democracy over time is a better indicator of whether it
(democracy) will survive going to the next period, not the extent of democracy that has been
accumulated over time. For the most part, the running totals of the democracy indexes do not
show any statistical significance.40

40

That is, accumulation of indexes without any depreciation (not shown).
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Indexes, Democratic Capital, and Income
A remarkable result is that the accumulation of democratic capital calculated on binary
democracy indicators produces a better fit than the raw indexes themselves in relation to income
levels (Table 13). This result confirms the (Gerring, Bond, Barndt, & Moreno, 2005) thesis that
there is a link between the historical experience of democracy and the current levels of income
that citizens enjoy. The result takes the thesis further by showing improved plausibility (log
likelihood) of the correlation and the prediction capability (R-squared statistic) of democratic
capital for levels of income. Furthermore, where democratic indicator based on the raw indexes
hold no explanatory power in the presence of key economic variables of Political Stability and
Economic Freedoms, democratic capital (of the binary indicator type) does.
In addition, the pattern observed with the incidence of democracy (binary forms of
democratic capital produced a better fit) suggests that, compared to the extent of democratization
(democratic capital based on the full scale of the index of democracy), it is the accumulated
qualitative difference between autocracy and democracy that is more significant for the
correlation between democracy and income. Underlying incremental changes which may not
result in whole scale reclassification of regimes from autocracy to democracy and vice versa may
not be as important as a dramatic change into how the polity is organized in a country.
Indexes, Democratic Capital, and Income Growth
The best fit in the estimation of the effect of democracy on income growth is produced by
the raw indexes and the democratic capital based on the binary indicators of democracy. Once
again, it suggests that, while the relationship between democracy and income growth has a clear
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historical element, the effect is episodic–a matter of the essential qualitative characteristics of the
regime type rather than the extent of the overall experience with democracy. As such, it is
possible that when it comes to growth, democratic capital may be a proxy for some other shortterm factor in the policy space, for example economic freedoms, which (as we have seen) is
positively correlated with growth although not statistically significant41.
Relative Democratic Capital
As in the other tests, best fit for democratic capital comes from the full democracy scale
in contrast to the binary indexes (not shown). Absent controls for economic freedoms,
democratic capital relative to a country’s age is statistically significant and positive, and it
produces the best fit followed by those relative to the US observation and maximum democratic
capital. This suggests that any estimation involving democratic capital must control for the age
of the country. It also implies that how far a country’s value of democratic capital is from the
theoretical maximum (distance from the frontier, or from the value of the leading democracies) is
a significant factor in the estimation of the effect of democracy on income and income growth.
On account of this, all estimation of the impact of democracy on incomes and income growth
must also take into account the relative age of a country in terms of how far countries are from
the time it takes to get to the theoretical maximum of democratic capital, i.e., in the presence of
the assumptions about the rates of depreciation and starting (initial) democratic capital.
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The lack of statistical significance for economic freedom may be due to the quality of the data and especially the
smaller sample size available for estimation.
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Conclusion and Further Study
The view of democracy as an accumulation of social-political infrastructure for economic
policy presents an attractive scenario for explaining the positive correlation between democracy
and incomes across countries. Our study raises the possibility that this historical element in the
relationship between democracy and income is distinct from that of the annual indexes of
democracy in that it produces a better statistical fit in the estimation of the relationship. Under
this framework, our results show that the effect that democracy has on income per capita as an
efficiency-inducing system over time is certainly possible.
Furthermore, democratic capital calculated using binary indicators, along with the age of
a country relative to the maximum possible democratic capital or relative to the value of the
leader’s democratic capital, also features in producing a good fit in the estimation. However, the
fact that the relationship is positive for income but negative for growth raises some questions
about the assumptions underlying the accumulation of democratic capital; there may be a need
for a more nuanced approach to the investigation of the relationship.
It is possible that binary democratic capital is a proxy for other episodic factors involved
in promoting income growth or that it is a feedback mechanism to higher incomes. Further
investigation into this difference might lead to fresh insights about the relationship, but there is a
more fundamental need: to examine the way democratic capital is accumulated. In this chapter
we have assumed initial democratic capital and depreciation rates for our estimations without
any specific justification. Those assumptions need to be tested before one can draw any
conclusion about whether democracy is a feedback mechanism or an essential factor in
producing higher incomes. In our next essay, we drop these assumptions and estimate the
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relationship between income and democratic capital to obtain the best-fit combination of initial
democratic capital and depreciation rate as the next step to more precisely determining the nature
between democracy and per capita incomes.
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CHAPTER 2
DEMOCRATIC CAPITAL: DOES THE RATE OF ACCUMULATION MATTER?

Introduction
Not much work has been done on the well documented correlation between the historical
experience of democracy expressed as democratic capital and per capita income since the work
of Gerring et al.(2005), Altug et al. (2008), and Persson and Tabellini (2009). Of these works,
only Persson and Tabellini (2009) attempted to estimate the rate at which democratic capital is
accumulated. However, even they assume an initial democratic capital for each country equal to
zero. It is an assumption that is difficult to justify in most cases.
It would be difficult to assume for example, that there were zero democratic institutions
at the time former colonies became independent from their colonial masters (the time at which
democracy indexes for most of these countries began to be recorded) given that the colonial
administrators had democratic institutions in their home countries. A case in point is that at
independence, the United States inherited and adapted much of its institutional framework from
the United Kingdom. Another example of this phenomenon is India whose first observation for
democracy in the dataset is for the year 1950 even though the country had a long history of
colonial rule during which British traditions and institutions were exported to the country and a
lot of which continue to survive to the present day.
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It would also be hard to imagine that countries which had existed as independent states,
but whose democracy indexes were recorded only after there was opportunity42 and sufficient
data to do so, should assigned zero democratic capital at the first observation in the dataset.
Egypt and Ethiopia for example, have long histories of statehood dating back to before Common
Era, and certainly before the earliest observation in the dataset (1800), but for whom the first
measures of democracy index occurred in 1922 and 1855 respectively.
Accordingly, in this essay, we seek to estimate the relationship between democratic
capital on the one hand and income on the other, to obtain the most plausible combination of
initial democratic capital and depreciation rate given the data that we have. In the process we
answer the question of whether the depreciation rate and initial democratic capital matters in the
estimation of the relationship between democratic capital and income and income growth.
In the next section we provide a brief review of the scant literature on the topic. Sections
three and four present the data and our research method, respectively. The last two sections
present our results, and a brief discussion of the results and avenues for further research.
Literature Review
A simple plot of years of democracy and income per capita shows a somewhat positive
correlation between the two. Lipset (1959) is credited with the first formal study attempting to
explain this apparent link between political institutions and macroeconomic outcomes. The title
of his work conveys his thesis and his eventual conclusion: that there are “Some Social
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Both from the perspective of the capacity of organizations coding democracy indexes, as well as from the
perspective of opportunity for access to the specific countries involved to do these investigations.
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Requisites of Democracy,” among which are economic wealth and a capitalist economy. His
thesis remains one of two main hypotheses concerning the link between per capita income and
democracy—the other being that democracy creates conditions for sustained economic growth.
A third view proposes an indirect relationship.
Since Lipset, literally hundreds of studies have been conducted into the exact nature of
the link between democracy and macroeconomic outcomes. Excellent surveys of the field can be
found in Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Brunetti and Weder
(1995), Kurzman, Werum and Burkhart (2002) and Brunetti (1997). Hristos Doucouliagos and
Mehmet Ulubasoglu (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of 470 estimations from 81 papers in an
effort to extract a dominant pattern among the studies. More recently, Acemoglu (2006, 2009)
has also summarized where he thinks the field stands on the question of the relationship between
democracy and economic growth. The overall consensus in these surveys is that the evidence for
a positive or negative causal relationship between democracy and economic growth is
inconclusive. Notwithstanding this, many of the studies in the surveys seem to indicate an
indirect role for democracy through vehicles of better political stability, human capital, and
economic freedoms.
Among the most quoted studies are those of Barro (1991, 1996, 1999), Przeworski et al.
(2000), and Helliwell (1994). Co-Authors Persson and Tabellini have also written extensively
on the topic. Other prominent studies include Alessina et al. (1996), Rivera-Batiz (2002), and
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Barro (1991) found political stability to be positively related to
incomes, and Barro (1996) found a weak negative effect of democracy on economic growth once
other control variables such as human capital, rule of law, free markets, and small government
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consumption share of GDP are introduced. Barro (1996) also found the effect of democracy on
economic growth to be non-linear: changes at the lower levels of democracy experience enhance
growth but not at higher levels. He also finds that improving economic wealth promote
democratization. Barro (1999) focuses on the direction of causation from increasing income per
capita to democracy: improving standard of living does result in democratic liberalization.
Helliwell (1994) finds a positive effect of growing incomes on democracy, but at best
only an indirect effect of democracy on economic growth through higher human capital and
investments. Przeworski et al. (2000) focus on the onset and survival of democracy and find that
higher incomes do not increase the probability of the onset of democracy. On the other hand
democracy is more likely to survive in wealthier countries once it has started. They also find that
slower population growth under democracies helps to account for the faster increase in per capita
incomes under democracy compared to dictatorships. Persson and Tabellini (2006) have pointed
out that within broad categorization into democracies versus autocracies, there are significant
differences and that they matter. For example, there are differences in the effect of democracy
on economic growth based on whether the specific regime is a parliamentary or presidential form
of democracy or whether elections are decided on majoritarian dominance or on a proportional
representation basis.
The studies mentioned above use annual indicators of democracy or some other proxy to
estimate democracy’s relationship with income and income growth. New ground was broken by
Gerring et al. (2005) when they made the case that democracy should be reckoned as
accumulated social experience (“democratic capital”), not mere annual indicators. Using this
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approach, they found43 a positive effect of democracy (expressed as democratic capital) on
income growth. The main drawback of their work is the limited sample period (1950-2000) with
democracy measures as early as 1900; plus, they assume—without theory or empirical test—zero
initial democratic capital and depreciation rate of 1%. Since then, Persson and Tabellini (2009)
have found differing effects for democracy based on a dichotomy of countries which thrive under
autocracy instead of democracy. Altug (2008) has found a positive effect of democracy on
incomes in the case of Turkey. Lisa Verdon (2011) has also found a positive correlation with
incomes between democratic capital and economic growth across a panel of countries.
Many questions arise in the use of democratic capital as a variable of choice to estimate
the relationship between democracy and macroeconomic outcomes. Some of them have already
been addressed by studies that used this measure, as mentioned above. But many more remain.
Some of these include: How exactly is the democratic capital accumulated? What initial
democratic capital may we assume for countries as they enter the dataset for the first time? What
democratic capital do we assign to countries that have divided and subdivided, merged and then
divided again? Which forms of the annual indicators are to be used for the accumulation? How
quickly is democratic capital accumulated? What other forms of democratic capital may hold
explanatory power in the investigation? What are the influences in the rate of accumulation of
democratic capital? How do these affect the investigation of the link between democracy and
incomes? Some of these questions have been addressed in the first chapter of this dissertation.
However, there are no studies at present that have sought to estimate the initial democratic
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See Chapter 1 in this dissertation.
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capital in combination with the rate of accumulation (depreciation) of democratic capital, which
is the goal of the present study. For example, Persson and Tabellini (2009), Verdon (2008), and
Altug (2008) all assume an initial democratic capital of zero when countries enter the dataset.
There are serious questions to this assumption. It is not reasonable to assume, for example, that
former British colonies inherited zero democratic capital at independence or that when former
Soviet Union countries became independent after 1991, they started from nothing in their
accumulation of democratic capital.
In this chapter we show that the initial democratic capital and depreciation rate
combination does matter in the estimation of the relationship between democratic capital and
incomes. It determines not only the significance of statistical estimates, but even also the signs
of the estimates.
Data
Our data is from the Polity IV project augmented for missing observations with
Vanhanen and Freedom House indexes of democracy44. Income data is from the Angus
Maddison dataset. The other main variables are from the World Bank or its affiliates. The
composite data has 37,000 observations, from 213 countries spanning 1800 to 2010. The panels
are unbalanced (there are just over 18,000 democracy index observations). There were only 19
democracy index observations for the first year of the dataset. The largest increase in
observations occurred between 1950 (105 countries) to 1970 (161 countries).

44

See the first chapter in this dissertation for details about the method of conversion between these datasets.
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In this chapter we focus on democratic capital calculated on two specific forms of the
indexes: the actual democracy index (that is the polity2 variable from the Polity IV Project,
which ranges from -10 to 10) made positive by adding 10 to each observation, and the binary
transformation of the democracy index equal to 1 for non-negative values of the polity2 variable
and 0 otherwise. The former serves as a benchmark against which we assess the fit of the latter,
using various combinations of initial democratic capital and depreciation rates in estimations
involving per capita income as the dependent variables.45
Research Method
Our approach to the question of whether the rate of accumulation matters in the
relationship between democracy and income is simple and straightforward. First, it involved
using democratic capital calculated using the binary form of the democracy index and comparing
it to that of the full scale index as a benchmark. As shown in Chapter 1, the binary form of the
democracy index produced the best fit in the estimation of the correlation between income and
democratic capital and between income growth and democratic capital for a fixed depreciation
rate and zero initial democratic capital.46 This latter assumption, however, is neither
theoretically necessary nor practically reasonable in a large number of cases.
Building on the result in the previous chapter, we estimated the relationship between
income and democracy without any assumptions about initial democratic capital and
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In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, we found that among various possible transformation of the annual indexes,
democratic capital calculated on the binary transform provided the best fit in the estimation of the relationship
between democracy and income per capita on the one hand and democracy and income per capita growth on the
other.
46
This is actually the Persson and Tabellini (2009) approach. They estimate the best fit depreciation rate but assume
an initial democratic capital of zero for all countries.
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depreciation rate. To do this we estimated combinations of initial democratic capital from zero
to the maximum possible for any given depreciation rate and compared their plausibility using
log likelihood based fit statistics (log likelihood and Akaike’s information criteria). We also
used the ability of each specification to predict values that are closest to the actual data (rsquared value) as a way to rank them. Finally, we obtained Hansen’s J statistic for our gmm
estimations as a calibration of fit for each specification.
We used two approaches to calculate initial democratic capital depending on the
underlying index used. Equation 1 is the mathematical representation for the accumulation of
democratic capital where Dcapi,𝑡 is the calculated democratic capital at time 𝑡 for country 𝑖,
𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 is the observation of democracy index at time 𝑡, and ρ is the depreciation rate of
democratic capital applied to the most recent period’s value.

(
Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1

(1)

To calculate the possibilities of initial democratic capital based on the full scale
democracy index, we first obtained the maximum possible democratic capital a country would
have if its average polity2 index during its pre-dataset history was equal to each of the points in
the range of the democracy index (i.e., -10 to 10 corresponding to 0 to 20 in our transformation
of the index into a wholly positive scale), and for each of the 100 possible integer depreciation
rates. Given our formulation of democratic capital, taking expectations of Equation 1 yields the
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expected maximum for democratic capital at each index to be equal to the index divided by the
depreciation rate.
We used the 2100 possible initial democratic capital and applied the 100 possible
depreciation rates to accumulate democratic capital for each country using actual recorded
indexes beginning with the first observation in the dataset for each country. Democratic capital
based on each unique combination of initial democratic capital and depreciation rate, calculated
for each country in the data, was then used to estimate the relationship between democratic
capital on the one hand and income and income growth on the other. The specifications were
then ranked by fit statistic.
For our second approach, we used the binary democracy index derived from the polity2
variable in the Polity IV project database. In Chapter 1, democratic capital calculated on this
form of the democracy index provided the best fit for the estimation at a fixed initial democratic
capital of zero and one percent depreciation rate. Whereas the full scale democracy index
provides us with a benchmark, democratic capital based on the binary form of the index should
provide a better empirical fit.
However, our approach using the binary indexes has to be different from that of the full
scale index. First, we specify a country’s pre-dataset history as the number of years between the
first observation for that country in the dataset and the year 1800,47 which is the year of the

47

We need the democracy measures from the dataset to calculate the probability of democracy by region for each
year. Since our dataset does not go earlier than 1800, we are reduced to limiting the pre-dataset democracy history
of each country to no earlier than 1800.
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earliest observation in the dataset48. Then, we divide each country’s pre-dataset history into
equal periods and calculate initial democratic capital as the democratic capital accumulated (at
each of the possible 100-integer depreciation rates), if a country experienced democracy as a
percentage of its pre-dataset history.
Furthermore, a country’s initial democratic capital will also be the expected value of the
accumulated presence (democracy index is equal to 1) or absence (democracy index is equal to
0) of democracy for a specified number of years, at specific depreciation rates, leading up to the
first observation in the data49. There are infinite possible distributions for the presence or
absence of democracy during a country’s pre-dataset history, each leading to different values for
initial democratic capital. To simplify the data-generating process, we assume that for each year,
the probability of democracy is influenced by its relative prevalence in the region in which the
country is located. The regions are defined according to the United Nations Statistics Division’s
sub regions of the world50. That is, for countries that have no observations for democracy for a
given year, we use the proportion of democracies among countries that do have observations as a
predictor of the presence or absence of democracy. Using this framework, initial democratic
capital of a country will be equal to the expected value (accumulated for each of the 100 possible

48

We dropped countries that had observations of the democracy index in 1800 to avoid the assumption of zero
democratic capital for these countries, and adding these countries did not change the ranking of the initial
democratic capital and depreciation rate combinations.
49
We do not have this information; however, it has been noted that democratization has often occurred in waves
among countries of geographical and cultural closeness, as for example in the “Arab” spring of 2011, and the “Third
Wave” of democratization among eastern European nations in the 1990s.
50
The regions and sub regions correspond to Africa: Eastern Africa, Middle Africa, Northern Africa, Southern
Africa, and Western Africa; Americas (Latin America and the Caribbean): South America, Caribbean, Central
America, and Northern America; Asia: Central Asia, Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, South-Eastern Asia, and Western
Asia; Europe: Eastern Europe, North Asia, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, and Western Europe; Oceania:
Australia, New Zealand, Melanesia, Micronesia, Polynesia.
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integer depreciation rates) for a given number of years during the pre-dataset history of a
country, i.e., before the first observation in the dataset.
Finally, we used a two-step GMM approach to estimate the correlation between levels of
per capita income on the one hand and lagged democratic capital on the other in the presence of
key economic variables as controls. Our trend variable is instrumented by time dummies for
every five-year period. The estimation is robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity, and
autocorrelation, with panel clustered errors.
Results
Democratic Capital Calculated Using the Full Scale Index of Democracy
The top ranked combinations of initial democratic capital and depreciation rate (based on
fit statistic: Akaike’s Information Criteria, and Hansen’s J-statistic from the test of over
identification) are shown in Table 15 and in Figure 3. The initial democratic capital based on the
full scale polity2 index of democracy that best fits the data is between 340 and 500, which is
about 25% of the maximum possible democratic capital (i.e., 2000, at the depreciation rate of
1%). The results imply that we can assume that countries enter the data with a mostly autocratic
history, i.e., halfway between total autocracy and the neutral point between autocracy and
democracy but definitely not zero. The depreciation rate of democratic capital that best fits the
data is between 4% and 6%. The results also show that democratic capital is positively
correlated with income levels and statistically significant in the presence of other key variables
such as regime durability, economic freedoms, real investment, and political stability.

Table 15
Democratic Capital and Income—Top Ranked Combinations Initial Democratic Capital and Depreciation Rate
(Full Scale Index)
Model
Initial Democratic
Capital(𝑫𝟎 )
Depreciation Rate (𝝆)

Democratic Capital(Dcap)
Regime Durability
Real Investment
Government Consumption
Economic Freedom
Political Stability
Inflation
Trade
Infant Mortality
Relative Age

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

500.000

475.000

400.000

340.000

450.000

380.000

0.040
0.775**
(0.317)
1.188*
(0.756)
28.383*
(16.330)
-184.016***
(41.460)
134.709***
(22.820)
43.338***
(13.120)
-0.019**
(0.008)
-65.851
(45.180)
-0.089
(0.886)
-15.491
(11.960)

0.040
0.763**
(0.317)
1.189*
(0.756)
28.416*
(16.330)
-183.981***
(41.460)
134.811***
(22.840)
43.339***
(13.120)
-0.019**
(0.008)
-66.037
(45.200)
-0.093
(0.886)
-14.827
(11.890)

0.050
0.793**
(0.341)
1.223*
(0.760)
28.327*
(16.290)
-184.244***
(41.370)
134.384***
(22.860)
43.101***
(13.160)
-0.019**
(0.008)
-66.601
(45.220)
-0.093
(0.886)
-12.664
(11.600)

0.050
0.749**
(0.342)
1.231*
(0.759)
28.422*
(16.290)
-184.113***
(41.370)
134.694***
(22.930)
43.146***
(13.170)
-0.019**
(0.008)
-67.139
(45.280)
-0.107
(0.886)
-11.288
(11.490)

0.040
0.750**
(0.318)
1.190*
(0.756)
28.447*
(16.330)
-183.944***
(41.460)
134.911***
(22.870)
43.343***
(13.130)
-0.019**
(0.008)
-66.222
(45.220)
-0.098
(0.885)
-14.176
(11.830)

0.050
0.779**
(0.341)
1.230*
(0.760)
28.361*
(16.290)
-184.202***
(41.370)
134.490***
(22.880)
43.112***
(13.160)
-0.019**
(0.008)
-66.782
(45.240)
-0.097
(0.886)
-12.194
(11.560)

(Continued on the following page)
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Table 15 (continued)
Trend
Constant(𝛂)
Hansen’s J Statistic P-Value
Akaike's Information Criteria
Log Likelihood

21.116***
21.184***
21.495***
21.677***
21.254***
21.552***
(3.070)
(3.066)
(2.986)
(2.976)
(3.062)
(2.983)
2964.295*** 2948.934*** 2883.600*** 2844.276*** 2933.495*** 2870.549***
(0.665)
(0.663)
(0.649)
(0.646)
(0.662)
(0.648)
0.613
0.613
0.616
0.617
0.614
0.617
-2268.202
-2267.812
-2267.786
-2266.675
-2267.429
-2267.407
1286.101
1285.906
1285.893
1285.338
1285.715
1285.703

Note. – The table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of the equation, Incomei,𝑡 = α +
Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income is log of per capita income, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic
capital, 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown in the first column after the fourth row in the table. 𝜸 is the
intercept term associated with 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. Each model shows the estimates of unique
combinations of initial democratic capital and depreciation rate. The top ranked combination (by fit statistic) of initial democratic capital (𝐷0 ) and
depreciation rate (𝜌) given the set of control variables are shown. All estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. The
estimation method is a fixed effects two-step generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time
indicator variables for every five-year period, that is the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the instruments. The optimal
weighting matrix (the inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) is
estimated using the Newey-West kernel with bandwidth equal to 3. The total number of observations in each specification is 1467. Significance
levels are given by asterisks where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per
capita due to the individual effects. Democratic capital (Dcap) is calculated by first adding 10 to the Polity2 index (𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, “Positive
Democracy Index” in the text) and then calculating a running sum at a fixed depreciation rate (𝜌). That is, Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 −
ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 , where 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time indicators respectively. Each series of democratic capital is also a function of an assumed initial
value (𝐷0 ). Relative age is calculated as the ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of years since the first observation in the
data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to the steady state of democratic capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions
of perfect democracy index each year and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in democratic capital. The errors are assumed to be normal, identical
and independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log likelihood calculations. Source. Polity IV (version
2011) dataset is the source for democratic capital (calculated by the author using the Polity2 Index) and Regime Durability. Income per capita data
is from Angus Maddison (2013). Other national accounts data such as Openness to Trade, Real Investment, and Government Consumption Share
of GDP are from Penn World Tables (version 7.1, 2013). Economic Freedom and Political Stability are from World Governance Indicators
(Version 2010), courtesy of the World Bank. Infant Mortality Rates are from the Quality of Governance dataset (version 2013).
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Figure 3: Contour

Plot of Akaike's Information Criteria, Depreciation Rate
and Initial Democratic Capital

Note – The figure shows a contour plot of standardized fit statistic (Akaike’s information Criteria - AIC) against the
top 2100 combinations of initial democratic capital (Dcap) and depreciation rate (in percentages) used in the
estimation of income levels on democratic capital in the presence of standard control variables (Table 15) for
democratic capital based on the full scale democracy index. The means of AIC, depreciation rate, and initial
democratic capital are 278.854, 0.110, and 187.533, respectively, and their standard deviations are 89.575, 0.0702
and 281.708, respectively.
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In the full range of combinations, there are specifications for which democratic capital is
not statistically significant and some for which it is negatively correlated with income levels.
Other variables have signs and statistical significance, as would be expected. For example,
political stability, Economic Freedom, Regime durability and Real Investment Share of GDP are
all positively correlated with income levels. On the other hand, Inflation, government
consumption share of GDP, and infant mortality have negative correlation with income levels.
Regime durability, openness to trade and the relative age of a country in the dataset are not
statistically significant in the presence of the other variables. Moreover, a one unit increase in
democratic capital (0.0005 of maximum democratic capital) will result in a 0.07 percent change
in GDP per capita income. Put another way, a change of one percent of maximum democratic
capital (20 points) will yield an increase 1.5% increase in GDP per capita annually. On average,
the impact of 1 unit change in democratic capital on GDP per capita is about $50.00.
As shown in Table 16, we fix the combination of democratic capital and depreciation rate to that
obtained as the best fit in Table 15 and vary the control variables. The first three specifications
drop democratic capital as a control variable. These results show that there is a positive trend in
income, and that the key variables have their expected signs and statistical significance. The
introduction of democratic capital almost always improves the fit statistic (Akaike’s information
criteria, Hansen’s J statistic, and log likelihood) of the corresponding model. The introduction of
democratic capital in the set of control variables did not change the significance of any of the
variables that are significant in their corresponding specifications. However, the magnitudes of
the estimates were affected.
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Table 16
Best Fit Initial Democratic Capital and Depreciation Rate Models (Full Scale Index)
Model
Democratic Capital(Dcap)
Regime Durability
Real Investment
Govt. Consumption
Economic Freedom
Political Stability
Inflation
Trade
Infant Mortality
Relative Age

(1)

(2)

1.069
(0.694)
30.098*
(15.610)
-173.422***
(41.380)
133.963***
(22.810)
49.297***
(12.610)
-0.023***
0.007

(3)

1.267*
(0.744)
27.787*
(15.900)
-181.334***
(41.530)
136.029***
(23.210)
46.073***
(12.740)
-0.021***
0.007
-70.948
(45.450)
-0.318
(0.873)
-7.610
(11.230)

(4)
0.843**
(0.339)

(5)
0.644**
(0.291)
0.965
(0.697)
30.579*
(15.940)
-174.4450***
(41.470)
132.611***
(22.230)
48.076***
(12.820)
-0.021**
0.008

(6)
0.775**
(0.317)
1.188*
(0.756)
28.383*
(16.330)
-184.016***
(41.460)
134.709***
(22.820)
43.338***
(13.120)
-0.019**
0.009
-65.851
(45.180)
-0.090
(0.886)
-15.491
(11.960)

(Continued on the following page)
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Table 16 (continued)
0.949*** 1864.478*** 2455.614*** 1296.123*** 2113.770*** 2964.295***
(272.900)
(276.600)
(585.500)
(350.900)
(322.400)
(664.500)
Trend
27.422***
26.3245**
23.912***
25.391***
24.829***
21.116***
(1.330)
(1.353)
(2.490)
(1.811)
(1.744)
(3.070)
P-Value – Hansen’s J Statistic
0.963
0.358
0.644
0.966
0.362
0.613
Akaike's Information Criteria -2018.494
-2276.240
-2265.632
-2024.671
-2282.107
-2268.202
Rho
0.496
0.760
0.861
0.344
0.710
0.809
Log Likelihood
1151.247
1286.120
1283.816
1155.336
1290.053
1286.101
Constant(𝛂)
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Note. – The table shows estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of, Incomei,𝑡 = α + Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 +
𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸𝒊 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income is log of per capita income, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic capital, 𝛃 is a vector of
coefficients on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown in the first column after the fourth row in the table. 𝜸 is the constant associated with 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy
variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. Each model shows the estimates of the top ranked combination of initial democratic capital
(𝐷0 , at 500) and depreciation rate (𝜌, at 4%). There are two groups of three model specifications based on whether the democratic capital variable is
included. Within each group, the specification first includes a constant and trend only, then a constant, a trend and the other statistically significant
variables of Table 15. The third specification is the same as in Table 15. All estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. The
estimation method is a fixed effects two-step generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time indicator
variables for every five-year period; that is, the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the instruments. The optimal weighting matrix
(the inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The total number of observations in each specification is 1467. Significance levels are given by
asterisks where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita due to the
individual effects. Democratic capital (Dcap) is calculated by first adding 10 to the Polity2 index (𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, “Positive Democracy Index” in the text)
and then calculating a running sum at a fixed depreciation rate (𝜌). That is, Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 , where 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and
time indicators, respectively. Each series of democratic capital is also a function of an assumed initial value (𝐷0 ). Relative age is calculated as the ratio
of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of years since the first observation in the data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get
to the steady state of democratic capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions of perfect democracy index each year and a minimal 1%
depreciation rate in democratic capital. The errors are assumed to be normal, identical, and independently distributed with mean zero and constant
variance for the purpose of log likelihood calculations. Source. Polity IV (version 2011) dataset is the source for democratic capital (calculated by the
author using the Polity2 Index) and Regime Durability. Income per capita data is from Angus Maddison (2013). Other national accounts data such as
Openness to Trade, Real Investment and Government Consumption Share of GDP are from Penn World Tables (version 7.1, 2013). Economic Freedom
and Political Stability are from World Governance Indicators (Version 2010), courtesy of the World Bank. Infant Mortality Rates are from the Quality
of Governance dataset (version 2013).
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Of the variables that are statistically significant (Regime Durability, Economic Freedom,
and Inflation—models 2 and 5), the estimates decreased slightly, while those of real investment
share of GDP, government consumption share of GDP, and political stability increased in
absolute terms. The magnitudes of the estimates on variables that were statistically
nonsignificant decreased with the introduction of the democratic capital variable. These
changes show that not only is democratic capital a significant factor in the explanation of the
differences in income levels among countries, its effect is not isolated from the other key
variables. For example, democratic capital reduces the impact of economic freedoms, regime
durability, and political stability. Conceptually, these are all interrelated variables and this effect
is therefore to be expected. However, the introduction of democratic capital increases the impact
of government consumption share of GDP (in absolute terms) and the real investment share of
GDP.
Democratic Capital Calculated Using Binary Indicator of Democracy
As shown in Table 17, the top ranked combinations of initial democratic capital and
depreciation rate (based on fit statistic: Akaike’s Information Criteria, and Hansen’s J Statistic
from the test of over identification) using the binary index of democracy are presented. The
initial democratic capital that best fits the data is one that assumes countries experienced
democracy about 30 percent of the time during their pre-dataset history. The results imply that
we may assume that countries enter the data with only a fourth to a third of their pre-dataset
history being possibly democratic. The results are close to those obtained using the full
democracy index scale for our calculation of democratic capital. That is, the best fit initial

Table 17
Democratic Capital and Income—Combinations of Initial Democratic Capital and Depreciation Rate
(Binary Index)
Democracy Proportion (%)
of Pre-data History
Depreciation Rate
Democratic Capital(Dcap)

28.000

28.000

26.000

26.000

24.000

24.000

0.040
0.050
0.040
0.050
0.040
0.050
11.352**
11.928**
11.279**
11.883**
11.191**
11.825**
(4.423)
(4.755)
(4.419)
(4.753)
(4.416)
(4.750)
Regime Durability
0.929
0.967
0.930
0.967
0.931
0.968
(0.777)
(0.782)
(0.777)
(0.782)
(0.777)
(0.782)
Real Investment
19.583
19.693
19.605
19.704
19.618
19.713
(16.800)
(16.800)
(16.800)
(16.800)
(16.800)
(16.800)
Government Consumption -196.669*** -197.121*** -196.637*** -197.099*** -196.604*** -197.075***
(47.270)
(47.150)
(47.270)
(47.150)
(47.270)
(47.150)
Economic Freedom
147.965*** 147.698*** 147.988*** 147.713***
0.148*** 147.731***
(26.820)
(26.860)
(26.830)
(26.870)
(26.840)
(26.870)
Political Stability
45.223***
44.768***
45.236***
44.777***
45.251***
44.788***
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.016)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.015)
Inflation
-0.021**
-0.021**
-0.021**
-0.021**
-0.021**
-0.021**
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.009)
Trade
-27.844
-28.398
-27.877
-28.417
-27.920
-28.443
(42.870)
(42.900)
(42.880)
(42.910)
(42.890)
(42.910)
Infant Mortality
-1.760**
-1.753**
-1.760**
-1.753**
-1.760**
-1.753**
(0.867)
(0.867)
(0.867)
(0.860)
(0.867)
(0.867)
(Continued on the following page)
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Table 17 (continued)
Relative Age
Trend
Hansen’s J Statistic P-value
AIC
Log Likelihood
Hansen’s J Statistic P-value
Rho

9.797
(12.070)
23.810***
(3.143)
0.408
-2119.449
1199.724
0.408
0.854

10.436
(12.030)
24.060***
(3.088)
0.410
-2119.341
1199.671
0.410
0.848

9.884
(12.070)
23.831***
(3.141)
0.408
-2119.284
1199.642
0.408
0.853

10.484
(12.030)
24.072***
(3.087)
0.410
-2119.245
1199.622
0.410
0.853

9.975
(12.070)
23.856***
(3.139)
0.408
-2119.091
1199.546
0.408
0.848

10.535
(12.030)
24.086***
(3.086)
0.410
-2119.128
1199.564
0.410
0.848
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Note. – The table shows the estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of the equation, Incomei,𝑡 =
α + Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income is log of per capita income, 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time indicators, respectively, α is the
constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic capital (Dcap), 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown in the first column
after the fourth row in the table. 𝜸 is the intercept term associated with 𝑃𝑖 (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. Each
model shows the estimates of unique combinations of initial democratic capital (𝐷0 ) and depreciation rate (𝜌). The top ranked combinations (by fit
statistic) given the set of control variables are shown. All estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. The estimation method is a
fixed effects two-step generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time indicator variables for every fiveyear period, that is, the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the instruments. The optimal weighting matrix (the inverse of the S
matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated using the Newey-West kernel with
bandwidth equal to 3. The total number of observations in each specification is 1341. Significance levels are given by asterisks where *= p-value <0.1,
**= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita due to the individual effects. Democratic capital is
calculated by summing the binary indexes of democracy (𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, 1 for non-negative values of polity2 variable in the Polity IV Project dataset, and 0
otherwise) at a fixed depreciation rate (𝜌). That is, Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 . The initial democratic capital is calculated as the total
democratic capital that would be accumulated corresponding to fixed percentages of a country’s pre-dataset history characterized as democratic as
opposed to autocratic. Relative age is calculated as the ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of years since the first observation in the
data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to the steady state of democratic capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions of perfect
democracy index each year and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in democratic capital. The errors are assumed to be normal, identical and independently
distributed with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log likelihood calculations. Source. Polity IV (version 2011) dataset is the source for
democratic capital (calculated by the author using the Polity2 Index) and Regime Durability. Income per capita data is from Angus Maddison (2013).
Other national accounts data such as Openness to trade, Real Investment and Government Consumption Share of GDP are from Penn World Tables
(version 7.1, 2013). Economic Freedom and Political Stability are from World Governance Indicators (Version 2010), courtesy of the World Bank. Infant
Mortality Rates are from the Quality of Governance dataset (version 2013).
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democratic capital is equivalent to that obtained when a country experienced democracy for only
about 25-30 percent of a country’s pre-dataset history. Zero initial democratic capital
specification ranked very low in fit statistic (98th for the highest ranked zero initial democratic
capital at 4 percent depreciation rate; not shown). Incidentally, initial democratic capital for
values approaching 100% of the pre-dataset history of countries as democracies are ranked last
(not shown).
The depreciation rate of democratic capital that best fits the data is once again between 4
and 6 percent. The results also show that at this best fit combination of initial democratic capital
and depreciation rate, democratic capital is positively correlated with income levels and
statistically significant at the five percent level in the presence of other key variables such as
regime durability, economic freedoms, real investment, and political stability. In the full range
of combinations, there are specifications which produced negatively correlated estimates of
coefficients on democratic capital which may or may not be statistically significant.
Other variables have signs and statistical significance as expected. For example, political
stability, economic freedom, regime durability and real investment share of GDP are all
positively correlated with income levels, while inflation, government consumption share of GDP,
and infant mortality show negative correlation. Regime durability, openness to trade and the
relative age of a country in the dataset are not statistically significant in the presence of the other
variables. Finally, a one unit increase in democratic capital of the binary index, i.e., each period
of democracy instead of autocracy will result in a 1.6 percentage change in GDP per capita
income. On average, the impact of 1 unit change in binary index based democratic capital on
GDP per capita is about $40.00.
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As shown in Table 18, we fix the combination of democratic capital and depreciation to
that obtained as the best fit in Table 17, and we vary the control variables. The first three
specifications drop democratic capital as a control variable. These results show the same
positive and statistically significant correlation with income, and similar type of correlation
between levels of income and key economic variables. Regime durability in this specification is
not statistically significant across all subsets of estimations, in contrast to the specification of
democratic capital calculated on the full scale of the index of democracy. The signs on the
estimates of the coefficients are as expected: positive on real investment share, economic
freedoms, and political stability. They are negative on government share of GDP, inflation, and
infant mortality. The introduction of democratic capital always improves the fit in terms of log
likelihood measures (Akaike’s information criteria; Bayesian information criteria) but the
Hansen’s J Statistic does not change consistently between models with and without democratic
capital. The introduction of democratic capital decreases rho (the proportion of total variation
explained by the fixed effect) across models.
The introduction of democratic capital in the set of control variables does not change the
significance level of any of the variables that are significant in their corresponding specifications
except in the case of inflation. The magnitudes of the estimates were also minimally affected
(between less than 1% to 12% change in magnitude for models 2 and 5, and less than 1% to 15%
in models 3 and 6). Of the variables that are statistically significant and positive (Economic
Freedom, and political stability, models 2 and 5), the estimates for economic freedom increased
slightly (by less than 1%) but decreased for political stability (about 5%). Of those variables
that have negative and statistically significant estimates (government expenditure share of

Table 18
Best Fit Initial Democratic Capital and Depreciation Rate Models (Binary Index)
Model
Democratic Capital(Dcap)
Regime Durability
Real Investment
Govt. Consumption
Economic Freedom
Political Stability
Inflation
Trade
Infant Mortality

(1)

(2)

0.835
(0.732)
26.477
(16.330)
-176.637***
(47.360)
145.605***
(27.680)
54.372***
(13.570)
-0.025***
(0.009)

(3)

0.001
(0.769)
20.212
(16.550)
-188.974***
(48.440)
149.074***
(27.340)
48.052***
(14.250)
-0.024***
(0.008)
-31.695
(43.070)
-2.000**
(0.855)

(4)
13.491***
(5.195)

(5)
12.447***
(4.454)
0.762
(0.747)
25.183
(16.510)
-185.490***
(45.950)
144.718***
(26.950)
50.341***
(14.010)
-0.021**
(.010)

(6)
11.352**
(4.423)
0.929
(0.777)
19.588
(16.800)
-196.669***
(47.270)
147.965***
(26.820)
45.223***
(14.560)
-0.021**
(0.010)
-27.844
(42.870)
-1.760**
(0.867)

(Continued on the following page)
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Table 18 (continued)
Relative Age

10.806
09.797
(12.080)
(12.070)
Constant(𝛂)
742.343**
10.683***
20.250***
10.338***
20.240***
20.681***
(315.200)
(314.600)
(668.100)
(453.000)
(393.800)
(716.300)
Trend
28.443***
27.488***
25.996***
25.515***
24.828***
23.810***
(1.537)
(1.500)
(2.821)
(2.218)
(2.017)
(3.143)
Hansen's J Statistic P-Value
0.877
0.293
0.427
0.907
0.298
0.408
Akaike's Information Criteria -1835.916
-2102.569
-2110.891
-1843.392
-2114.462
-2119.449
Log Likelihood
1047.958
1187.285
1194.446
1052.696
1194.231
1199.724
Rho
0.534
0.802
0.854
0.262
0.694
0.803
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Note. – The table shows estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of the equation, Incomei,𝑡 = α +
Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸𝒊 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income is log of per capita income, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic capital, 𝛃
is a vector of coefficients estimates on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown in the first column after the fourth row in the table. 𝜸 is the intercept
term associated with 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. Each model shows the estimates of the top ranked
combination of initial democratic capital (𝐷0 , ) and depreciation rate (𝜌, at 5%). There are two groups of three model specifications based on whether
first democratic capital and then other control variables are included. All estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. The
estimation method is a fixed effects two-step generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time indicator
variables for every five-year period; that is, the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the instruments. The optimal weighting
matrix (the inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The total number of observations in each specification is 1467. Significance levels are
given by asterisks where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita due to
the individual effects. Democratic capital is calculated by summing the binary indexes of democracy, (𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 , 1 for non-negative values of the
democracy index, and 0 otherwise) at a fixed depreciation rate (𝜌). That is Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 . The initial democratic capital is
calculated as the democratic capital that would be accumulated corresponding to the probability that a fixed percentage of a country’s pre-dataset
history was democratic. Relative age is calculated as the ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of years since the first observation in
the data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to the steady state of democratic capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions of
perfect democracy index each year and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in democratic capital. The errors are assumed to be normal, identical and
independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log likelihood calculations. Source. Polity IV (version 2011)
dataset is the source for democratic capital (using the Polity2 Index) and Regime Durability. Income data is from Angus Maddison (2013). Other
national accounts data such as Openness to Trade, Real Investment and Government Consumption Share of GDP are from Penn World Tables (version
7.1, 2013). Economic Freedom and Political Stability are from World Governance Indicators (Version 2010), courtesy of the World Bank. Infant
Mortality Rates are from the Quality of Governance dataset (version 2013).
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income and inflation), the magnitude of the coefficient on government expenditure share of
income decreased (by 3%) while the estimate on inflation increased (by 12%) with the
introduction of democratic capital.
These changes confirm what was observed in the earlier specification for democratic
capital using the full scale of the democracy index, with some exceptions: Democratic capital is
a significant factor in the explanation of the differences in income levels among countries, but its
effect is not isolated from the other key economic variables. For example, democratic capital
reduces the impact of regime durability and political stability51 and has practically no effect (less
than 1% change) on the impact of economic freedoms. Conceptually, these are all interrelated
variables and this effect is therefore to be expected, but the empirically better fit specification
(with the binary variable for democracy index) draws a stronger tie between regime durability
and political stability than with economic freedom, which can be said to be a relatively more
distant concept from democracy. Finally, the introduction of democratic capital increases both
the impact of the government consumption share of GDP (in absolute terms), and of inflation.
Discussion and Conclusion
Initial Democratic Capital Matters
Zero initial democratic capital is neither theoretically necessary nor practically justifiable
in most cases. Our results show that it is not the most plausible assumption either, given our
data. Our results also show that the estimated coefficients and statistical significance are

51

The correlation among these three variables ranges from 0.4087 to 0.4667.
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influenced by the initial values of democratic capital and are therefore to be factored into the
study of the influence of democratic capital on income levels. Furthermore, the results of our
empirical tests using both the binary and the full scale indexes are reasonable: the most plausible
assumption of initial democratic capital is that countries enter the dataset with a mostly
autocratic level of democratic capital but one that is definitely greater than zero. Actual history
of democratization in the world has shown a slight but significant trend towards greater
democratization52. In this regard, going forward, one can imagine that any country that entered
into the dataset later than the 1990s may do so with a democratic capital in the neutral range, i.e.,
neither democratic nor autocratic level of democratic capital.
This is an avenue for further research. It means that building initial democratic capital
that is based on primary sources of the political arrangements in each country before it entered
the dataset will improve our understanding of the effect of democracy on income. This also
implies the need for more historical research into the political arrangement of countries as far
back as possible, at least to the point when they became defined as nation-states.
Depreciation Rate Matters
A similar point can be made for depreciation rates. The rate of depreciation of
democratic capital is important for determining how quickly it can be accumulated and how soon
a country can reach steady state in its democratic capital. Our results show that we can assume
that democratic capital will be accumulated rather quickly (only three to six percent depreciation

52

See Figure 18 in Appendix B, where the world weighted trend in democracy index is presented. It shows a
population and income weighted world average index to have been negative and slowly improving over time since
the 1950s.
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rate); however, it will take a longer time for countries to reach the steady state. Furthermore, in
our results, we find different levels of statistical significance and different signs for the estimates,
depending on the depreciation rate applied to the accumulation of democratic capital, even
within the same initial democratic capital.
Implications and Future Research
Together, these findings imply that democratization is a long-term project, not a quick-fix
solution to the economic problems in underdeveloped countries. Those who want to encourage
and invest in democratization among developing countries must be prepared for a long
engagement of the type to which western nations are usually not willing to commit.
Democratic capital as our democracy variable of choice also points to the need for a
continued nuance in our analysis of the relationship between economic and political institutions
in a country. As we saw in the first chapter of this dissertation, democratic capital is positively
correlated with income but negatively correlated with annual income growth. If increased
democratization produces higher per capita incomes, it seems contradictory that it would produce
lower income growth. The contradiction may be explained by the possibility that the positive
effect of democracy is a feedback (higher incomes produce increased democratization, which in
turn preserves the economic gains of higher incomes). It may also point to the possibility of a
structural break in the data wherein the correlation changes at some point in the history of
countries. This is a viable avenue for future research and is partly taken up in our next chapter.
It turns out that democratic capital also has some effects on other variables in the dataset,
especially on such variables as Economic Freedoms, Political Stability, and Regime Durability.
These variables have similar and overlapping concepts and are all significantly correlated in the
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data. Nevertheless, democratic capital maintains its level of statistical significance and
magnitude in the presence of these variables. The lesson: Democracy by itself is a factor in the
levels of income that citizens enjoy. As such, advocating for political liberalization will have
welfare implications for citizens. However, the fact that the presence or absence of democracy
(democratic capital based on the binary index) provides a better fit than extent of
democratization (democratic capital based on full scale index) in the accumulation of democratic
capital, in relation to levels of income, coupled with the results in this chapter, suggests two
important points.
First, democracy’s influence on income may come as feedback from higher incomes, and
second, democracy or democratic liberalization is not a substitute for sound economic policy.
Economic policy advisers—especially in the developing world—will make their countries better
off by focusing on other variables such as economic freedoms, institutional growth, and the tight
controls of government share of consumption while encouraging democratic reforms as a
guarantee of continued economic prosperity.
This implication is in line with events in Great Britain, the cradle of the Industrial
Revolution. Although the Industrial Revolution started in Britain as early as 1765, it was not
until 1832 (The Great Reform) that the new middle class and the peasant masses won the right to
significantly and more broadly participate in national governance. This also coincides with the
political and economic history of the Asian Tiger countries and China. The leaders of these
countries exercised tight political control while overseeing rapid growth in their economies53.

Singapore, Hong Kong (part of the People’s Republic of China since 1997), South Korea, and Taiwan are all
classified as High Income Countries by the World Bank at the time of writing.
53
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However, the Asian Tiger economies experienced political reforms after their economies settled
down to a relatively slower growth pattern similar to that of the industrialized countries.
Finally, if this pattern is true, as the growth rate of the Chinese economy slows down
from its record highs over the last quarter of a century, we can expect increasing pressure for
liberalization from the rising middle classes—as unlikely as this may sound at the moment. This
conclusion leads to another avenue for research and further study. Does the relationship between
democracy and income levels have a structural break around the takeoff into industrial growth?
If so, can we expect that the estimates on democracy in relation to incomes will be of different
signs before and after the takeoff into industrial growth—if we can identify the takeoff point?
That is the focus of the final chapter in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3
DEMOCRATIC CAPITAL AND THE TAKEOFF INTO INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

Introduction
The correlation between democracy and income among countries has been well
established. However, despite the considerable amount of research that has been directed at the
question,54 the precise nature of the relationship and the direction of causation (if any) is still
being debated. Two competing theories have emerged: exogenous democratization and its
endogenous counterpart, also referred to as the Modernization Theory (Boix & Stokes, 2003).55
The former posits democratization occurs from factors outside of the economic performance of
countries, while the latter holds that democratization occurs as countries achieve higher levels of
income.
Fundamental to such an investigation is the definition of democracy as a concept. The
concept can be defined in very broad terms as in Lincoln’s Gettysburg address: “a government of
the people, by the people, and for the people.”56 It can also be described in the narrow sense as

54

See Brunetti (1993) and Kurzman et al. (2002) for a survey of research in the field.
Boix and Stokes (2003) critique the work of Przeworski et al. (1997) and arrive at a different conclusion on the
effect of income on the probability of exit from dictatorship into democracy.
56
Lincoln, Abraham. "The Gettysburg Address." 19 Nov. 1863. Abraham Lincoln
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm. Accessed: 6 March 2014.
55
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the ability of a country to hold elections for political offices.57 The broader concept is termed
“liberal democracy” as opposed to mere “electoral democracy.”58
The broad term is difficult to operationalize. On the other hand, to reduce democracy to
only the electoral process would omit key characteristics that are themselves central to the
concept: that democracy is a method of governing as much as it is about choosing who should
govern (Diamond, 2002).59 In this chapter we follow the definition of the Polity IV Project,
which emphasizes concepts that are at the core of all democracy: truly competitive national
elections for policy makers, accountability of elected officers to citizens, and the openness and
effective participation of all citizens in the political process at all levels.60 These core qualities
will in turn affect all areas of life captured by the broad sense of the term.
Additionally, this chapter uses the concept of an accumulated democratic experience of
democracy as the variable of choice for measures of democracy. We agree with Gerring et al.
(2005) 61 that a historical approach presents the best case that can be made for democracy’s

Vanhanen, Tatu, “Polyarchy Dataset Manuscript” Introduction, URL:
http://www.prio.no/Data/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/Polyarchy-Dataset-Manuscript/ accessed
March 16, 2014. Tatu Vanhanen focuses largely on this dimension to operationalize his measures of democracy,
although he allows for a broader concept.
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Essential Readings in Comparative Politics: The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State, New
York: Norton & Company.
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Larry Jay Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13.2 (2002): 21-35. Project
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Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2002. Polity IV Project: Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012. Version p4v2012 [Computer File]. Vienna, VA: Integrated Network for
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influence on economic performance. In this chapter, “democratic capital” refers to the
accumulated historical experience of a country with democracy. To arrive at a measure of
democratic capital we calculate a running sum past all annual measures of democracy indexes,
with adjustments for depreciation. We use this measure to test for the impact of democracy on
economic performance.62
This chapter is an extension of Lucas (2000), in which he posits that the growth trajectory
of countries in the world can be explained in terms of when countries “take off” into industrial
growth. Our purpose here is to see whether there is a change in the relationship between
democratic capital and economic performance around takeoff into industrial growth.
The unique contribution of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence that the
relationship between democratic capital and income is not monotonic but that it changes around
the event of takeoff into industrial growth. After a country has taken off into industrial growth,
the relationship between income and democracy changes—it goes from a negative to a positive
correlation with income. This could partly explain why the results between democracy and
economic growth have sometimes been contradictory. Depending on the dataset, we may be
dealing with different countries at different periods in their economic histories. This is not the
first time that democracy has been shown to have a changing quality in relation to income.
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2007) found larger changes in income after democratization
compared to a change from democracy to dictatorship. Persson and Tabellini (2009) also found

period along with accumulated capital over time are together significant for current and future economic
performance, it should also be the case that a country's democratic “capital” (current and past experience with
democracy) presents the best case that can be made for the influence of democracy on economic outcomes.
62
See Chapter 1 for a more detailed description.
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different effects by types of countries: those which do better economically under autocracy from
those which are likely to do better under democracy.
This chapter is also related to the Przeworski and Limongi (1997) paper, where they
investigate the probability that a country will democratize with rising income. They test whether
income increases the probability of transition into democracy on the assumption that the
relationship between income and type of political regime goes through a change. In this chapter
we provide further evidence that there is indeed a change in the relationship and that the key to
that change is whether a country has taken off into industrial growth!
We now go on to describe a brief survey of work that has already been done in this area
of research. In the third section we describe the datasets employed in our analysis. In the fourth
section we describe our research method. In the remaining three sections we present our results,
discuss their basic implications, and in our conclusion reiterate the main findings and discuss
some possible avenues for further research.
Literature Review
Probably the earliest attempt to draw a theoretical and an empirical link between regime
types and economic performance is Lipset (1959). He argued that the onset and survival of
democracy requires “social prerequisites,” among which are literacy, “equalitarian value
system,” an “open class system,” a “capitalist economy,” and—most relevant for our study—
“economic wealth.” He theorized that a country's growing wealth is a precursor to
democratization. Later writers have referred to this as “endogenous” democratization or
“modernization theory” (as, for example, in Przeworski and Limongi, 1997 and Boix and Stokes,
2003).
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Barro (1996) set the benchmark empirical estimation of the effect of democracy on
income and growth. His cross-sectional study found that democracy had only a weakly negative
effect on income growth once other factors such as rule of law, small government, human
capital, and free markets are accounted for. He also found a non-linear relationship between
democracy and income in a later study (Barro, 1999). In the 1999 study, he found that political
freedom had a positive effect at low levels of income, becoming negative at higher levels of
income. Helliwell (1994), in a similar cross-sectional study, found similar indirect effects for
democracy through investment and education.
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) looked at countries in the post-war period (1950-1990)
and found that, whereas income may not cause the onset of democracy, democracy's survival was
enhanced in countries with higher incomes. Democracy's effect on income is also inconclusive
after controlling for economic freedoms and other factors. Their work challenged some longheld conclusions in the field. They have since been criticized by Boix and Stokes (2003),
Inglehart and Welzel (2005), and Epstein et al. (2006), among others. Boix and Stokes (2003)
used a larger dataset dating back to 1850 to find that higher incomes do increase the probability
for the onset of democracy. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) found fault with their approach,
specifically that they failed to include controls for regime stability when they calculated the
probability of regime transition from dictatorship to democracy. The Epstein et al. (2006)
critique was directed at the technical details of the statistical estimation. All these studies
conclude that higher incomes increase the likelihood of the onset of democracy as well as the
survival of democracy.

97
Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis (2007) study the relationship from a beforeand-after event perspective—that is, when changes occur in either direction. They find that the
change in the direction of democracy produces greater incomes and economic growth. They also
find that countries with higher levels of human capital stand to benefit the most from a change
towards democratization.
Gerring et al. (2005) are credited with being the first to advance the view that
democracy's impact on economic outcomes should be studied from a historical perspective.
After making a convincing narrative and logical case for a historical perspective, their empirical
analysis found a positive effect of their “democratic capital” variable. Persson and Tabellini
(2009) took this historical perspective further. They posit that if countries are by nature more
suited for democracy or autocracy, then a random sampling of countries at any point in time will
find the group of countries which are democracies will be predominantly those suited for
democracy. They proceed with the assumption that such countries will see a positive effect of
democracy on their incomes and growth, while the sample from the group of countries which are
autocratic at that point in time will show a negative effect of democracy on their income growth.
Although their theory seems plausible, they may have put too much stock in countries being
intrinsically more suited for one regime type or the other. A brief look at the world trends in
democratization shows a steady increase towards democratization (see Figure 4).63
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The graph of population weighted polity2 (Figure 2) variable of the Polity IV project shows a steady increase in
world democracy index despite a period of short drawbacks between the 1950s to the 1970s when many colonial
territories became independent and promptly fell back into dictatorships.

98

Figure 4: World Polity2 Trends.
Note.—Calculation by the author. Source –Polity IV Project Database, version 2011, URL:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, accessed on December 31, 2013.

The field remains unsettled, but the consensus is tending more toward the modernization
theory. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) raised serious issues with endogenous democratization
indeed, but the response by other researchers (e.g., Epstein et al., 2005; Boix and Stokes, 2003,
Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, etc.) seems adequate, at least for now.
Questions remain however, and they go beyond any particular paper. These issues
revolve around the availability and reliability of macroeconomic data of long enough duration
for most countries of the world to allow a more robust empirical analysis. Moreover, even if we
have economic data going back to the 1800s, other data on factors such as literacy, trade, life
expectancy, and inequality drastically reduce the range of our control variables in any panel
estimation. In addition, the theoretical foundation connecting the micro-level assumptions that
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lead to these macroeconomic conclusions continues to be underdeveloped. Finally, the
operationalization of democracy measure is still evolving. Each dataset on democracy has a
unique set of assumptions and/or definition of democracy. Depending on the variations in the
concept, it is possible that each study may be covering the issue using different specifications.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to consider the question of the
relationship between income and democratic capital around the event of takeoff into industrial
growth.
Data
The key variables in this chapter are democracy indicators and measures of real income
(GDP) per capita. Data for democracy is obtained from the datasets published by the Polity IV
Project, Freedom House (Political Rights), and Professor Tatu Vanhanen’s Polyarchy dataset.
The democratic capital calculated from these is a composite and is detailed in Chapter 1.64 At
the time of writing, the most recent dataset of the Polity IV Project (released in 2012) covers
about 167 countries from the 1800s up to 2012. 65 Data is limited to countries with a population
of over half a million in 2006. To cover for missing observations and for smaller countries we
obtained information from two other sources: Freedom House66 and Professor Vanhanen’s
dataset.67 Incorporating data from these two additional sources expanded our raw dataset to
about 212 countries worldwide. Our Dataset on Economic Growth and Income per capita is
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See Chapter 1.
Note: some countries do not have observations for the most recent years, so our cut-off year for the present
investigation is 2010.
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from the Maddison Project (2013).68 The most recent edition (2013) covers the period from
1800 to 2010 and about 170 countries.
In Chapter 1, we established a preference for binary indicators of democracy and
estimated the best fit initial democratic capital and depreciation rate combination for estimating
per capita income. We use this specific construction of democratic capital alongside (for
comparison purposes) that based on the best fit democratic capital of the full scale positive
democracy index for all estimations in this chapter.
Research Method
Democratic Capital as the Variable of Choice
Gerring et al. (2005) made an adequate and convincing case that when it comes to the
effect on economic outcomes, democratic capital is the better measure compared to the yearly
indexes of democracy. Democracy must be seen as an institution that is built up over time, and
that, like physical capital, it can depreciate, that resources and effort must be invested in each
period to maintain its quality and longevity and, that its effective utilization could produce
improved economic outcomes in the future. Democracy is also learned over time, just like other
cultural institutions. It is not static but ever evolving. Its present configuration and influence are
generally bound to a country's history. However, in terms of policy, its distant past must be
considered less influential than more recent events.
Consistent with this view, we calculate democratic capital as the running sum of
depreciated total indexes (see Chapters 1 and 2) and the binary index of democracy.69 To that
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GDP per capita data is from The Maddison Project: Accessed at http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm,
version 2013 accessed December 17, 2013.
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mix we add a democratic capital that is the raw sum of the yearly indexes without any
depreciation. Our rationale for a running sum without depreciation is that depreciation imposes
an asymptotic maximum to the total democratic capital. An asymptotic maximum for
democratic capital can be justified on theoretical and practical grounds. By definition, the
characteristics of a fully and perfectly (although dynamically) functioning liberal democracy can
be delineated and conceivably can also be achieved. Democratic capital must therefore have a
maximum when this is the case. At such a “steady state” of democracy, further investments in
democracy will be used to replace depreciated democratic “capital” in the same way that
investments and70 depreciation in physical capital balance each other out at the steady state in the
classic Solow Growth Model.
In practical terms it is implausible that democracy can continue to have an unbounded
and monotonically increasing effect on economic policies and their outcomes if the political
regime in existence in a country satisfies all the requirements of a perfectly functioning
democracy. Moreover, research has not established that faster growth necessarily takes place in
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See Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation.
The typical formulation of the Solow Model (1956) assumes capital as one of two basic inputs to production (the
other being labor). Capital grows every successive period as long as consumption is lower than income. However,
existing capital depreciates and some of the savings from income is used to replace depreciated capital. The model
predicts increasing output per unit labor up to a steady state where the capital investment is just enough to balance
the depreciation. Democratic capital can also be thought of as depreciating because those in positions of authority
and power have an incentive to collect rents from holding public office by illegally or inappropriately extending
their stay in office or by exploiting loopholes in the rules and regulations governing such offices. In this way they
blunt the ideals of democracy unless a society takes steps to punish those who abuse their offices, and redefine the
rules and regulations so that these institutions run more effectively and safeguard against abuse as they are
discovered. This corresponds to the need for continuous investment resources in the maintenance of the democratic
“infrastructure” of a society.
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democracies compared to non-democracies (Acemoglu, 2009).71 What research has established
is that there is a high correlation between incomes and the democratic experience.72
However, the above considerations must be set aside in at least one setting. By
construction, the second derivative is negative for a curve, at least in the vicinity of a local (or
global) maximum. To avoid this confounding element, we use the raw totals of democracy
indexes instead of the depreciated running sum when measuring proportional changes in
democratic capital around takeoff into industrial growth.
We also made another minor technical adjustment to the democracy indexes in our
investigation. Our major dataset for democracy index is obtained from the Polity IV Project,
which publishes a yearly 21-point scale of measures of democracies (the polity2 variable). The
index ranges from negative 10 to positive 10, with the latter representing the highest level of
democracy possible. We used a translated scale (shifted by 10) that ranges from 0 to 20 to make
the taking of comparative proportions straightforward and more readily obvious.73 We also used
this translated scale and its index in deriving geometric means to calculate changes in democratic
capital before and after takeoff into industrial growth. The initial democratic capital and
depreciation rate combination used are from the first two chapters in this dissertation.
Sweden as Template for Takeoff into Industrial Growth
In this investigation we seek to analyze the relationship between democratic capital and
economic growth around the event of takeoff into industrial growth. The “Industrial Revolution”
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Acemoglu (2009; 851 ff.) gives an excellent overview of the current state of research of the relationship between
democracy and economic performance as a whole.
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This point is made by Figure 1 in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
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These two scales are perfectly correlated (Please see Chapter 1) and the covariance between their running sums
are the same as their individual variances.
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started in Great Britain around the middle of the eighteenth century. It then spread to other
countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, and across the Atlantic to the United
States.74 Although it would be theoretically pleasing to propose a model by which one could
declare what the true characteristics of takeoff into industrial growth (or “Industrial Revolution”)
must be—and it is indeed possible to have quite a large body of theoretical criteria for takeoff—
we chose to use the actual historical experience of those countries which were among the first to
take off into industrial growth. One advantage of this approach is to make the resulting criteria
less arbitrary.
The British experience (since by all accounts it was the first to industrialize starting in the
mid eighteenth century)75 would certainly qualify as among the best benchmarks for the
characteristic of an economy that took off into industrial growth. However, the events of the
Industrial Revolution in Britain are spread out over the period between 1750 and 185076 for
which we do not have reliable, readily available, and internationally comparable data. Choosing
Britain as benchmark would skip half the vital period over which the British economy took off
into industrial growth.
France was also launched into the Industrial Revolution shortly after Britain (Crafts,
1977).77 But whether from the political and social turmoil of the late eighteenth century (the
French Revolution) or the destabilization caused by the Napoleonic rule and wars, economic data
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for France dating back to the early 1800s is also not widely available. Similarly, Belgium,
another early entrant into the industrial age, also lacks widely available data for the period.
Germany, on the other hand, had yet to become a united country from its constituent states even
as at the time several of its smaller parts were all being affected in one form or the other by
events in Britain, France and other European countries. This has given rise to some amount of
confusion in dating the German takeoff into industrialization (Tipton, 1974).78
This leaves us with Sweden. There are many advantages of using Sweden as a template.
First, we have a continuous data series for both democratic measures as well as economic data.
We also have documentary evidence denoting 1799 as a time when the country had clearly not
taken off into industrial growth (Magnusson, 2000).79 And we do know that by 1830 the
Swedish economy had been launched into industrial growth (Magnusson, 2000).80 We can
therefore check the results of our criteria against the data of the economic history of Sweden.
We also know that Sweden was relatively a peaceful and unitary state within its borders, that it
did not face complicating factors such as social unrest, revolutions, external wars or invasions
during its entire history and especially around the start of and since the Industrial Revolution in
Europe. For the above reasons we have chosen the Swedish experience as our template for the
concept of takeoff into Industrial Growth.
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Criteria for Takeoff into Industrial Growth: Two Approaches
We settled on two frameworks for defining Takeoff: an Average Growth approach and a
combined Income and Average Growth Trends approach.
Average Growth Approach
In this framework, initial tests showed that a definitive trend in average growth for
Sweden emerged when we use a rolling 20-year average growth in per capita incomes (Figure 5).
Starting around 1821, this rolling mean became positive and growing for a period of at least 10
years.81 Although business cycle related variations in growth are also evident in this rolling
mean measure, the overall upward trend of this measure is clear for most of the 19th century. It
never fell below the initial value of 0.0022 or 0.02% (Figure 5). Using this framework, we
identified a clear "takeoff" point that coincided with the middle of the period during which
economic historians agree that Sweden’s industrial revolution occurred (Schon and Krantz,
2012) 82 namely around 1821. More precisely, this 20-year average growth framework for
takeoff is a combination of three sub-conditions, as detailed below.
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A drop in the trend occurred around 1832 and again in 1842, but the 20-year lagged average growth never fell
below the initial positive value.
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Figure 5: Average Growth—Sweden.
Note. – The figure shows a plot of Sweden’s 20-year average growth in GDP per capita.
Source.—GDP per Capita data is from The Maddison Project: Accessed at
http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm, version 2011 accessed December 17, 2013

Threshold 20-year Average Growth
A country is considered to have taken off into industrial growth when its 20-year average
growth in GDP per capita becomes greater than or equal to 0.02% (the initial average growth of
Sweden at the point when a pattern of sustained growth emerged; Figure 5).
Length of Time above the Threshold of 20-Year Average Growth
Additionally, a country is considered to have experienced takeoff into industrial growth,
when it sustains a 20-year average growth value that is greater than or equal to the threshold for
at least 15 years. Sweden experienced two downturns in economic growth after initially taking
off from the threshold. These events occur at 10- and 20-year periods following the point we
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initially identified as “takeoff.” We took the average between these two dips in the 20-year
average growth after takeoff and settled on 15 years of above threshold average growth. It must
be pointed out that notwithstanding these dips, the average growth did not go below the original
threshold.
Overall Positive Growth Trend of Lagged Average Growth
Finally, a country is considered to have taken off into industrial growth if in addition to
the two criteria above, a simple time series linear and/or quadratic regression fit of this 20-year
average growth has an overall positive trend, i.e., the estimates of the coefficient on the average
growth variable must be positive over the entire economic history of the country in question
(Figure 6).
Thus the year that all these three conditions are met for the first time is designated the
year of takeoff into industrial growth.83 If these conditions are never met in the entire economic
record of the country, we conclude that country has not yet taken off into industrial growth.
Combined Income and 20-year Average Growth Trends Approach
In this framework, we combined the fact that a country with an increasing trend in its
average growth would also post growing incomes (GDP per capita) for its citizens (Lucas,
2002).84 Takeoff must then be evidenced by both a threshold level of income enjoyed by its
citizens as well as a positive trajectory of its 20-year average growth. Using the HodrickPrescott filter, we separate out the trends for both the income and the income growth and identify
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threshold values based on the filtered levels of income and 20-year average growth (Figure 6).
The specific conditions for this framework are detailed below.

Figure 6: Income, Average Growth, and Fit Line for Sweden.
Note. – The figure shows 20-year average growth and income per capita trends (obtained using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter) and the linear fit (LFit) of income growth of Sweden. Source.—GDP per Capita
data is from The Maddison Project: Accessed at http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm, version
2011 accessed December 17, 2013.

Threshold Average Growth Trend Condition
A country which has taken off into industrial growth must have its 20-year average
growth trend value greater than or equal to the 0.03, the value of average growth trend for
Sweden after which it continued to be positive and increasing.
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Threshold Income per Capita Trend Condition
In this condition we propose that country which has taken off into industrial growth must
have a per capita income trend value that is equal to or greater than about half of the British per
capita income trend at the turn of the 19th century.85 Britain’s real GDP per capita non-trend
value at that point was equal to about $2000 and its income trend was at $2090 in 1800 (in 1990
United States dollars). The earliest date for the start of the industrial revolution in Britain is as
early as 1765. It is reasonable, therefore, to express the takeoff threshold of income per capita
relative to Britain’s level in 1800. Broadberry et al. (2010) estimated Britain’s GDP per capita
around the start of the Industrial Revolution to between 50 to 75% of the value in 1800.86
Length of Time above the Threshold of 20-year Lagged Average Growth Trend Condition
To the above two conditions we add the requirement that a country which has taken off
into industrial growth must have its 20-year average growth trend values sustained at a level
equal to or greater than the threshold average growth trend value for a period not less than 35
years.87 It must be noted that Sweden’s trend line in income and income growth using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter never fell below the threshold and never dipped significantly after the
initial period of takeoff (Figure 6).
Within this framework and for comparison purposes, the length of period above threshold
20-year lagged average growth was varied from 5 to 35 years in steps of 5 years. A period of
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between 20 and 30 years gave the best identifying statistic of what we know about the set of
industrialized countries today. We compared our own set of industrialized countries against the
World Bank Income classification of countries according to their 2012 GNI we found a very
close match. All of the countries our criteria identified as having taken off into industrial growth
are classified by the World Bank as either Upper Middle or High Income Countries.” 88
Indexes, Total Index, and Democratic Capital around Takeoff into Industrial Growth
Means Before and After Takeoff
If our hypothesis is correct, that the takeoff into industrial growth is crucial for how a
country designs its political system, we would expect that the average yearly democracy indexes
and democratic capital preceding the takeoff into industrial growth to be different from that of
the years after takeoff. We therefore obtained and compared the mean of democracy index
before and after takeoff into industrial growth for various time periods (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35,
and 40 years).
Percentage Change on Either Side of Takeoff into Industrial Growth
Assuming that the core relationship between democracy and income or income growth
changes around the takeoff event, we expect to see a change in the rate of growth of total
democracy indexes around a country’s takeoff into industrial growth. If democratic reforms
occur after takeoff into industrial growth as income increases, we can expect to find a speeding
up of the accumulation of total democracy indexes. We took the proportional change in total
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democracy indexes on either side of the takeoff into industrial growth among countries that were
identified as having taken off and then averaged them by income categories. These percentage
changes were obtained for different time periods (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 years) before and after
takeoff into industrial growth.
Percentage Change across the Event of Takeoff into Industrial Growth
If, according to our hypothesis, a change in the relationship between democracy and
income (and income growth) occurs around the takeoff into industrial growth, we expect that the
proportional change in democratic capital across the event of takeoff should be either always
positive or always negative depending on the nature of the change in the relationship. In this
paper following Przeworski and Limongi (1997), we hypothesize that the relationship will be
negative or inconclusive before takeoff and definitely positive afterwards. This implies that the
proportional change in democratic capital across takeoff into industrial growth must always be a
positive one. Once again we took this percentage change for different time periods across the
event of takeoff into industrial growth (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 years) and averaged the change by
income categories among the countries that were identified as having taken off into industrial
growth.
Proportion of Countries by Index after Takeoff
Assuming that when countries experience takeoff into industrial growth, democratic
reforms are more likely, we would expect that together as a group of “takeoff” countries, the
proportion of countries with yearly democracy indexes moving towards the ‘democracy’ side of
the scale to be increasing. We therefore ran a test on whether the proportion of takeoff countries
with specific yearly democracy indexes is increasing towards the democratic end of the scale as
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the length of time after the takeoff into industrial growth occurred is increased. We did this for
time periods of 5 to 35 years after the takeoff into industrial growth.
Average Growth by Index after Takeoff
Assuming that the relationship between democratic capital and income changes around
the event of takeoff into industrial growth, and that this change is a positive one, one could also
test whether this applies to annual growth rates of income or just increasing levels of income. To
see whether high growth rates in income coincided with high yearly democracy indexes after
takeoff into industrial growth, we took the average growth rates of income and compared them to
the average indexes over specified time periods after takeoff.
Panel Regressions
Empirical estimation going back to before the 1950s suffers from a serious lack of
covariates. Within this constraint we tested the relationship between income and democratic
capital around takeoff into industrial growth using fixed effects generalized method of moment
(GMM) panel estimation. GMM estimations allows for robust estimation in the presence of
arbitrary heteroskedasticity with only minimal distributional assumptions about the data. The
fixed effects will minimize the variation from factors unique to each country given the
unavailability of data for a significant number of controls. A time trend variable is also included
as a control.
Covariates for countries that are constant within panels (example surface area,
geographical location, dummy variables specific to country, region, colonial history, official
language, religion etc.) were not used because they would drop out of the estimation in this type
of (fixed effects) model specification. Thus we conducted the simplest of estimations of the
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relationship between democratic capital and income and income growth around takeoff into
industrial growth given by:

Income(Income Growth)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏1 BestFit_DCapi,𝑡−1 + 𝐁𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐥𝐬 i,𝑡−1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1)

where 𝐁 is a vector of coefficients for control variables (Controls). The variable
BestFit_DCapi,𝑡 is the best fit democratic capital obtained in the first essay of this dissertation.
The estimation is divided into three parts. First, we estimate the relationship over the full sample
of countries without any distinction in connection to the takeoff criteria. Then, we subdivided
the panels based on whether countries have experienced takeoff. Finally among the countries
that have taken off we estimate the relationship between democratic capital and income before
and after takeoff into industrial growth.
We expect the overall dataset to confirm a positive and statistically significant estimate of
the coefficient on democratic capital with respect to income as has been shown by Gerring et al.
(2005) and in Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation.89 We anticipate that there should not be any
qualitative difference in the coefficient on democratic capital between countries that have taken
of and those that have not. However, among countries that have taken off into industrial growth,
we expect that the relationship would be different depending on whether we are looking before
or after the takeoff into industrial growth.

89

That is, without variables representing Economic Freedom as controls.
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Test for Structural Break
If our test were to show a qualitative difference in the estimates for democratic capital on
income and income growth, a structural break is implied. Following Gould (2011), we test for
this by creating dummies for the subsets of data for countries that have taken off into industrial
growth specified by:
𝑦1 = 𝑋1 ∗ 𝑏1 + 𝑢1

(Equation for group 1 before Takeoff)

𝑦2 = 𝑋2 ∗ 𝑏2 + 𝑢2

(Equation for group 2- After Takeoff)

Combining and rearranging the equations yields:
𝑦 = 𝑏1 𝑿 + (𝑏2 − 𝑏1 )𝑑2 𝑋2 + 𝑑1 𝑢1 + 𝑑2 𝑢2
where 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 are dummy variables indicating the subset representing before and after,
takeoff and 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 are coefficients on democratic capital for subsets of country data before
and after the takeoff event and
X = (𝑋1 , 𝑋2) are covariates including the democratic capital variable.
Test H0: 𝑏2 = 𝑏1 or (𝑏2 − 𝑏1 ) = 0
To reject the null would indicate that there is indeed a structural break in the coefficients and that
the relationship does change around takeoff into industrial growth. Based on the modernization
theory of democratization (see Boix and Stokes, 2003), we expect that this relationship will
change and that there will indeed be a structural break in the coefficient on democratic capital.
Results
Criteria for Takeoff: Countries that Took Off
After applying the 20-year average growth framework criteria using the Swedish
experience as template, 44 countries qualified as having taken off into industrial growth (see
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Error! Reference source not found. for an excerpt). They include the usual Western countries and t

heir approximate date as evidenced in their economic histories. The combined income–growth
rate trends criteria resulted in 50 countries qualifying as having experienced takeoff into
industrial growth and sustaining the threshold levels for at least 20 years (see Error! Reference s
ource not found. for an excerpt).90 Some observations stand out. According to our criteria,

Britain took off into industrial growth later (1832) than Sweden and the United States (1821 for
each) under the first framework for takeoff. This feature is repeated in the combined income and
average growth framework criteria where, again, Sweden and the United States (1823) precede
the United Kingdom into the takeoff into industrial growth (1831). This seems to run counter to
the general consensus that the Industrial Revolution started in Great Britain.
Some factors need to be taken into account to explain this apparent anomaly. The most
important is that our framework for takeoff emphasizes income growth. The data shows that
Britain did indeed have a greater GDP per capita at the turn of the 18, century. On that basis
alone, it is clear that Britain was ahead in terms of the living standards of its citizens.
However, the twenty-year average of annual growth rate of Britain’s economy swung
more widely between positive and negative growth during the period between 1800 and 1830
(Figure 7)91 giving Britain a lower average growth overall during this period. The second
framework criteria for takeoff (that is, a combination of income and income growth trends),

90

Adjusting the criteria to be more or less restrictive changes the number of countries that would be classified as
having experienced takeoff into industrial growth. It is also clear that the two different frameworks produced
slightly different datasets.
91
Crafts, Nicholas. Journal of the European Economic Association. Volume 3, 2005 Issue; 2-3, pp. 525-534, for
example argues convincingly that improved industrial output during the “industrial revolution” did not necessarily
result in macroeconomic growth in GDP per capita until the 1830s.
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Table 19
Takeoff into Industrial Growth for Selected Countries – Average Growth Criteria
Country
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay

Year
Years
Mean
2010
Democratic
of Takeoff After Takeoff Income Growth Income ($)
Capital
1891
119.000
1.829
24095.680
482.010
1867
143.000
1.605
23556.820
489.437
1891
119.000
1.921
24941.240
497.561
1891
119.000
1.697
13883.180
371.438
1971
39.000
4.183
8031.945
74.343
1909
101.000
1.676
7062.505
498.766
1841
169.000
1.535
23512.630
494.983
1881
129.000
2.127
23290.480
485.009
1871
139.000
1.670
20661.450
477.119
1961
49.000
1.539
14690.730
443.140
1942
68.000
2.430
22013.140
484.533
1874
136.000
1.242
18520.430
472.859
1891
119.000
2.423
21934.900
482.762
1977
33.000
3.172
10094.490
317.355
1941
69.000
1.606
7715.665
293.282
1836
174.000
1.033
24302.620
493.222
1900
110.000
1.291
18886.160
498.947
1851
159.000
1.951
27987.200
496.451
1886
124.000
1.948
14279.050
397.768
1971
39.000
3.178
29037.560
169.415
1945
65.000
1.119
5080.122
410.743
1871
139.000
1.716
16797.430
407.610
1821
189.000
1.612
25306.370
493.598
1971
39.000
4.066
9372.209
315.396
1944
66.000
2.812
8224.861
395.803
1832
178.000
1.156
23777.160
497.783
1821
119.000
1.829
24095.680
499.787
1944
143.000
1.605
23556.820
409.168

Note. – The Table shows excerpts from the results of the criteria for takeoff into industrial growth using
conditions based on the average growth profile of Sweden. The conditions for takeoff are that a country must
record a 20-year average income growth of at least 0.02% sustained for not less than 15 years. It must also have
an overall positive income growth trend throughout its history. Democratic capital is the running sum—with
depreciation—of the transformed polity2 variable from the Polity IV Project dataset (Version 2011). The
transformation involves adding 10 to each observation to make the variable wholly positive. Democratic capital
presented is the best fit combination of initial democratic capital and depreciation rate obtained from paper 2 of
this dissertation. Income per capita data is from Angus Maddison dataset (2013). All calculations are by the
author.
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Table 20
Takeoff into Industrial Growth for Selected Countries—Income and Growth Trends Criteria
Country

Belgium
Brazil
Canada
China
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Japan
Korea-South
Malaysia
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Singapore
South-Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United-Kingdom
United-States
Uruguay
Venezuela

Year
Years
Mean
of Takeoff After Takeoff Income Growth (%)
1867
1920
1891
1978
1841
1881
1841
1871
1942
1891
1971
1968
1836
1851
1971
1886
1971
1945
1871
1823
1872
1831
1823
1905
1912

143.000
90.000
119.000
32.000
169.000
129.000
169.000
139.000
68.000
119.000
39.000
42.000
174.000
159.000
39.000
124.000
39.000
65.000
139.000
187.000
138.000
179.000
187.000
105.000
98.000

1.605
1.619
1.921
4.183
1.535
2.127
1.548
1.670
2.430
2.423
4.393
3.172
1.033
1.951
2.191
1.948
3.178
1.119
1.716
1.612
1.503
1.156
1.504
1.189
2.037

2010
Income
23556.820
6879.055
24941.240
8031.945
23512.630
23290.480
21477.480
20661.450
22013.140
21934.900
21700.860
10094.490
24302.620
27987.200
10762.460
14279.050
29037.560
5080.122
16797.430
25306.370
25033.240
23777.160
30491.340
11526.330
9874.358

2010
Democratic
Capital
489.746
353.978
498.961
74.434
495.074
495.786
458.200
477.210
497.221
482.853
352.254
372.514
493.390
496.611
332.231
397.859
245.877
418.841
407.701
493.689
500.000
497.874
499.877
409.452
379.374

Note. – The table shows excerpts from the results of the income and Income Growth Trends criteria for takeoff into
industrial growth based on Sweden’s economic history. According to this criteria, a country is considered to have
taken off into industrial growth when its income trend value is equal to half of the real income of the United
Kingdom in 1800, and the growth rate trend value is equal to 3% sustained for 20 years. Democratic capital is the
running sum (at a fixed depreciation rate) of the democracy index (Polity2 variable from the Polity IV Project
database, version 2011). The Polity2 variable is made positive by adding 10 (“Positive Democracy Index”) to each
observation. The democratic capital formulation is the best fit combination of assumed initial democratic capital
and depreciation rate obtained in paper 2 of this dissertation. The trend values for income and income growth are
obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. All calculations are by the author. Source. – Democratic capital
(calculated from the Polity2 variable) is from Polity IV (version 2011) dataset. Income per capita data is from
Angus Maddison dataset (2013).
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Figure 7: Twenty-year Average Growth for Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Note. The figure is a time series plot of the 20-year average growth for the United Kingdom and
Sweden. Source -Income data is obtained from the Maddison Project database (version 2013).
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does not resolve the anomaly either, as can be seen in Figure 6), and in the results of the second
framework criteria for takeoff (Table 20). I considered alternative criteria based solely on the
income of Britain in 1800. But this produced even less appealing results.92
In the end, the best explanation for the anomaly is that Britain was in a spell of slow
growth between 1800 and 1830. This fact, as it turns out, is confirmed by Broadberry et al. in
their 2011 study of British incomes from original sources covering the period between 1270 and
1870. Their estimates of GDP trend around the turn of the 18th century show that Britain
experienced rapid growth between 1780 and 1801 and then returned to higher growth only after
1830, a fact that is also evident in Maddison’s estimates of its GDP per capita growth (Figure 7).
Another interesting observation involves China. In the stand-alone 20-year average
growth approach, China took off into industrial growth in 1971 (Table 19), whereas in the
combined Income and Income Growth Trends criteria, the date is pushed forward to 1978 (Table
20) . This latter date conforms very well with China’s recent economic history. Major economic
policy change in China occurred after December of 1978, when the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist party adopted Den Xiaoping's agenda for reform toward a market economy.
Implementation started in 1979 (Morrison 2014).93 However, the earlier date shows that the
foundation for takeoff for even more dramatic growth may have been laid much earlier. This

92

Countries which discover large oil reserves or some other marketable natural resources can increase income levels
in a relatively short time high incomes without actual takeoff into growth. For example Equatorial Guinea recorded
dramatic increase after its discovery of oil in 1996 but has clearly not taken off into industrial growth. There is little
industry within the country, and electricity, water supply, infrastructure are in scarce supply whilst, inequality,
corruption and poverty are rife. Moreover, on the basis of income criteria alone, some industrialized countries
example Sweden, Germany, etc. result in takeoff times as late as the early of the 20 th century!
93
Morrison (2014) China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States,
Congressional Research Service, CSR Report prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, 2014, p.1. Also
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Figure 8: Real Income Growth Trends of Sweden, United States, and the United Kingdom.
Note.–-The figure shows the time series plot of the income growth trends for the United Kingdom, United
States, and Sweden. The trend values were obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. Source.–-Income
data is obtained from the Maddison Project database (version 2013).

see MacFarquhar, Roderick (1987). "The succession to Mao and the end of Maoism". In Roderick MacFarquhar.
The Politics of China (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 320.
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Figure 9: Income Trajectory—Selected Countries
Note.—The figure shows a plot of yearly income per capita (1990 US international dollars) trends for the
United States (US), Sweden, United Kingdom (UK), Belgium and France obtained using the HodrickPrescott filter. Source.—GDP per Capita data is from The Maddison Project: Accessed at
http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm, version 2011 accessed December 17, 2013.
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Table 21
Correlation: Incomes, Average Growth, and Democratic Capital
(Takeoff Countries)
Average Growth Framework
Criteria for Takeoff
Mean
Years
Growth
After Takeoff

2010 Income
Mean Growth
Years After Takeoff
Democratic Capital

2010 Income
Mean Growth
Years After Takeoff
Democratic Capital

2010
Democratic
Income
Capital
1.000
-0.274
1.000
0.612
-0.672
1.000
0.429
-0.719
0.682
1.000
Income and Income Growth Trends Framework
Criteria for Takeoff
2010
Mean
Years
Democratic
Income
Growth
After Takeoff
Capital
1.000
-0.116
1.000
0.571
-0.716
1.000
0.539
-0.685
0.740
1.000

Note. – The table shows the matrix of Pearson’s correlation coefficients among income per capita, average growth,
number of years after takeoff into industrial growth, and democratic capital in 2010. Democratic capital is the
running sum (at a fixed depreciation rate) of the democracy index (Polity2 variable from the Polity IV Project
database, version 2011). The Polity2 variable is made positive by adding 10 (“Positive Democracy Index”) to each
observation. The specific democratic capital formulation is the best fit combination of assumed initial democratic
capital and depreciation rate obtained in paper 2 of this dissertation. The Average Growth framework criteria require
that a country experiences a 20-year average income growth of at least 0.02% sustained for not less than 15 years. It
must also have an overall positive income growth trend throughout its history in the dataset. The Income and
Income Growth Trends framework criteria, requires a country to experience an income trend value equal to half of
the real income trend value of the United Kingdom in 1800, a trend value of growth rate equal to 3%, and sustained
for at least 20 years after the point of takeoff. All calculations are by the author. Source. – Democratic capital
(calculated from the Polity2 variable) is from Polity IV (version 2011) dataset. Income per capita data is from Angus
Maddison dataset (2013).

123
Korea, with the exception of Hong Kong, which has now been subsumed under China) and
Malaysia.
Comparisons in Democratic Capital and Indexes around Takeoff into Industrial Growth
Means Before and After Takeoff
In both frameworks for the criteria for takeoff into industrial growth, the means94 of
democracy indexes (Figure 10) and democratic capital95 (Figure 11) after takeoff into industrial
growth (that is at 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 years after takeoff) is always greater than before across all
by income levels. The difference between the means across the takeoff event appears to become
larger the further away the country is from the event of takeoff at all income levels. The change
in means is, however, more pronounced at the extreme ends of income categories: that is, at high
and very low incomes.
Percentage Change on Either Side of Takeoff
We used different periods to measure proportional change in democratic capital on either
side of the takeoff event. The size of proportional change in democratic capital around takeoff
into industrial growth depends on the specific type of underlying index used. The democratic
capital constructed using the actual (raw) polity2 index (i.e., the full scale ranging from -10 to
+10) produces a greater proportional change immediately after the takeoff into industrial growth.
The full scale positive index based democratic capital (that is polity2 plus 10) of democratic

94

We took the arithmetic and geometric means of the sum of raw indexes as well as the geometric mean of the
running sum (raw totals and depreciated totals, of the positive democracy indexes).
95
Figure 8 shows geometric means in which each country in the income categories is given equal weight, thus
minimizing the effect of the extreme values. There is a wide variation in democratic capital within each income
category.
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Figure 10: Mean of Democracy Indexes around Takeoff.
Note.—The figure shows a plot of the mean of democracy indexes at specific periods before and After Takeoff into
industrial Growth. All calculations are by the author. Source –Polity IV Project Database, version 2011, URL:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, accessed on December 31, 2013.
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Figure 11: Mean Democratic Capital around Takeoff.
Note.—The figure shows a plot of the geometric mean of democratic capital at 10 years before and after takeoff into
industrial growth. All calculations are by the author. Source –Polity IV Project Database, version 2011, URL:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, accessed on December 31, 2013.

capital showed a decreasing proportional change after takeoff into industrial growth the closer
we are to the takeoff event. Nevertheless, it too becomes positive after a longer time period.
Percentage Change across the Event of Takeoff into Industrial Growth
The proportional change in the mean of democracy indexes across the takeoff event is
always positive and is also generally higher for lower income countries (Figure 12, categories 0
and 1 levels of income). The proportional change in democratic capital across the takeoff event
varies with distance from the takeoff event without any apparent trend. Higher income countries
(category 3) show an increasing trend in proportional changes, while low-income countries
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Figure 12: Percentage Change in Mean Democracy Indexes across Takeoff.
Note.—The figure shows a plot of the percentage change in Total Democracy index across the event of Takeoff into
industrial Growth. There are equal periods on either side of the takeoff. Ten years across represents 5 years on
either side, 20, 10 years on either side and so on. All calculations are by the author. Source –Polity IV Project
Database, version 2011, URL: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, accessed on December 31, 2013
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(category 0) show high proportional change closer to the takeoff event to be followed by a period
of decline and eventual recovery as we move farther away. Lower middle income and middle
income countries show a tendency to have the highest proportional change at the middle distance
(15 and 20 years) on either side of the takeoff event.
Average Democracy Index and Average Growth after Takeoff into Industrial Growth
This holds true at all levels of income, as well as at various points after the takeoff event.
In the average growth rate framework criteria, there appeared to be a trend towards higher
growth around the middle of the scale (around zero) at 10-15 years after takeoff (Figure 13), but
that pattern breaks down as we move further away from the takeoff event. However, high
growth rates seem to be concentrated at both ends of the spectrum, (low and high democracy
index countries) the further away we move from the points of takeoff into industrial growth.

Proportion of Countries by Index after Takeoff
We also tested to see whether as a group the countries which have taken off into
industrial growth show improvements in their democratic credentials over time, that is, whether
the proportion of countries that maintained a certain level of democracy type index or better after
the takeoff event is increasing with time. Figure 14 shows that among countries that have taken
off into industrial growth, and within each range of democracy indexes, the proportion of
countries with the upper bound of the range or better is increasing with time (i.e., after the
takeoff event).
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Figure 13: Growth Rates by Average Democracy indexes after Takeoff.
Note.—The figure shows a plot of the average index by average growth rate (percentages) at specific periods after
takeoff into industrial growth. All calculations are by the author. Source –Polity IV Project Database, version 2011,
URL: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, accessed on December 31, 2013
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Figure 14: Proportion of Democracy Indexes by Group after Takeoff into Industrial Growth
Note.—The figure shows the proportion of countries which have taken off into industrial growth and which showed
improved democracy indexes (i.e., at specific levels or better). Each category represents a range of the Polity IV
Project democracy indexes. The percentages of countries (within each range) which have taken off and which
observed a democracy index at the upper bound of each range or better, at regular intervals after takeoff are
presented. All calculations are by the author. Source –Polity IV Project Database, version 2011, URL:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, accessed on December 31, 2013;
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Panel Regressions
We estimated the coefficients on the best fit democratic capital relative to income and
income growth, using fixed effects panel regression. Lack of macroeconomic data for most
countries going back to the late 18th and early 19th centuries (Error! Reference source not found.) l
imits the number of control variables that can be used in the estimations. Our controls are
therefore limited to lagged average growth in incomes, which absorbs all prior effects on income
and income growth,
political regime durability, lagged income levels (to account for the convergence effect upon
growth), and a trend variable.
In addition, for many of the countries that–based on our criteria–qualified as having taken
off into industrial growth, we have little data for the period preceding the takeoff. For some,
especially the Western countries, takeoff occurred at a time long before the modern era of data
collection. For others, the takeoff into industrial growth occurred soon after the first observation
in the data. The overall effect is a limitation on the amount of observations available for the pretakeoff period for most of these countries.
Democratic Capital and Income and the Takeoff into Industrial Growth
by Categories of Countries
Our results show that democratic capital has a positive correlation with income, with high
statistical significance for the full sample for both framework criteria for takeoff (i.e., all
countries without distinction between countries that may or may not have taken off into
industrial growth; see Table 22 andTable 23). This result is also repeated in each sub-category
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of countries; that is, among those which have experienced takeoff and those which have not, with
the exception of the takeoff countries under the income and income growth trends framework

Table 22
Democratic Capital and Income – Average Growth Criteria
Country Category
Democracy Index
Democratic Capital(Dcap)
Regime Durability
Relative Age
Lagged Average Growth
Trend
Constant(𝛂)

All Countries
Polity2
Binary
0.994***
10.200***
(0.139)
(3.090)
1.320**
1.430***
(0.558)
(0.536)
0.280
0.744***
(0.248)
(0.216)
108. 000***
114. 000***
(4.350)
(4.750)
-15.300***
-15.200***
(0.430)
(0.563)
3575.000***
3674.000***
(85.000)
(110.000)

Non-Takeoff Countries
Polity2
Binary
1.020***
9.610***
(0.158)
(2.430)
0.854*
1.300***
(0.512)
(0.493)
0.444***
0.833***
(0.122)
(0.176)
103. 000***
108. 000***
(4.580)
(4.770)
-15.100***
-14.100***
(0.449)
(0.610)
3608.000***
3890.000***
(89.900)
(142.000)

Takeoff Countries
Polity2
Binary
0.766***
6.750***
(0.060)
(0.454)
2.010***
1.390***
(0.100)
(0.127)
0.029
0.369***
(0.097)
(0.134)
117. 000***
116. 000***
(3.260)
(3.880)
-15.000***
15.500***
(0.118)
(0.149)
3882.000***
3913.000***
(23.400)
(30.400)

(Continued on the following page)
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Table 22 (continued)
Observations
Hansen’s J-Statistic (P-value)
Akaike’s Information Criteria
Log Likelihood
Rho

7820.000
0.066
-1860.175
1070.087
0.576

6586.000
0.132
-1602.751
929.375
0.723

3583.000
0.870
-1284.471
732.235
0.818

3125.000
0.579
-1520.104
844.052
0.853

4237.000
0.945
-665.293
387.646
0.228

3461.000
0.122
-222.258
160.129
0.241

Note. The table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of the equation, Incomei,𝑡 = α +
Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income is log of per capita income, α is the intercept term, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on
democratic capital, 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown in the first column after the fourth row in the table. 𝜸
is the intercept term associated with 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. Each model shows the estimates
for categories of countries based on whether they have taken off into industrial growth, subdivided into democracy index types. The criteria for
takeoff into industrial growth examines whether countries achieve Sweden’s income and income growth profile around the 1810-1830 period
when the country is considered to have taken off into industrial growth. A country has taken off into industrial growth, if it experiences a 20year average income growth of 0.02% sustained for at least 15 years. It must also have an overall positive trend in income growth over its entire
economic history within the dataset. All estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. The estimation method is a fixed
effects two-step generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time indicator variables for every
five year period, that is the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the instruments. The optimal weighting matrix (the inverse
of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated using the Newey-West
kernel with bandwidth equal to 5. Significance levels are given by asterisks where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value
<0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita due to the individual effects. Democratic capital (Dcap) is calculated by first
adding 10 to the (“Full Scale”) Polity2 index (𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, “Positive Democracy Index” in the text and then calculating a running sum at a fixed
depreciation rate (𝜌). That is Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 , where 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time indicators respectively. For
democratic capital of the “Binary Index” we replace the “Full Scale Index” with a dummy indicator variable equal to 1 for all strictly positive
values of polity2 and 0 otherwise. The specific democratic capital used in the estimation was obtained from paper 2 in this dissertation. It
assumes a depreciation rate of 4% and initial democratic capital of approximately a quarter of the maximum possible. Relative age is calculated
as the ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of years since the first observation in the data) to the number of years it will take
for a country to get to the steady state of democratic capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions of perfect democracy index for each
year and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in democratic capital. The errors are assumed to be normal, identical and independently distributed
with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log likelihood calculations. Source. Democratic capital (calculated by the author using
the Polity2 Index) and Regime Durability are from Polity IV (version 2011).
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Table 23
Democratic Capital and Income – Income and Average Growth Trends Criteria
Country Category
Democracy Index
Democratic Capital(Dcap)
Regime Durability
Relative Age
Lagged Growth
Trend
Constant(𝛂)

All Countries
Full Scale
Binary
0.722***
7.370***
(0.128)
(2.770)
1.350***
591.000
(0.436)
(0.556)
0.296
0.776***
(0.184)
(0.275)
114. 000***
120. 000***
(3.760)
(4.560)
15.600***
15.900***
(0.373)
(0.580)
3565.000*** 3542.000***
(75.200)
(114.000)

Non-Takeoff Countries
Full Index
Binary
1.180***
16.800***
(0.251)
(4.010)
3.950***
4.270***
(0.666)
(1.340)
0.012
0.325*
(0.179)
(0.168)
114. 000***
119. 000***
(5.110)
(4.630)
12.000***
9.270***
(0.457)
(0.573)
4208.000*** 4803.000***
(96.500)
(110. 000)

Takeoff Countries
Full Index
Binary
0.193
0.901
(0.136)
(2.750)
0.085
-1.040*
(0.460)
(0.552)
0.225
0.427
(0.229)
(0.318)
110. 000***
111. 000***
(4.450)
(5.520)
17.600***
18.700***
(0.444)
(0.678)
3564.000*** 3417.000***
(89.800)
(125. 000)

(Continued on the following page)
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Table 23 (Continued)
Observations
Hansen's J-Stat P-value
Akaike's Information Criteria
Log Likelihood
Rho

8083.000
0.756
-2072.883
1174.441
0.574

6786.000
0.334
-1272.405
761.202
0.597

2185.000
0.979
-976.091
543.045
0.894

1978.000
0.871
-472.526
287.263
0.908

5898.000
0.485
-1340.823
758.411
0.937

4808.000
0.417
-1024.310
591.155
0.942

Note. The table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of the equation, Incomei,𝑡 = α +
Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income is log of per capita income, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic
capital, 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown in the first column after the fourth row in the table. 𝜸 is the
intercept term associated with 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. Each model shows the estimates for
categories of countries based on whether they have taken off into industrial growth, subdivided into democracy index types. The criteria for
takeoff into industrial growth examines whether countries achieve Sweden’s income and income growth trends around the 1810-1830 period
when the country is considered to have taken off into industrial growth. The income and income Growth trends framework criteria requires
that a country experiences an income trend value equal to half of the real income of the United Kingdom in 1800, a trend value of average
growth rate of income equal to 3%, and sustained for at least 20 years after the point of takeoff. All estimates of coefficients and standard
errors are in thousandths. The estimation method is a fixed effects two-step generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time
trend is instrumented by time indicator variables for every five year period, that is the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z
are the instruments. The optimal weighting matrix (the inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix (heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated using the Newey-West kernel with bandwidth equal to 3. Significance levels are given by
asterisks where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita due to the
individual effects. Democratic capital (Dcap) is calculated by first adding 10 to the (“Full Scale”) Polity2 index (𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, “Positive
Democracy Index” in the text and then calculating a running sum at a fixed depreciation rate (𝜌). That is Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 −
ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 , where 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time indicators respectively. For democratic capital of the “Binary Index” we replace the “Full
Scale Index” with a dummy variable equal to 1 for all strictly positive values of polity2 and 0 otherwise. The specific democratic capital used
in the estimation was obtained from paper 2 in this dissertation. It assumes a depreciation rate of 4% and initial democratic capital of
approximately a quarter of the maximum possible. Relative age is calculated as the ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of
years since the first observation in the data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to the steady state of democratic capital (to
four decimal places) under the conditions of perfect democracy index for each year and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in democratic capital.
The errors are assumed to be normal, identical and independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log
likelihood calculations. Source. Democratic capital (calculated by the author using the Polity2 Index) and Regime Durability are from Polity
IV (version 2011).
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criteria (Table 23). In this case, the estimates of these coefficients are positive but not
statistically significant.
By Takeoff Period for Countries which have Taken Off
Our panel regressions also show that, for countries that have taken off into industrial
growth and in both framework criteria, there is a negative correlation with income before takeoff
and a positive one after takeoff (see Table 24 and 25). The estimates are all statistically
significant and the results hold for the best fit democratic capital based on both the binary and
the full scale (positive) indexes.
Average growth in income maintains the same sign across the takeoff into industrial
growth. Relative age is negative in all but the full scale after the takeoff event. Regime
durability followed a similar pattern as democratic capital in both framework criteria for
takeoff—that is, negative before and positive estimates after takeoff. Average growth is not
statistically significant for the binary index before takeoff, but this could be because of the rather
small number of observations available.
Democratic Capital and Income Growth and Takeoff into Industrial Growth
by Categories of Countries
In relation to the average growth criteria for takeoff, the estimates of the coefficient on
democratic capital are not consistent in their signs or statistical significance across the categories
of countries and across underlying index of democracy (Table 26). The signs are negative for
takeoff countries but statistically significant only in relation to the democratic capital based on
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Table 24
Democratic Capital and Income around Takeoff – Average Growth Criteria
Variables
Period Around Takeoff
Democratic Capital(Dcap)

Full Scale Index
Binary Index
Before Takeoff After Takeoff
Before Takeoff After Takeoff
-0.448***
0.685***
-4.210**
7.550***
(0.091)
(0.103)
(1.780)
(0.767)
Regime Durability
-0.457
1.500***
-0.752
0.842***
(0.520)
(0.214)
(0.575)
(0.168)
Relative Age
0.123***
-0.193
0.061**
0.023
(0.033)
(0.281)
(0.028)
(0.213)
Average Growth
19.900**
120.000***
10.300
118.000***
(9.930)
(5.950)
(0.013)
(5.610)
Trend
7.660***
15.200***
7.630***
16.000***
(0.383)
(0.212)
(0.622)
(0.287)
Constant(𝛂)
5434.000***
3932.000***
5355.000***
3908.000***
(0.057)
(0.055)
(0.107)
(0.071)
Observations
304.000
3917.000
248.000
3201.000
Hansen’s J-Statistic (P-value)
0.258
0.154
0.230
0.173
Akaike’s Information Criteria
-308.886
-626.324
-212.379
-452.169
Log Likelihood
175.443
368.162
123.189
275.084
Rho
0.050
0.275
0.101
0.248
Note. – The table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of the
equation, Incomei,𝑡 = α + Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income is log of per capita
income, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic capital, 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients on 𝐗, a matrix of
control variables shown in the first column after the fourth row in the table. 𝜸 is the intercept term associated with
𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. Each model shows the estimates for
countries that have taken off into industrial growth divided into periods before and after the takeoff event and
further grouped into types of democracy indexes on which democratic capital is calculated. The criteria for takeoff
into industrial growth examines whether countries achieve Sweden’s income growth trends around the 1810-1830
period when the country is considered to have taken off into industrial growth. A country has taken off into
industrial growth, if it experiences a 20-year average income growth of 0.02% sustained for at least 15 years. It
must also have an overall positive trend in income growth over its entire economic history within the dataset. All
estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. The estimation method is a fixed effects two-step
generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time indicator variables
for every five year period, that is the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the instruments.
The optimal weighting matrix (the inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix
(heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated using the Newey-West kernel with bandwidth equal
to 3. Significance levels are given by asterisks where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value
<0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita due to the individual effects. Democratic capital
(Dcap) is calculated by first adding 10 to the (“Full Scale”) Polity2 index (𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, “Positive Democracy Index”
in the text and then calculating a running sum at a fixed depreciation rate (𝜌). That is Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 +
(1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 , where 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time indicators respectively. For democratic capital of the
“Binary Index” we replace the “Full Scale Index” with a dummy variable equal to 1 for all strictly positive values
of polity2 and 0 otherwise. The specific democratic capital used in the estimation was obtained from paper 2 in
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this dissertation. It assumes a depreciation rate of 4% and initial democratic capital of approximately a quarter of
the maximum possible. Relative age is calculated as the ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of
years since the first observation in the data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to the steady
state of democratic capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions of perfect democracy index for each year
and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in democratic capital. The errors are assumed to be normal, identical and
independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log likelihood calculations. All
calculations are by the author. Source. Democratic capital (calculated by the author using the Polity2 Index) and
Regime Durability are from Polity IV (version 2011).
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Table 25
Democratic Capital and Income around Takeoff – Income and Average Growth Trends Criteria
Period Around Takeoff
Democratic Capital(Dcap)
Regime Durability
Relative Age
Lagged Growth
Trend
Constant(𝛂)

Observations
Hansen's J-Stat P-value
Akaike's Information Criteria
Log Likelihood
Rho

Full Scale Index
Before
After
-1.510***
0.321**
(0.265)
(0.147)
-0.806
0.808
(0.567)
(0.493)
-0.293
0.286
(0.182)
(0.361)
87.000*** 108.000***
(6.690)
(4.970)
5.610***
17.00***
(1.540)
(0.533)
3631.000***
(98.800)
264.000
5634.000
0.214
0.128
-685.624
-1516.820
347.812
846.410
0.992
0.937

Binary Index
Before
After
-30.800***
6.220*
(3.880)
(3.230)
-0.634**
0.125
(0.275)
(0.598)
-1.150***
-0.113
(0.280)
(0.386)
120.000*** 112.000***
(10.900)
(6.070)
14.700***
17.000***
(1.210)
(0.739)
4267.000***
(141.000)
154.000
4115.000
0.319
0.168
-394.203
-730.377
202.101
428.189
0.997
0.932

Note. – The table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation
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of the equation, Incomei,𝑡 = α + Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income is log of per
capita income, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic capital, 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients
on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown in the first column after the fourth row in the table. 𝜸 is the
intercept term associated with 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term.
Each model shows the estimates for countries that have taken off into industrial growth divided into periods
before and after the takeoff event and further grouped into types of democracy indexes on which
democratic capital is calculated. The criteria for takeoff into industrial growth examines whether countries
achieve Sweden’s income growth trends around the 1810-1830 period when the country is considered to
have taken off into industrial growth. The Income and Income Growth Trends framework criteria, requires
a country to experience an income trend value equal to half of the real income of the United Kingdom in
1800, a trend value of growth rate of income equal to 3%, and sustained for at least 20 years after the point
of takeoff. The trend values are obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. All estimates of coefficients and
standard errors are in thousandths. The estimation method is a fixed effects two-step generalized method of
moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time indicator variables for every five
year period, that is the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the instruments. The
optimal weighting matrix (the inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix
(heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated using the Newey-West kernel with
bandwidth equal to 3. Significance levels are given by asterisks where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value
<0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita due to the individual
effects. Democratic capital (Dcap) is calculated by first adding 10 to the (“Full Scale”) Polity2 index
(𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, “Positive Democracy Index” in the text) and then calculating a running sum at a fixed
depreciation rate (𝜌). That is Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 , where 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time
indicators respectively. For democratic capital of the “Binary Index” we replace the “Full Scale Index”
with a dummy variable equal to 1 for all strictly positive values of polity2 and 0 otherwise. The specific
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democratic capital used in the estimation was obtained from paper 2 in this dissertation. It assumes a
depreciation rate of 4% and initial democratic capital of approximately a quarter of the maximum possible.
Relative age is calculated as the ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of years since the
first observation in the data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to the steady state of
democratic capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions of perfect democracy index for each year
and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in democratic capital. The errors are assumed to be normal, identical
and independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log likelihood
calculations. All calculations are by the author. Source. Democratic capital (calculated by the author using
the Polity2 Index) and Regime Durability are from Polity IV (version 2011).
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Table 26
Democratic Capital and Income Growth – Average Growth Criteria
Country Category
Democracy Index
Democratic Capital(Dcap)

All Countries
Non-Takeoff Countries
Takeoff Countries
Full Scale
Binary
Full Scale
Binary
Full Scale
Binary
0.021
0.595
0.055*
0.882
-0.023
-1.230**
(0.019)
(0.576)
(0.031)
(0.603)
(0.024)
(0.574)
Regime Durability
-0.028
-0.107
-0.104
-0.117
-0.101
-0.228**
(0.056)
(0.087)
(0.094)
(0.101)
(0.069)
(0.097)
Relative Age
-0.017
0.002
0.083**
0.144***
-0.022
-0.012
(0.040)
(0.027)
(0.036)
(0.045)
(0.036)
(0.044)
Average Growth
-0.713
-1.350
5.390***
8.010***
-2.450
1.730
(2.270)
(2.930)
(1.680)
(1.860)
(1.860)
(2.450)
Lagged Income
-22.200
-17.500
-0.075***
-96.700***
-13.200
-51.600***
(18.200)
(23.400)
(13.300)
(13.000)
(14.100)
(17.900)
Trend
0.431
0.345
1.320***
1.690***
0.457
1.350***
(0.374)
(0.535)
(0.238)
(0.296)
(0.290)
(0.399)
Constant(𝛂)
62.900
50.100
239.000***
312.000***
53.200
149.000***
(50.000)
(54.100)
(46.900)
(41.600)
(46.100)
(53.300)
Observations
7818.000
6553.000
3581.000
3123.000
4237.000
3461.000
Hansen's J-Stat p-value
0.141
0.212
0.154
0.134
0.246
0.270
Akaike's Information Criteria -21115.000 -17430.000 -9239.000
-7997.000
-12000.000 -9511.000
Log Likelihood
10698.000
8844.000
4711.000
4083.000
6056.000
4805.000
Rho
0.349
0.366
0.527
0.577
0.132
0.131
(Continued on the following page)
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Note. – The table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of the equation, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝐷𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝑿 𝑖,𝑡−1 𝛽 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income Growth is growth of per capita income, 𝛼 is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on
democratic capital, 𝛽 is a vector of coefficients on 𝑿, a matrix of control variables shown in the first column after the fourth row in the table. 𝛾
is the intercept term associated with 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. Each model shows the estimates
for categories of countries based on whether they have taken off into industrial growth, subdivided into democracy index types. The criteria for
takeoff into industrial growth examines whether countries achieve Sweden’s average income growth profile around the 1810-1830 period when
the country is considered to have taken off into industrial growth. A country has taken off into industrial growth, if it experiences a 20-year
average income growth of 0.02% sustained for at least 15 years. It must also have an overall positive trend in income growth over its entire
economic history within the dataset. All estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. The estimation method is a fixed effects
two-step generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time indicator variables for every five year
period, that is the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝑍′(𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)] = 0 where Z are the instruments. The optimal weighting matrix (the inverse of the S
matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated using the Newey-West kernel with
bandwidth automatically selected using the Newey and West (1994) procedure. Significance levels are given by asterisks where *= p-value
<0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita growth due to the individual effects.
Democratic capital (𝐷𝑐𝑎𝑝) is calculated by first adding 10 to the (“Full Scale”) Polity2 index (𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, “Positive Democracy Index” in the text
and then calculating as a running sum at a fixed depreciation rate (𝜌). That is 𝐷𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌)𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝 𝑖,𝑡−1 , where 𝑖 and 𝑡, are
country and time indicators respectively. For democratic capital of the “Binary Index” we replace the “Full Scale Index” with a dummy indicator
variable equal to 1 for all strictly positive values of polity2 and 0 otherwise. The specific democratic capital used in the estimation was obtained
from paper 2 in this dissertation. It assumes a depreciation rate of 4% and initial democratic capital of approximately a quarter of the maximum
possible value. Relative age is calculated as the ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of years since the first observation in the
data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to the steady state of democratic capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions
of perfect democracy index for each year and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in democratic capital. The errors are assumed to be normal,
identical and independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log likelihood calculations. Source. Democratic
capital (calculated by the author using the Polity2 Index) and Regime Durability are from Polity IV (version 2011).
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the binary index. In contrast, democratic capital is positive for non-takeoff countries but
statistically significant only in relation to the full scale of democratic capital. The full
dataset shows positive and statistically nonsignificant estimates for democratic capital of both
types.
Regime durability is consistently negative but statistically significant only in relation to
the binary index of democracy. The lagged income levels have estimates that are consistent with
the prediction of the convergence theory: they are negative and statistically significant for the
most part across all categories. Average growth estimates also show some variation in the signs
of the estimates as well as in their statistical significance.
In relation to democratic capital, income growth, and the takeoff into industrial growth
based on the income and income growth trends criteria, it turns out that the estimates on
democratic capital are mostly positive and statistically significant (Table 27). Regime durability
is negative and statistically significant for full scale index based democratic capital for the allcountries category but positive and statistically significant for the binary index based democratic
capital and for the takeoff countries category. Lagged average growth is positive and statistically
significant across all the categories, with the exception of the binary index based democratic
capital for all countries. Income levels are negatively correlated and statistically significant.
By Takeoff Period for Countries which have Taken Off
In relation to income growth and in the first framework criteria for takeoff (the average
growth criteria), the estimates of the coefficient on democratic capital show changing signs going
from before to after the takeoff into industrial growth (Table 28). The direction of the change of
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Table 27
Democratic Capital, Income Growth and Takeoff – Income and Average Growth Trends Criteria
All Countries
Democracy Index
Full Scale
Binary
Democratic Capital(Dcap)
-0.036
0.401
(0.034)
(0.688)
Regime Durability
-0.255**
-0.084
(0.113)
(0.114)
Relative Age
0.175**
0.001
(0.078)
(0.037)
Lagged Growth
12.500***
3.280
(2.660)
(2.330)
Income Levels
-134.000***
-40.700*
(24.800)
(20.800)
Trend
2.810***
0.766
(0.522)
(0.533)
Constant(𝛂)
345.000***
125.000***
(67.600)
(39.700)
Observations
8083.000
6786.000
Hansen's J-Stat P-value
0.731
0.336
Akaike's Information Criteria -20556.070
-17981.050
Log Likelihood
10417.034
9116.525
Rho
0.113
0.116

Non-Takeoff Countries
Takeoff Countries
Full Scale
Binary
Full Scale
Binary
0.135***
0.475
0.024**
0.001***
(0.028)
(0.741)
(0.0119)
(0.307)
0.022
-0.294
-0.038
0.179***
(0.109)
(0.217)
(0.035)
(0.053)
0.136***
0.158***
-0.021
-0.012
(0.033)
(0.046)
(0.026)
(0.018)
8.540***
7.740***
2.620***
-1.460*
(0.810)
(1.180)
(0.483)
(0.825)
-93.500***
-76.800***
-36.700***
15.300***
(5.050)
(7.230)
(3.050)
(4.700)
1.780***
1.460***
0.700***
0.582***
(0.093)
(0.173)
(0.058)
(0.106)
269.000***
229.000***
96.900***
-24.300
(20.600)
(33.600)
(12.600)
(18.900)
2185.000
1978.000
5898.000
4808.000
1.000
0.994
0.188
0.055
-4858.747
-4311.473
-17355.450
-13838.590
2485.373
2207.736
8766.724
6999.295
0.070
0.063
0.062
0.067
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Note. – The Table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of the equation, Income Growthi,𝑡 = α +
Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income Growth is growth of per capita income, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic capital,
𝛃 is a vector of coefficients on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown in the first column after the fourth row in the table. 𝜸 is the intercept term associated with
𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. Each model shows the estimates for categories of countries based on whether they
have taken off into industrial growth, subdivided into democracy index types. The criteria for takeoff into industrial growth examines whether countries achieve
Sweden’s income and income growth trends around the 1810-1830 period when the country is considered to have taken off into industrial growth. The Income
and Income Growth trends framework criteria, requires a country to experience an income trend value equal to half of the real income of the United Kingdom in
1800, a trend value of growth rate of income equal to 3%, and sustained for at least 20 years after the point of takeoff. All estimates of coefficients and standard
errors are in thousandths. The estimation method is a fixed effects two-step generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is
instrumented by time indicator variables for every five year period, that is the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the instruments. The
optimal weighting matrix (the inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated
using the Newey-West kernel with bandwidth automatically selected using the Newey and West (1994) procedure. Significance levels are given by asterisks
where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita growth due to the individual effects.
Democratic capital (Dcap) is calculated by first adding 10 to the (“Full Scale”) Polity2 index (𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, “Positive Democracy Index” in the text and then
calculating a running sum at a fixed depreciation rate (𝜌). That is Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 , where 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time indicators
respectively. For democratic capital of the “Binary Index” we replace the “Full Scale Index” with a dummy indicator variable equal to 1 for all strictly positive
values of polity2 and 0 otherwise. The specific democratic capital used in the estimation was obtained from paper 2 in this dissertation. It assumes a depreciation
rate of 4% and initial democratic capital of approximately a quarter of the maximum possible. Relative age is calculated as the ratio of the age of a country in the
data (i.e., the number of years since the first observation in the data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to the steady state of democratic
capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions of perfect democracy index for each year and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in democratic capital. The
errors are assumed to be normal, identical and independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log likelihood calculations.
Source. Democratic capital (calculated by the author using the Polity2 Index) and Regime Durability are from Polity IV (version 2011).
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Table 28
Democratic Capital, Income Growth around Takeoff – Average Growth Criteria
Democratic Capital Index Type
Full Scale Index
Binary Indicator
Period around Takeoff
Before Takeoff After Takeoff Before Takeoff After Takeoff
Democratic Capital(Dcap)
-0.462
0.002
4.690
-0.301
(0.285)
(16.100)
(5.200)
(1.210)
Regime Durability
0.337
-0.044
-0.856
-0.147
(0.645)
(0.048)
(0.589)
(0.212)
Relative Age
0.143
-0.050*
0.039
-0.050
(0.090)
(0.029)
(0.059)
(0.031)
Average Growth
4.660
-1.670**
-54.60**
0.073
(23.200)
(0.785)
(23.300)
(5.420)
Lagged Income
-261.000
-11.100***
195.000
-25.200
(188.000)
(3.380)
(188.000)
(48.600)
Trend
3.030
0.300***
-3.210
0.684
(2.330)
(0.058)
(2.810)
(1.170)
Constant(𝛂)
1288.000
782.000*** -704.000
105.000
(876.000)
(15.700)
(773.000)
(120.000)
Observations
304.000
3917.000
248.000
3201.000
Hansen's J-Stat p-value
0.181
0.074
0.666
0.156
Akaike's Information Criteria
-556.800
-11549.000
-426.400
-9329.000
Log Likelihood
300.400
5831.000
231.200
4714.000
Rho
0.206
0.146
0.199
0.160
NOTE. The table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of the
equation, Income Growthi,𝑡 = α + Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income Growth is growth
of per capita income, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic capital, 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients on
𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown in the first column after the fourth row in the table. 𝜸 is the intercept term
associated with 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. Each model shows the
estimates for countries that have taken off into industrial growth divided into periods before and after the takeoff
event and further grouped into types of democracy indexes on which democratic capital is calculated. The criteria
for takeoff into industrial growth examines whether countries achieve Sweden’s average income growth profile
around the 1810-1830 period when the country is considered to have taken off into industrial growth. A country
has taken off into industrial growth, if it experiences a 20-year average income growth of 0.02% sustained for at
least 15 years. It must also have an overall positive trend in income growth over its entire economic history within
the dataset. All estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. The estimation method is a fixed
effects two-step generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time
indicator variables for every five year period, that is the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are
the instruments. The optimal weighting matrix (the inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix
(heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated using the Newey-West kernel with bandwidth
automatically selected using the Newey and West (1994) procedure. Significance levels are given by asterisks
where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01. Rho is the proportion of variance of income
per capita due to the individual effects. Democratic capital (Dcap) is calculated by first adding 10 to the (“Full
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Scale”) Polity2 index (𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, “Positive Democracy Index” in the text and then calculating a running sum at a
fixed depreciation rate (𝜌). That is, Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 − ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 , where 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time
indicators, respectively. For democratic capital of the “Binary Index” we replace the “Full Scale Index” with a
dummy variable equal to 1 for all strictly positive values of polity2 and 0 otherwise. The specific democratic
capital used in the estimation was obtained from Chapter 2 in this dissertation. It assumes a depreciation rate of 4%
and initial democratic capital of approximately a quarter of the maximum possible value. Relative age is calculated
as the ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number of years since the first observation in the data) to the
number of years it will take for a country to get to the steady state of democratic capital (to four decimal places)
under the conditions of perfect democracy index for each year and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in democratic
capital. The errors are assumed to be normal, identical and independently distributed with mean zero and constant
variance for the purpose of log likelihood calculations. All calculations are by the author. Source. Democratic
capital (calculated by the author using the Polity2 Index) and Regime Durability are from Polity IV (version 2011).
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sign is, however, different depending on the underlying index used. Moreover, the estimates are
not statistically significant.
Using the income and income growth trends framework criteria for takeoff (Table 29),
the change of signs in the estimates disappear altogether, and the estimates continue to be
statistically nonsignificant. In fact, the patterns in the estimate of the other variables also break
down. Lagged income levels are mostly negative as predicted by the convergence theory, but the
estimates are not statistically significant either. Most of the variables do not show any statistical
significance at all.
Test for Structural Break
With regard to incomes, and using both framework96 criteria for takeoff into industrial
growth, we reject the null97 of the test for structural change with very high level of statistical
significance for both constructions of democratic capital (i.e., democratic capital based on the
full scale positive and the binary democracy indexes). However, in regard to income growth, we
fail to reject the null that the coefficients on democratic capital show no systematic difference
between the periods before and after takeoff into industrial growth in all but one specification
(Table 30). This is true for both types of indexes (full scale and binary) on which democratic
capital is built.

96

That is, the average income growth criteria and the income and income growth trends criteria for takeoff into
industrial growth.
97
The null is that there is no systematic difference in the coefficients between the two periods: before and after
takeoff into industrial growth.
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Table 29
Democratic Capital, Income Growth around Takeoff –
Income and Average Growth Trends Criteria
Democracy Index
Period Around Takeoff
Democratic Capital(Dcap)

Full Scale Index
Before Takeoff After Takeoff
0.100
0.029
(0.227)
(0.031)
Regime Durability
0.189
-0.028
(0.406)
(0.068)
Relative Age
0.047
-0.025
(0.240)
(0.036)
Lagged Average Growth
-13.400
1.620
(14.300)
(1.870)
Lagged Income
-22.800
-26.000
(62.200)
(18.300)
Trend
1.530
0.463
(1.360)
(0.410)
Constant(𝛂)
64.000
(59.200)
Observations
242.000
5634.000
Hansen's J-Stat P-value
0.543
0.644
Akaike's Information Criteria
-711.500
-16617.000
Log Likelihood
361.800
8397.000
Rho
0.861
0.206

Binary Index
Before Takeoff After Takeoff
0.937
1.050
(2.190)
(0.814)
0.104
0.093
(0.200)
(0.129)
-0.286
-0.012
(0.201)
(0.025)
-33.800***
-0.282
(11.500)
(2.270)
-61.000
1.590
(69.600)
(22.300)
1.120
-0.223
(1.370)
(0.572)
4.660
(56.400)
154.000
4637.000
0.427
0.798
-435.300
-13520.000
223.600
6840.000
0.430
0.245

Note. The table shows the estimates and standard errors of a fixed effects (unbalanced) panel estimation of the
equation, Income Growthi,𝑡 = α + Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income Growth is growth
of per capita income, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the coefficient on democratic capital, 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients on
𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown in the first column after the fourth row in the table. 𝜸 is the intercept term
associated with 𝑃𝑖 , (dummy variables for countries) and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. Each model shows the
estimates for countries that have taken off into industrial growth divided into periods before and after the takeoff
event and further grouped into types of democracy indexes on which democratic capital is calculated. The criteria
for takeoff into industrial growth examines whether countries achieve Sweden’s income and income growth trends
around the 1810-1830 period when the country is considered to have taken off into industrial growth. The Income
and Income Growth Trends framework criteria, requires a country to experience an income trend value equal to
half of the real income of the United Kingdom in 1800, a trend value of growth rate of income equal to 3%, and
sustained for at least 20 years after the point of takeoff. The trend values are obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter. All estimates of coefficients and standard errors are in thousandths. The estimation method is a fixed effects
two-step generalized method of moments approach (GMM), in which time trend is instrumented by time indicator
variables for every five year period, that is the moment conditions are: 𝐸[𝒁′(𝐲 − 𝐗𝛃)] = 0 where Z are the
instruments. The optimal weighting matrix (the inverse of the S matrix) is used in the estimation. The S matrix
(heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) is estimated using the Newey-West kernel with bandwidth
automatically selected using the Newey and West (1994) procedure. Significance levels are given by asterisks
where *= p-value <0.1, **= p-value <0.05, and ***= p-value <0.01.
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Rho is the proportion of variance of income per capita due to the individual effects. Democratic capital (Dcap) is
calculated by first adding 10 to the (“Full Scale”) Polity2 index (𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, “Positive Democracy Index” in the text
and then calculating a running sum at a fixed depreciation rate (𝜌). That is Dcapi,𝑡 = 𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + (1 −
ρ)DCap i,𝑡−1 , where 𝑖 and 𝑡, are country and time indicators respectively. For democratic capital of the “Binary
Index” we replace the “Full Scale Index” with a dummy variable equal to 1 for all strictly positive values of polity2
and 0 otherwise. The specific democratic capital used in the estimation was obtained from paper 2 in this
dissertation. It assumes a depreciation rate of 4% and initial democratic capital of approximately a quarter of the
maximum possible value. Relative age is calculated as the ratio of the age of a country in the data (i.e., the number
of years since the first observation in the data) to the number of years it will take for a country to get to the steady
state of democratic capital (to four decimal places) under the conditions of perfect democracy index for each year
and a minimal 1% depreciation rate in democratic capital. The errors are assumed to be normal, identical and
independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance for the purpose of log likelihood calculations. All
calculations are by the author. Source. Democratic capital (calculated by the author using the Polity2 Index) and
Regime Durability are from Polity IV (version 2011).

Table 30
Test for Structural Breaks around Takeoff into Industrial Growth
Takeoff Criteria
Democratic Capital
Full Scale Index
Binary Index
Full Scale Index
Binary Index

Average Growth Criteria
Income
Income Growth
Panel
Gmm Estimation Panel Estimation
Gmm
Estimation
Estimation
0.0000
0.0016
0.1213
0.2068
0.0149
0.0000
0.6818
0.7892
Income and Average Growth Trends Criteria
0.0000
0.0000
0.8327
0.1290
0.0000
0.0000
0.4728
0.4791

Note. – The table shows P-values for the likelihood ratio test of the equality of estimates of the coefficients on
democratic capital before and after the takeoff into industrial growth (test for structural breaks) for both the Sweden
Takeoff Criteria and the Income and Income Growth Trends Criteria. The original estimation equation is
Income(Growth)i,𝑡 = α + Dcapi,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏1 + 𝐗 i,𝑡−1 𝛃 + 𝑃𝑖 𝜸 + Dcap2i,t−1 (𝐷0 , 𝜌)𝑏21 + 𝐗𝟐 i,𝑡−1 𝛃𝟐 + 𝑃2𝑖 𝜸𝟐 +
G2 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where Income (Growth) is log (differenced log) of per capita income, α is the constant, 𝑏1 is the
coefficient on democratic capital, 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients on 𝐗, a matrix of control variables shown in tables 310 above. The additional variables with the number 2 are interaction terms with dummy variables representing data
after the takeoff into industrial growth. G2 is the dummy for the period after the takeoff into industrial growth. The
coefficients 𝑏21 , 𝛃𝟐, and 𝜸𝟐, by construction represent the difference in estimates between the period before and
after the takeoff into industrial growth. We test whether this is equal to zero.
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Discussion
Clearly, all tests about the relationship between democratic capital and income around the
takeoff into industrial growth, as detailed above, show that the relationship changes. Average
democratic capital increases at all income levels after takeoff. The rate of change in democratic
capital also speeds up after takeoff. The proportion of countries that have taken off but which
experience lower levels of democracy falls the further away we move from their points of takeoff
into industrial growth. Finally statistical tests (fixed effects panel regression) and tests for
structural breaks confirm the change in the relationship after takeoff. These results, however, do
not extend to GDP per capita growth. Higher average democracy indexes do not correspond to
higher growth rates, and the pattern of correlation between democratic capital and income
growth is not consistent. The estimates seem to depend on the estimation sample.
The results confirm the findings of Gerring et al. (2005) that, overall, democratic capital
is positively correlated with income. Consistent with Boix and Stokes (2003), Inglehart and
Welzel (2005) and Epstein et al. (2006) and contrary to one aspect of Przeworski and Limongi
(1997),98 we find that there is indeed a connection between rising incomes and the push for
political reforms. That the change is not correlated with income growth may be related to our
data size, especially in relation to the period before takeoff into industrial growth. On the other
hand, it may point to the fact that the driving force for political reforms towards more democracy
is the rising incomes of citizens and the growing concern for an effective mechanism for the

98

Przeworski et al. (1997) do not find increasing probability of democratization with income. However, they find
increased survival of democracy with increased income, a finding we confirm below and illustrate in Figure 9.
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peaceful distribution of income among the population. Thus, reforms made as a response to
increasing incomes may have a feedback effect towards higher incomes. This may be another
reason why the study of the relationship between democracy and incomes and income growth
sometimes yields conflicting results.
The negative correlation between democratic capital and incomes before takeoff is
indicative of the fact that economic growth took precedence over regime type during that period
in the history of industrialized countries. However, after the takeoff into industrial growth,
regime type (how policy makers are chosen and how they rule) becomes more prominent in the
concerns of citizens and these countries moved towards political liberalization.
That the extent and trends of the effect of takeoff on democratization varies with income
categories (Figure 10 and Figure 12) is a further indication that the takeoff event is what may be
significant to the democratization process. Relatively poor countries (Figure 10, category 0)
have lower democracy indexes, but nevertheless still experience positive change in democracy
indexes and democratic capital after takeoff, as is the case for wealthier ones (category 3). The
trend towards higher democratization is also different for the categories of income. Poorer
countries experience some reversals in rate democratization (Figure 12, category 0) closer to the
takeoff event, which confirms Przeworski (1997) that higher incomes make the survival of
democracy more likely. In contrast, wealthier countries experience a monotonic trend towards
greater democratization. A common trend, however, is that the further away from the point of
takeoff, the greater the difference between before and after measures of democracy (indexes,
totals, and democratic capital, Figure 10).
A clear implication of these results is that as citizens move away from basic survival
needs, have access to greater incomes, higher levels of education, and the expectation of
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continued growth in their welfare, they become more interested in issues relating to the
mechanism for distribution of resources in the economy. Political reforms allowing greater
participation in policy making and the distribution of resources is the next natural step. The
pressure for reforms may become more acute if (perhaps one can even say, when) after the initial
takeoff into industrial growth, the economies of the countries involved experience some
economic reversals. In poorer countries this may lead to the reversals in democratization.
Whether this type of reversals in democratic liberalization is due to lower incomes or lower
democratic capital at their points of takeoff is a question for further investigations.
The economic history of Britain (where the Industrial Revolution started) is an
illustration of the findings of this study. Between 1800 and 1830—that is, after the initial takeoff
into industrial growth average—economic growth fell. Not surprisingly during this period, the
clamor for reforms grew louder until Parliament enacted the Great Reform of 1832,99 which
allowed more representation for the peasantry and the new and increasingly influential middle
class. Similarly, all the Asian Tiger countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South
Korea) experienced rapid growth during the period between the early part of the 60s and the
1990s under dictatorships. By the end of this period of rapid growth, however, the long-serving
dictators in each of these countries had either been forced out of office by protesters or lost
elections to opposition parties followed by a period of political liberalization.
This thesis also provides grounds for a bold prediction about China: that when the
economic miracle of the last 30 years (an average annual growth rate of about 10%) can no
longer be sustained, the pressure for political reform will grow stronger, perhaps even

99

The actual short title is “Representation of the People Act 1832 (2 & 3 Wm. IV, c. 45).”
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irresistibly, and will likely result in liberalization of the political space in order to preserve the
economic gains already achieved. The alternative to reform is to risk social unrest, which
potentially could reverse the gains towards higher incomes for everyone.
Conclusion and Further Research
Our research has shown that there is a change in the relationship between income and
democratic capital around the event of takeoff into industrial growth. We have also seen that this
change is with respect to income and not necessarily in relation to annual income growth. A
natural extension of these results will be to investigate what the exact channels of
democratization are, more especially to confirm whether it may be driven by income inequality,
that is to say, after takeoff into industrial growth. Unfortunately, inequality data for the modern
period (since 1950) is notoriously unavailable and/or inconsistent among the various sources.
Historical measures would be even more problematic. Some work100 in this area has been done,
but none so far around the issue of takeoff into industrial growth. Further theoretical work may
provide some insights into the issue.
One of the arguments for a negative effect of democracy on growth101 is the possibility
that under democracy citizens will be shortsighted, preferring consumption over investment. It is
therefore natural to investigate whether increasing rate of accumulation in democratic capital
leads to a slowing down of income growth rate after the takeoff into industrial growth.
In relation to income growth, the estimates on democratic capital were of different signs
depending on the type of underlying index used. The estimates for democratic capital based on

100

See Acemoglu (2009), Chapter 23, quoted above, for a brief survey.
See Knutsen, Carl (2012) for a survey of the arguments for and against democracy being a positive factor for
economic growth.
101
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binary indexes are more likely to be positive (albeit statistically nonsignificant), while those
based on the full scale positive index are negative. The binary index based democratic capital
captures accumulation of the presence or absence of democracy. The full scale positive index
democratic capital highlights the extent and depth of democratic practices. It may be that the
estimates are merely sensitive to the sample. On the other hand, this difference in fit may
indicate the possibility of a more complex relationship between rising incomes and democracy:
that the effect of democracy in relation to growth is to be found more in the qualitative difference
between democracy and autocracy, not in the extent and depth of democracy.
Our overall study has also shown that the initial democratic capital and depreciation rates
matter. The values we used were estimated, but the lack of reliable historical data highlights the
need for more investigation into regime characteristics as far back as possible. The better the
dataset, the more confidence one can have in the results of our estimation and the implications
they have for policy.
Finally, our study showed that for some countries, the accumulation of democratic capital
slows down in some intermediate period after the takeoff into industrial growth. Some
studies102 have found that levels of income play a role in the survival of democracy, but our
study opens up a new question: Is the level of democratic capital at the point of takeoff a factor
in the breakdown of democracy afterwards? This may also be another avenue for future
investigation.

102

Przeworski et al. (1997), for example.
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Table 31
Number of Years to Maximum Democratic Capital
Calculation of Maximum (Steady State) Democratic Capital
Maximum (To four,
Democratic capital
decimal points)
(depreciation rate)
99.99064
1%
24.99987
6%

Number of Periods
(years) to Maximum
924 years
300 years

Note–Calculations by the author. Source – Dataset from Polity IV Project Augmented with
Freedom House and Tatu Vanhanen datasets.
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Figure 15: Positive (0, 1) Democratic Capital for Four Countries
NOTE – US =United States; UK=United Kingdom; Calculations by author. Source. – Polity IV Project Dataset,
version 2011.

Figure 16: United States Democracy index and Democratic Capital, 1850-1910
Note– Dem=Democratic capital; St. State = Steady State or Maximum Democratic capital; Proximity to Steady State
Calculated as a ratio of current democratic capital to maximum possible democratic capital; calculations by author.
Source – Polity IV from Polity IV Project Dataset(Polity2 Variable), version 2011; Polyarchy Dataset by Tatu
Vanhanen, version 2010.
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Figure 17: Democratic Capital - Uruguay
Note. PT=Persson and Tabellini (2009); Positive = Positive (0, 1) Democratic Capital; Exponential = Exponential
Democratic Capital; All calculations are based on a running sum, with the most recent sum depreciated by 1%;
Calculations by author; Source. Polity IV from Polity IV Project Dataset (Polity2 Variable), version 2011.

Figure 18: Population and Income Weighted World Polity2 Trends
Note. – Calculations by author. Source. – Polity2 from Polity IV Project, version 2011.
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Figure 19: Median World Polity2 Trend
Note. – Calculations by author; Source. – Polity IV Project (Polity2 Variable), version 2011.
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COUNTRY DEMOCRATIC CAPITAL CALCULATIONS
1. For countries for which observations on democracy index exists for shorter or longer period
than their total histories the following principles are applied to their calculation of democratic
capital.
a. If newly independent countries were part of an older sovereign entity and contiguous
with it,
i. When one country divides up in to several countries having had contiguous
borders with the new states, then we assign the assign the democratic capital
of the older sovereign state up to the point of independence to the newer,
smaller state (Note, however, that we will treat the starting income as the
income of the first year of independence, since we are tracing how the
evolution affects income and income growth over time). Examples:
1. Yugoslavia: 1921-1991 to progressive breakup starting 1991. Its
democratic capital in 1991 will be assigned to:
a. Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-Present)
b. Croatia (1991-Present)
c. Slovenia (1991-Present)
d. Macedonia (1991-Present)
e. Serbia and Montenegro (27th April 1992-5th June 2006)
f. Kosovo – We drop Kosovo since it has existed only since
2008.
2. Serbia and Montenegro: from Yugoslavia (1992-2006); its democratic
capital in 2006 will be assigned to:
a. Serbia (2006-Present – from Serbia (1878), absorbed into
Yugoslavia 1918 (1921), then Serbia and Montenegro 19922006, and 2006 to present Serbia)
b. Montenegro (independent State from 1878-1921/22), then
absorbed into Yugoslavia until 1992 (part of Serbia and
Montenegro) then independent again (2006-Present)
3. Czechoslovakia (1918-1992); its democratic capital in 1992 will be
assigned to:
a. Czech Republic (1993-Present)
b. Slovak Republic (1993-Present)
4. USSR (1922-1991); its democratic capital will be assigned in 1991:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
b. If a country was under the domination of another country but was not contiguous with
it, we calculate its democratic capital from the first index in the year of independence.
i. The two Koreas will be treated thus:
a. North Korea (1948-Present)
b. South Korea (1948-Present)
c. Note that we do not have data on the united Korea before 1948.
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ii. Pakistan (1947-Present):
a. Pakistan (1972-Present) will be continuous with Pakistan 1947
since it was the dominant country with reference to
Bangladesh. It has a continuous history of democracy indexes
even while under British rule.
b. Bangladesh (Formerly East Pakistan - Independent in 1971)
was geographically separate from Pakistan and was generally
neglected by the ruling power – Pakistan, a situation that led to
the clamor for independence. Its democratic capital will not be
grandfathered from Pakistan.
c. If two or more sovereign states unite to form one larger one,
1. The new state is assumed to be a continuance of the older dominant
state before the merger and is assigned the democratic capital of the
older dominant state at the point of merger (e.g., Germany is
considered to be a continuation of West Germany after East Germany
got absorbed by West Germany. Examples:
a. Prussia – expanded to become Germany after smaller states
are absorbed in the 19th century.
b. North Vietnam absorbed South Vietnam
c. North Yemen absorbed South Yemen
2. The smaller states which are absorbed are then assigned their unique
democratic capital from their start to the end of their existence when
they get absorbed. These smaller states will be dropped if there are no
economic data for them for which we could do analysis. Examples:
a. 20th century: South Vietnam, South Yemen
b. 19th century, Baden, Bavaria and Saxony, Wuerttemburg,
which all got absorbed into Germany
c. Parma, Tuscany, Two Sicilies, Sardinia were all minor
players in the region of Italy that were absorbed by the Papal
States
d. We keep the Papal States separate from Italy, however,
because Italy (according to Polity IV) existed alongside Papal
States even though other sources say Papal States were
dominant and led in the absorption of others.
For the smaller states which ceased to exist, if there is economic data for analysis, we might
control for democratic capital effect on income and growth by taking the income at the start and
close of their history as controls. (Example: Monaco; see below).
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MISSING OBSERVATIONS
1. Freedom House is my substitute democracy index of choice when Polity IV values are
not available. I use Vanhanen only if
a. Freedom House values are not available, e.g. pre - 1972 (which is when the first
annual democracy index of Freedom House data was published), and if
b. I cannot estimate the missing Polity IV values that are consistent with the specific
Polity IV data series and given the historical information on the country at the
time when the breaks in data are observed (see 4 f below). We prefer to use our
own interpolation of Polity2 variables rather than use Vanhanen's dataset in
certain instances, because Vanhanen's indexes are based on election results, and in
most of these cases, there are gaps when there were no elections. Under such
situations the attempt to calculate an index based on election and participation
indicators may not be any better than simple interpolations.
2. Expanded polity4 dataset,
a. Where Polity IV is absent (for example, for countries with population less than
half a million people), we choose the data from Freedom House, specifically the
index of Political Rights (PR). When Freedom House data is not available we
seek to fill in the blanks after a study of the history of the country and the trends
in the Polity IV data around the breaks. When we cannot fill in missing data using
the history or the trends apparent in the data series data, we used Vanhanen’s
Index of Democracy (for example, Barbados, 1967-1972, Afghanistan 19791988).
b. If there is a trend in the data surrounding the breaks in observations, we used a
software package such as R to fill in missing data. In every case we prefer a
software completed sequence to the Vanhanen values because the Vanhanen
measures of democracy are conceptually more distant from the Polity IV
measures.
c. Why choose Political index of Freedom House instead of Vanhanen?
i. The Polity IV index is conceptually closest to Freedom House’s Political
Rights than to the Civil Liberties index itself, a conceptually closer
quantity to Polity IV measures than the Vanhanen index.
ii. It is more inconvenient mathematically to convert from Vanhanen (a
percentage measure) to Polity IV measures (a 20-point scale): the
Vanhanen scale is highly non-linear.
d. Why prefer Political index of Freedom House instead of an average of Civil
Liberties and Political Rights?
i. The civil liberties index captures far more than concepts that are central to
democracy– fair elections, participation, accountability to citizens, and the
rights of citizens to form parties, affect political outcomes and influence
policies.
ii. Civil liberties deal with other periphery issues such as economic freedom,
rule of law, practice of journalism etc.
e. Rules for Conversion:
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i. When Polity IV values are absent we choose Freedom house values as a
replacement after conversion. When Freedom House observations are not
available, we use a reading of history to fill the gap by a simple smoothing
function. The conversion follows the following formulae (see Table 32):
ii. Freedom house (FH):
Table 32
Conversion Framework – Freedom House to Polity2
Freedom
House
Polity IV

iii.
iv.

v.

vi.

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

-10 -6.6667 -3.3333 0 3.3333 6.6667 10

1. (xtreg) Predicted Values Polity2 = 14.86234,-2.39779 * FH(PR_1)
2. (xtreg) Predicted Values Polity2 = 14.86139 -2.39755 * FH(PR_1)
Vanhanen: Polity2 = -7.9201 + 2.7003*SQRT(F2364)
The Vanhanen formula is arrived at by seeking the best fit model through
linear least squares estimation. It is the conversion method among other
forms we tried that best fits the distribution of the Polity IV series in terms
of mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis for any randomly selected year.
Missing Values in all datasets fill-in Rules: Our rules of replacement are
informed by a reading of the historical background within the countries at
the times for which the observations are missing. In some cases it is the
result of war (Europe, 1939-1945); in other cases it is the result of internal
reorganization in the institution gathering the data (Freedom House,
1989); and in some cases it is an interruption of sovereign rule (Dominican
Republic, 1916-1924). As a general rule these missing observations are
obtained by a smoothing function between the boundaries of the missing
observations, i.e., mean or a linear sequence of steps from one boundary
observation to the other.
For missing values for a single year in all datasets (for Freedom House
- 1989, Polity IV and Vanhanen datasets), I take the simple average of the
observations of the years before and after the gap in the data . Examples:
Freedom House
1. Antigua and Barbuda
2. Bahamas
3. Barbados
4. Belize
5. Brunei
6. Grenada
7. Iceland
8. Saint Kitts
9. Saint Lucia
10. Saint Vincent
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11. Samoa West
12. Sao Tome
13. Seychelles
14. Suriname
15. Tuvalu
16. Vanuatu
Polity IV
1. Austria (1806)
2. East Germany (1990)
3. Germany (1945)
4. Honduras (1907, 1912, 1919, 1924)
5. Hungary (1956)
6. Kuwait (1990)
7. Portugal (1801)
8. Romania (1916)
9. Thailand (1949)
vii. When there is a multi-year gap and there is no clear trend in the values
on either side of the gap,
1. If the data is available in Freedom House, we use the Freedom
House index after conversion. Examples:
a. Afghanistan (1979-1988, 2001- 2010)
b. Andorra (1993-2010)
c. Antigua and Barbuda (1981-2010)
d. Bahamas (1973-2010)
e. Barbados (1972-2010)
f. Belize (1981-2010)
g. Bosnia (1995-2010)
h. Brunei (1985-2010)
i. Cambodia (1979-1987)
j. Dominica (1978-2010)
k. East Timor (1999-2001)
l. Grenada (1974-2010)
m. Iceland (1972-2010)
n. Iraq (2003-2009)
o. Kiribati (1979-2010)
p. Maldives (1972-2010)
q. Malta (1972-2010)
r. Marshall Islands (1991-2010)
s. Micronesia (1991-2010)
t. Monaco (1972-1976, 1993-2010)
u. Nauru (1972-2010)
v. Palau (1994-2010)
2. If there is a multi-year break in the data, and Freedom House
data is not available (for example, pre-1972) and with or
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without a trend on either side of the break in data, we replicate
the (Polity IV) trend in integer steps of the index going from the
earlier boundary value to arrive at the later boundary for which
there are values. Examples:
Without a Trend
i. Some missing gaps show a flat (or no) trend on
either side, and we use the average of the 3-5
observations on either side of the break in the data.
Examples:
ii. Serbia (1915-1916) [ 4, 4 ], (1813-1814), [-10, -10]
iii. Saxony (1848), [,-8],
iv. Portugal (1807- 1809, p-IV) [-10.0, -10, -10]
information from Tatu Vanhanen from 1810
onward, flat before that.
v. Belgium (1939-1943)
vi. China (1937-1949)
vii. Ethiopia (1936-1941)
viii. Netherlands (1940-1944)
ix. Nicaragua (1926- 1927)
x. Norway (1940-1943)
xi. Prussia (1806-1812), renamed “Germany”
xii. Saxony (1814-1815)
xiii. Serbia (1915-1916)
xiv. Spain (1808-1809 p-IV) [-10, -10]
3. With a Trend: If there is a multi-year break in the data, and
neither Freedom House nor Vanhanen data is available and if
there is a trend, we proceed to fill in the gaps in the data in equal
steps between the endpoints of the gaps in the data. Examples:
a. Andorra (1972-1992, p-IV) [4.000,4.125, 4.250, 4.375,
4.500, 4.625, 4.750, 4.875, 5.000, 5.125, 5.250,
5.375,5.500,5.625,5.750, 5.875, 6.000]
b. Estonia (1918, [ 8, 9, 10]
c. Haiti (1915-1917, p-IV) – [-3.00,-1.75, -0.50,0.75, 2.00]
d. Hungary (1943-1944, p-IV) [ -1, -1.5, -2]
e. Liechtenstein (1977-1991, FH). [4,
4.1875,4.3750,4.5625,4.7500, 4.9375,
5.1250,5.3125,5.5000,5.6875, 5.8750,
6.0625,6.2500,6.4375,6.6250, 6.8125, 7.0000]
f. Luxemburg (1940-1941, Tatu Vanhanen) ‘seq’ r
[26.20000 27.18333 28.16667 29.15000 30.13333
31.11667 32.10000]
g. Monaco (1977-1992; FH, democratic throughout), ‘seq’ in
R [4.0000, 4.117647, 4.235294, 4.352941, 4.470588,
4.588235, 4.705882, 4.823529, 4.941176, 5.058824,
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5.176471,5.294118, 5.411765, 5.529412,5.647059,
5.764706, 5.882353, 6.000]
h. Philippines (1941-1943) ‘seq’ r – [5, 4, 3, 2]
i. Sao Tome (1988-1990, FH) [ 2, 2.5, 3]
j. Singapore (1963-1964) [7,4, 1, -2]
k. Syria (1958-1960, p-IV), [ 7,4.75, 2.5, 0.25, -2]
l. Turkey (1918-1921) [ -1, -0.8, -0.6, -0.4, -0.2, 0]
viii. If Polity IV and Freedom House data are not available and the break
in observations cannot be easily fitted under the preceding rules, we
used Tatu Vanhanen data, converting it to Polity IV by the formula given
above. Examples:
a. Barbados (1967-1971)
b. Burma (Myanmar 1947-1971)
c. Greece (1916-1919)
d. Iceland (1944-1971)
e. Japan (1945-1951)
f. Luxemburg (1867-1971)
g. Maldives (1965-1971)
h. Malta (1964-1971)
i. South Vietnam (1965-1972)
ix. In some cases, we used the Vanhanen data to discover the trend in
democracy index and input the trend into the Polity IV dataset where the
Polity IV values are absent. If, for example, the Vanhanen data shows the
same values over the interval where there is a break in the Polity IV
dataset, we assign the same Polity IV value to those periods where the
Polity IV data is absent. Examples:
1. China (1860-1861)
2. East Germany (1945-1949, where the ending value [1950] of
Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy, 0.3, corresponds to the Polity IV
value of –7. Thus we assign –7 to all the preceding years of East
Germany’s existence to a democratic value (Polity IV) of –7.
3. Country Histories – (These are mostly additions to Polity IV countries)
a. Andorra became a parliamentary democracy (1993)
b. Antigua and Barbuda got independence (1981)
c. Bahamas became independent (1973)
d. Bangladesh (1971, Independence, West Pakistan)
e. Barbados (1966, independence, UK)
f. Dominica (1978, independence: UK)
g. Grenada became independent (1975)
h. Cape Verde Independence from Portugal (1975)
i. Kiribati (1979)
j. Vanuatu independence (1980)
k. Tuvalu Independence (1978)
l. Monaco (centuries old; current constitution 1962, modified 2002, UN 1993)
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m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
r.
s.
t.
u.

v.
w.
x.

y.

Nauru (1968)
Suriname (1975)
San Marina (1992 – the date it became a member of the UN)
Saint Vincent (1979)
Saint Lucia (1979)
Saint Kitts (1983)
Seychelles, independence (1976)
Sao Tome, independence (1975)
Tonga (native monarch since 1900, joined commonwealth 1970, UN 1999, 1st
dataset, 1972 FH. This is a difficult case. It is supposed to have some form of
democracy before the 1972 date, but no records are available. We consider it
reasonable to drop this panel.
Palau (1994)
Singapore (1965)
Countries with earlier independence than before data became available:
i. Tonga (joined commonwealth 1970; data – 1972 [FH])
ii. Nauru (gained independence in 1968; data – 1972 [FH])
iii. Micronesia (independence 1979; data start 1991 [FH, Vanhanen])
iv. Marshall Islands (independence 1986; data start 1991 [FH, Vanhanen])
We take Germany as being continuous from Old Germany, through East and West
Germany, and finally Germany; Old Germany assigned –9 in 1945.

4. Number of countries before expansion: 153, after expansion: 194 (diff = 41, or
26.79739%)
5. Number of observations of Polity IV before expansion: 16046, after expansion: 17271
(diff = 1225 or 7.634301%)
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APPENDIX E
COUNTRY HISTORICAL NOTES
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Country Historical Notes
1. Germany
a. Baden was established in 1803-06 (Wikipedia), and then was sovereign until
1871 when it joined the German empire. If we can find income values for it 50
years before it became Germany we will use it; otherwise we will have to drop it.
We consider it as represented within the one Germany. We will drop this country
for the purposes of estimation
b. Bavaria We consider it as represented within the one Germany. There are no
reliable income estimates for income in the historical data. Approximations by
Maddison may not be useful enough for our purposes.
c. Wuerttemburg (1800-1871) Another smaller state that got absorbed into the
German state. We will assume it to be independent and use it if we can find
economic data on it. Economic data generally unavailable.
d. Germany: We take Germany as Germany, then Federal Republic of Germany
(i.e., West Germany), and then Germany again.
e. East Germany Will be treated as a separate entity from start to finish. We take
its democratic capital at the time of creation as that of the older Germany.
f. Saxony (1806-1870) Formerly independent and the non-dominant state which
became part of Germany. Will consider independent and unless economic data is
available—and there is not much usable economic data—it will be discarded.
g. Prussia (1800-1867) The dominant state in the pre-Germany German states. We
take Germany as a continuation of Prussia.
2. Italy
a. Papal States (1815-1870) We take the Papal States to be independent and
discard it unless there is data for it. Italy will be considered the continuous
political region for the area as indeed Polity IV recognizes.
b. Parma (1815-1860) Former minor state that was concatenated into Italy.
c. Sardinia (1815-1861) An island off the coast of Italy that was independent before
becoming Italian in 1861; since it was not the dominant pre-Italy state, we take it
as independent and use its democracy index if there is other economic data on it.
d. Tuscany (1815-1860) Not being the dominant kingdom before Italy proper, we
will treat it as independent short-lived entity, which we will use in our analysis
only if there is adequate economic data for it.
e. Two Sicilies (1815-1860) Pre- Italy states which were absorbed by the dominant
Sardinia which eventually, together with the Papal States, became Italy.
3. Cyprus (1960 independence UK) A divided island; old Cyprus, which is recognized by
the world, is used going forward).

185

4. Estonia (1939-1991) was independent state from 1920 – 1939 after which it was under
Soviet occupation until 1991. Estonia’s democracy indexes will be equal to that of the
Soviet Union during the years between 1939 and 1991.
5. Georgia (1921-1991) USSR took over in 1921; it regained independence in 1991; we
give it USSR democracy index from 1921 to 1991 and then use its index for democracy
from 1992 onward.
6. Orange Free State: (1854-1902) Initially a sovereign state, now within South Africa. If
records are available for it in terms of income, education, life expectancy, trade, etc., one
could treat it as an independent entity, otherwise drop it.
7. Vietnam, North Vietnam (1955-1975), South Vietnam (1955-1975) We will use
Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Vietnam again for democracy index. Because the North
essentially absorbed South Vietnam through war and its polity is what has continued to
the present (having defeated the U.S. and the South in the Vietnamese war), we will also
take South Vietnam as a short-lived independent country if data is available for it.
8. Korea, North Korea, South Korea (Korea annexed 1910 by Japan; became South
Korea and North Korea 1948) With Korea separated physically from Japan, we will treat
South and North Korea's history as starting from 1948 when they became independent
from Japan. Korea has, however, had a long history (documented 1800-1910) before the
Japanese annexation. Thus, it would be a shame to ignore such significant data. We will
treat Korea as an independent cluster, as there is sufficient economic information for this
during its period of existence.
9. North Yemen and South Yemen, then Yemen: These are two countries that agreed to
come together. There does not seem to have been one dominant country, although North
Yemen gained independence by itself and the South only became independent after the
British withdrew. We will take North Yemen as the dominant polity and ignore South
Yemen.
10. Pakistan and Bangladesh (East Pakistan) East Pakistan broke away from Pakistan in
1971. We start Bangladesh on its own scale since Bangladesh was separated from
Pakistan by thousands of miles of Indian Territory and had been known to be neglected
by the Pakistani controlling power.

